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Note
Union Elections and the LMRDA:
Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse'
Thirteen years ago Congress discovered violence, mismanagement,
and autocratic rule in many American labor unions and responded
by passing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA).' The Act established standards of administration for many
aspects of internal union affairs, including the conduct of officer
elections. Despite passage of the Act, however, allegations of unfair
and fraudulent elections have persisted. The recent campaign of
the late Joseph A. Yablonski to defeat United Mine Worker President
W.A. Boyle, for example, raised charges of discriminatory use of union
resources, intimidation of voters, and manipulation of ballots by the
incumbents. The Yablonski campaign and the ensuing litigation have
served to spotlight the question of whether the LMRDA actually in-
sures honest union elections. It has resulted in a comprehensive in-
vestigation by the Senate Labor Subcommittee into the Mineworkers
election2 and led Senator Robert Griffin, an original sponsor of the
LMRDA, to conclude that the Act has not insured fair elections and
that changes in its structure and enforcement are needed. 3
The LMRDA includes six major sections, only one of which is ad-
dressed specifically to elections, but all of which have some bearing
on the fairness of election procedures. Title I is a Bill of Rights for
union members, specifying voting, nominating, and free speech rights
guaranteed to all members.4 Title II requires the reporting of union
financial information to the Department of Labor (DOL).5 Title III
provides limitations on union trusteeships, devices by which a national
union takes over the operation of its locals or districts.( Title IV in-
cludes specific regulations for the conduct of elections.- Title V im-
* Research was made possible by a grant from the American Bar Foundation.
1. See Declaration of Findings, LMRDA (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 2(b), 29 US.C. §
402(b) (1970).
2. Hearings on the United 1ine Workers' Election Before the Subcomm. on Labor of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Just before
publication of this Note, Boyle's 1969 election victor) was overturned under Title IV
of the LMRDA. N.Y. Times, May 2, 1972, at I, col. 2 (city ed.); id., May 9. 1972, at 12,
col. 3.
3. See N.Y. Times, July 14, 1971, at 12, col. 4.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-40 (1970).
6. 29 US.C. §§ 461-66 (1970).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1970).
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poses fiduciary responsibilities on union officials." Title VI contains
miscellaneous provisions, including authority for the Department of
Labor to investigate any union suspected of violating provisions of
the Act and criminal penalties for any persons who prevent the exer-
cise of LMRDA rights through force or violence. 9 While some LMRDA
guarantees are enforced by court suits brought by private parties, most
of the election provisions of Title IV are enforced by an administra-
tive scheme through which the Secretary of Labor is to bring suit in
federal court to have an election set aside when violations of Title IV
have occurred that "may have affected" the outcome of the election.
Such a suit is to be brought only upon receipt of a complaint by an
aggrieved union member who has invoked the internal appeals mech-
anism of his union and waited at least three months for the union's
response.10
This Note seeks to examine the ways in which the LMRDA, and
particularly Title IV, has functioned with respect to the goal of in-
ternal union democracy. Part I explores the concept of union respon-
siveness and the importance of union officer elections in achieving
this responsiveness. Part II draws on field interviews to delineate
potential obstacles to the conduct of fair elections and analyzes the
extent to which the substantive provisions of the LMRDA deal with
those obstacles. Part III, also drawing on field interviews, describes
the post-election process by which Title IV rights are enforced. Part
IV explores the internal appeals structures of unions, upon which the
LMRDA substantially relies for remedying election abuses. Finally,
Part V argues that the purposes of the statute would be better effectu.
ated by an expansion of the right of union members to obtain judicial
relief before union elections are conducted.
I. Union Democracy
A. The Need for Responsiveness to the Membership
Before the advent of unionism in the United States, individual
workers were largely unable to affect the terms and conditions of their
employment. Through union organization and collective bargaining,
8. 29 US.C. §§ 501-04 (1970).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 521-31 (1970).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
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workers have been able to muster enough strength to gain some con-
trol over important features of their economic life."' The goal of
democratizing the work place cannot, however, be achieved unless the
labor union is responsive to its members' needs and desires:
The effects of unionism are undoubtedly to democratize industrial
management in the sense that autocratic powers of employers are
restricted by rules and regulations negotiated with representa-
tives of the workers .... If labor organizations also exercise auto-
cratic powers over their members, then workers may merely be
substituting dictatorial rule of union officials for the arbitrary
authority of the employer or his managers.12
Democratization of the work place has been important not only as
a matter of political principle, but also as a means of fostering indus-
trial peace. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was premised
on a belief that giving workers a voice in industrial governance would
greatly reduce the number of economically disastrous work stop-
pages.13 It was assumed that workers, by participating through their
union in decisions formerly made by management alone, would be
more likely to obtain the terms and conditions of employment they
desired-and therefore less likely to strike. The goal of labor peace
through industrial democracy is thwarted, however, if autocratic union
11. Collective bargaining in the United States has been historically conceived as more
than an economic device to equalise bargaining power. It has been conceived as an
instrument of industrial democracy. The Industrial Commission of 1893 stated:
'By the organisation of labour, and by no other means, is it possible to introduce
an element of democracy into the government of industry. By this means only can
workers effectively take part in determining the conditions under which they work.'
[Final Report of the Industrial Commission of 1898, at 805 (1902).] Again in 1916 the
United States Commission on Industrial Relations declared: 'The struggle of labour
for organisation is *not merely an attempt to secure an increased measure of the
material comforts of life, but is an age-long struggle for liberty . . . . Even if men
were well fed, they would still struggle to be free.' [Final Report of the United States
Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong. 1st Sess. 62 (1916).]
One of the fundamental purposes of the Wagner Act of 1935, in protecting the right
to organise and bargain collectively, was to give workers a voice in determining the
terms and conditions of employment. Senator Wagner urged its adoption so that,
'We can raise a race of men who are economically as well as politically free.' [75
CoNG. Rc. 4918 (1932).]
Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MOD. L. REv. 273, 275 (1952).
12. W. LmSERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMoc:RAcY 54 (1959).
13. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). reads in
part:
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest which have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . . It is declared to be the policy
of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate those obstructions.
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leadership prevents workers from having an effective voice in union
governance.14
American labor legislation contains provisions designed both to
organize the work place and to assure unions' responsiveness to
their members. Organization is achieved through the recognition
of exclusive bargaining representatives,'a and through the principle
of compulsory unionism'0 as reflected in collective bargaining agree-
ments containing union security clauses.Y7 These devices achieve half
of the goal of industrial democracy: providing workers with enough
power to bargain collectively through their union. National labor
policy, however, would be incomplete if it did not also guarantee
workers some means of controlling their union and its agents-the
union leadership.18 This second feature of industrial democracy was
14. It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic
union elections. Under the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts the
union which is the bargaining representative has powers, in conjunction with tihe
employer, to fix a man's wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The indl.
vidual employee may not lawfully negotiate with his employer. He is bound by the
union contract. In practice, the union also has a significant role in enforcing the
grievance procedure where a man's contract rights are enforced. The Covernnent
which gives unions this power has an obligation to insure that the officials who
wield it are responsive to the desires of the men and women whom they represent.
S. REP. 187 ON S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959).
15. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970);
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
16. Compulsory unionism is a firm tenet of practically all American labor unions,
despite affirmations in some of their constitutions that they are voluntary organiza-
tions, and despite the fact that unions generally look upon themselves as voluntary
in nature.
LEISERSON, supra note 12, at 70-71.
17. Studies indicate that eighty per cent of all employees covered by collective bar.
gaining contracts are subject to such union security clauses. See Union Securily Pro.
visions in Major Union Contracts, 1958-59, 82 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1348, 1349-51 (1959);
BNA LAB. REL. REP. (News and Background Information), 73 L.R.R. 150, 151 (1970).
Union membership may be compulsory under union shop or maintenance of memn-
bership agreements. Union shop agreements include contract clauses which require all
employees as a condition of employment or within 30 days after commencement of work
to be union members (full union shop) and clauses which require all employees except
those who were not members on the effective date of the agreement to be union nem.
bers (modified union shop). Maintenance of membership clauses provide that employees
are not required to be union members, but those who are members when the clause
becomes effective, or those who choose to become members thereafter, are required to
retain their membership as a condition of employment.
Union membership may also be effectively required where the union operates a hiring
hall and refers its members exclusively or preferentially. The LMRA (Labor-Management
Relations Act) banned closed shop agreements, stipulations that a man must be a union
member before being hired. LMRA §§ 7, 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. 157, 158(a)(3), 158(b)(2)
(1970). In practice, however, a closed shop effect is achieved in some hiring halls, Se
BNA LAB. REL. REP. (News and Background Information), 73 L.R.R. 150, 151 (1970).
Even where membership is not required, either explicitly or effectively, the payment
of union dues may be compulsory. Id. Seventy-five per cent of these arrangements, called
agency shops, were found in conjunction with other union security clauses. It 1970 at
study showed that eight per cent of union contracts had an agency shop clause, BNA,
LAB. REL. REP., L.R.X. 95 (§ 17A).
18. An alternate way of viewing the need for members to control their leaders is to
recognize that in the performance of its many functions, the union may be regarded as
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the focus of the LMRDA. The responsiveness of union leaders to their
membership is thus a cornerstone of American labor legislation.
B. Alternative Union Models
The notion that unions should be internally democratic is not
unanimously held. Two other models have substantial support: the
union as a "united front" and the union as an institution "responsible"
to the public at large.
Unions themselves often argue that they must present a "united
front" to employers and to the public. Recalling the early days when
unions were struggling organizations facing powerful corporate man-
agers and an unsympathetic public, the united front conception holds
that:
Frequently workingmen are willing to resign themselves to "boss
control" in their union for the sake of this liberty in the shop.
In other words, they are willing to sacrifice their "political" lib-
erty so long as they have "economic" liberty on the job.10
The united front model assumes that the primary demand on union
leaders
is that they "deliver the goods," in terms of high wages, short
hours and good conditions. So long as they do this [members] do
not care to interfere .... It really cannot be othenvise; the work-
ers, untrained and exhausted by daily toil, cannot keep track of
affairs. The officers are specialists-good talkers-and the rank
and file must trust them.2 0
a dispenser of goods. In return for these goods, members pay dues. Goods dispensers
are normally controlled by consumers through a market mechanism: price and quality
are regulated by consumer demand. But, because of the exclusive bargaining status of
unions and the prevalence of union security clauses, there is very little market control
of unions. Workers have only limited choice about whether to consume union services.
Unless union policies are determined through mechanisms which provide responsiveness,
workers have no control over the "price" and "quality" of the services their union is
providing.
19. S. PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MovEMF.%Er 275 n.l (1949).
20. R. HOXIE, TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 178 (2d ed. 1926). The united
front argument has been echoed by union leaders. John L. Lewis used it to explain why
district autonomy in the Mineworkers was undesirable and unrelated to membership
desires for more pay, pensions and better working conditions. Lewis, Futility of Union
Democracy, Address before the 43rd (1960) Consecutive Constitutional Convention of the
United Mine Workers, United Mine Workers J., Nov. 1, 1960, at 12, 15, excerpted in
E. BAKKE, C. KERR, C. ANROD, UNIONS, MANAGE.MINT AND THE PU3LIC 178, 180 (3d ed.
1967).
Conflicting with leaders' calls for united fronts is the evidence that members desire
a voice in the running of their unions. P. SULTAN, DisENci. ,TF UNIONIST passim (1963);
D. BoKa & J. DUNLOP, LABOR AND THE A.mesucAN COMMUNITY 21 (1970).
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The united front model posits a need for complete unity within the
union in order to achieve economic gains for the membership. Labor
officials sometimes employ this quasi-military view of unions under
siege to justify the suppression of internal dissent.21
As unions have become powerful forces in the American economy,
a second model has been urged on union leaders. Under this theory,
unions are to be "responsible," placing the public interest above the
demands of union members.2 2 Union leaders have been asked to hold
down inflation, eliminate featherbedding, and integrate the working
place, even when such policies are contrary to their members' desires. 2 3
Apart from being antithetical to the conception of unions under-
lying national labor legislation, both the united front and union
responsibility models are inconsistent with broader public policy goals.
The united front model rests its case on the need for solidarity in
order to optimally serve the economic needs of the membership. How-
ever, the leadership cannot know which needs the members consider
to be most important without some internal political mechanism
through which members express their preferences. Furthermore, the
need for solidarity is the need for a united front against the employer
and not the need for monolithic unity within the union. The felt need
for solidarity in facing the employer has been recognized by Congress
and legally assured in the form of exclusive representation. Having
been given this legal protection, unions are virtually guaranteed the
required united front against the employer without the need for sup-
pression of internal dissent.
Even were it argued that additional bargaining strength was re-
quired beyond that provided by Congress through the device of ex-
clusive representation, it would not follow that suppression of dis-
sent within the union is justified. Factionalism within a union is often
21. Conflicting with the union self-conception as united fronts, however, is the often-
expressed proclamation by union leaders that their organizations should be democratic.
Summers, Legislating Union Democracy, PROCEEDINGS OF TIlE TENTH ANNUAL MELING
OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ASSOCIATION 228 (September 1957).
Even those leaders indicating that democracy is unworkable and detrimental to the
workers' interests go on to say that they would prefer democracy if it would work,
LEISERSON, supra note 12, at 55, citing H. FELDMAN, PROBLEMS IN LABOR RELATIONS 245
(1937).
The AFL-CIO constitution declares that among its "objects and principles" Is the
necessity "[t]o safeguard the democratic character of the labor movement." CONsTrIrTrIoN
oF THE AFL-CIO, art. 2, § 11 (1955).
22. It has been argued that the union's function is to further its members' interests
or welfare "as fairly and as effectively as possible without interfering unduly with tile
interests of third parties." BoK & DUNLOP, supra note 20, at 71.
23. See the discussion of these issues, id. at 84-90, 112-.37, 281-94.
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a strong incentive for leaders to be tough bargainers, for only by
being tough will the leaders be able to satisfy a majority of their mem-
bers.2 4 Moreover, even if demands within the union are diverse, all
that is really required for power at the bargaining table is the threat
of united strike action. Such united action against the employer can
best be achieved by membership participation in determining bargain-
ing priorities; only if those priorities recognize the desires of the rank
and file will the membership view it as in their interest to support
the strike. Once having achieved this rough consensus, the few recal-
citrant individuals can be held in line through the union's authority
to penalize members who break strikes mandated by the membership.25
The argument for total internal unity is further weakened by a
recognition of the status of American unionism today. Unions are
no longer fighting organizations on the weak end of the bargaining
table, constantly threatened by public disapproval. They are an estab-
lished part of the political and economic scene, bureaucracies repre-
senting millions of workers.
The union responsibility model is weak because it seriously mis-
conceives the role of labor unions in a pluralist political system. To
be sure, any interest group with power, such as a labor union, can and
does have an impact on the public at large. But if interest group pol-
itics are to function as a normatively acceptable mode of political
organization, the policies advocated and implemented by various in-
terest groups must reflect the desires of their members. Only when
each institution's leaders accurately reflect their constituency will the
aggregate decisionmaking process reflect the sum of individual needs
and desires.2 It is not clear that a union democracy model regularly
24. J. SasAN, J. Loxoo, B. KAscu, & D. TAGLACOZZO, TuE Wousat VIEwS HIs
UNION 211 (1958).
25. Unions may lawfully fine members for crossing a picket line in an authorized
strike. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 892(1967). The NLRB will not even look into the reasonableness of the fine. Machinists
Local 504 (Arrow Development Co.). 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970).
26. C. KERR, UNIoNS AND UNION LEADERS OF TiRm OWN ChlOOsiNG 11 (1962).
Opponents of union democracy often attack the proposition that institutions in a
democratic society should be democratic by pointing to the undemocratic nature of the
corporation. For example, Joseph A. Beirne, President of the Communications Workers,
has stated:[L]et me note in passing that the individual union member, so poignantly depicted
by some commentators as captive of the "labor bosses" has an infinitely better chance
to be heard during this confrontation than all the little old ladies who hold shares
but are captives of the "corporation bosses." Union meetings are held before the
event; stockholders' meetings are held after it. and the few individual dissidents
are buried under an avalanche of proxies. After all, there is no Landrum.Griffin
act for management.
J. BEIRNE, CHALLENGE TO LABOR: NEw ROLEs FOR AMERICAN TRADE UNIoNS 209 (1969).
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pits union members' interests against the "public interest." Nor is it
clear that appeals to union members as citizens to take particular
positions seemingly contrary to their short term economic interest will
be consistently unavailing. If such conflicts do persist, they should
be resolved by the national political process, rather than by asking the
leaders of one interest group to forsake their members for the greater
good of society.
A further problem with the union responsibility model is that it
relies on the erroneous assumption that autocratic, non-responsive
union leaders will be benevolent and act only in the "public interest."
There are no clear correlations in labor union history between des-
potism and virtue.2 Unless it can be shown that responsive leadership
fails to consider the "public interest" because it is not autocratic, there
is no reason to prefer the union responsibility model to union democ-
racy. Further, proponents of the union responsibility model, to the
extent that they would countenance unresponsive leadership, fail to
take account of the adverse effects of strikes occasioned by worker
disenchantment with arbitrary union leadership.28
However, a minimum of responsiveness is imposed on corporations by law through
proxy regulations, fiduciary duties, regulation of insider trading and self.dealing, state
blue sky laws, and statutes requiring the filing of annual reports. See S. REP. No. 187
ON S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix C at 105-10, Appendix D at 111, 114.16, and
statutes cited therein (1959).
Moreover, many states have passed statutes authorizing courts to enjoin and/or set
aside corporate elections in which fraud or improper practices have occurred. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 610, 619 (McKinney 1963); DEL. CORP. LAW §§ 211, 215, 225,
235 (West 1953); CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 2232-2233 (West 1955).
27. Many practices against the public interest have been maintained by dictatorial
unions. For example, "many of the railroad brotherhoods, which are much less demo.
cratic [than the International Typographers Union (ITU)] . . . retain historic policies
which keep more workers than necessary on the job [and the] highly dictatorial United
Mine Workers Union ran more strikes during war-time than any other union." Lipset,
The Law and Trade Union Democracy, 47 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1960).
On the contrary, it has been suggested that a "correlation can be observed betweel
a union's commitment to large social goals and its observance of internal democratic
procedures." I. HowE & B.J. VIDIK, UAW AND WALTER REUTHER 244 (1949). How-
ever, the ITU, a reputably democratic union, also acted against the public interest on
several occasions. For example, it campaigned against permanent registration of New
York voters largely because of the extra volume of printing work entailed by yearly
registration and refused to abolish featherbedding practices when a leadership resolution
against featherbedding was defeated by the membership. N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1960, at
39, cols. 2-3.
In a third category is the ILGWU, credited with being a dictatorial but corruption.
free union which carries on a great deal of social work. P. JAcoBs, TIlE STATE OF 'ilii
UNIoNs 148 (1966).
Unions, whether democratic or oligarchic, generally have not acted in the public
interest with respect to racial integration at the work place. According to Herbert Hill,
the NAACP national labor director, the AFL-CIO has defended discriminators. Hill,
Black Protest and the Struggle for Union Democracy, 1 IssUEs IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 19,
20-22 (1969).
28. See Knowles, "Strike Proneness" and Its Determinants, 60 Ass. J. Soc. 214, 224(1954).
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If we are to insist, then, on a democratic model of union governance,
as is suggested by considerations of policy and required by the
LMRDA, attention must shift to means for structuring internal po-
litical responsiveness. The search for such techniques must begin
with some understanding of the political structure of modern American
labor unions.
C. Unionism and Bureaucracy
More than twenty million American workers belong to labor
unions.2 9 Three unions have more than one million members each;
twenty-one others have more than 200,000 members; and another
twenty-two unions have more than 100,000 members.3 0 Unions per-
form a wide range of services for their members in addition to collec-
tive bargaining. They administer contracts, process grievances, publish
newspapers, run organizational campaigns, operate social and educa-
tional programs, own and maintain housing facilities, administer in-
surance and pension funds, develop medical health centers, and lobby
at state and federal legislatures and administrative agencies.3 '
To perform these functions for so many persons, national unions
have developed large staffs. These staffs include lawyers, accountants,
economists, journalists, hygienists, teachers, and a large number of
clerks and secretaries. As the traditional function of collective bar-
gaining has become more sophisticated, with wage packages taking
a multitude of forms, bargaining staffs have also become larger and
more specialized.32 In 1964 the 189 national unions employed more
than 13,000 full-time employees at their headquarters. The Teamsters
and Autoworkers each employed nearly 700 persons.33
29. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL AND L tRNATIONAL Ltuon UNIoNs
IN THE UNITED STATES 1969, at 64 (1970).
30. Id. at 69.
31. See BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 20, at 361-455.
32. Some unions may have bureaucratized themselves to force industry to be less
competitive:
Unions such as the garment unions have developed highly centralized structures so
as to be able to force employers to develop similar collective bargaining practices.
In some cases, the unions have been able to force bureaucratic structures on employers
by forcing them to join industrial associations and set up codes of business practice.
Lipset, The Political Process in Trade Unions: A Theoretical Sfatentenet, in LDuon AND
TRADE UNIONIsM: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 216, 218 (W. Galenson & S.M. Lipset cds.
1960).
33. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIREcToRY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAD0.n
UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1965, table 15, at 63 (1966).
Beyond the large number of staff employees at national headquarters, the 75,000 locals
and district offices each have staffs varying in size from one part.time to fifty full-time
persons. While the precise number of employees in all unions is difficult to determine,
The Yale Law Journal
Union affiliations tend to be relatively stable. Except for a few
unions organizing teachers and farm, hospital, and government em-
ployees, organization of new members is not a pressing union con-
cern.34 AFL-CIO "no-raiding" agreements have virtually eliminated
rivalry for members among different unions.33 Although there are
statutory provisions for workers to deauthorize or decertify their ex-
isting bargaining representatives, use of these mechanisms has been
rare.
301
This stable bureaucratic character of modern unions tends to
frustrate achievement of responsiveness. In many unions a great "dis.
tance" separates leaders from the rank and file. Leaders tend to have
been out of the shop for many years and are generally older than their
the staffs of several unions are large enough to support their own local. The IAM
Representatives Association represents staffers of the IAM. (172 N.L.R.B. No. 239 (1968))1;
Agents and Organizers Association of the Retail Clerks Union was formed in 1962 by
staff employees of the union (153 N.L.R.B. No. 15 (1965)); VARU, Variety Artists Rep-
resentatives Union, represents the staffers of AGVA (162 N.L.R.B. No. 128 (1967)), the
Office Employees International Union has organized the staffers of several unions, In.
eluding the Seafarers (138 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (1962)), B.L.F.E. (168 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1967)),
and Chain Service Restaurant, Luncheonette & Soda Fountain Employees (132 N.L.R.B.
No. 79 (1961)).
34. Total union membership has increased only about ten per cent between 1956
and 1968. At the same time, the total labor force and the total non-agricultural labor
force have increased about twenty per cent and thirty per cent respectively. The per-
centage of non-agricultural workers belonging to unions has decreased steadily fron
thirty-three per cent in 1956 to just under twenty-eight per cent in 1968. 1969 DatEaroRy,
supra note 29, table IA, at 67.
Another guide to the organizing efforts of unions is the changes in membership of the
fifty-one unions reporting a membership of 100,000 or more in 1967. Id. at 93, Ap.
pendix D. Thirty-six of the fifty-one unions either lost members (twenty.one), or in.
creased in membership (fifteen) at an average rate of two per cent or less per year from
1956 to 1968. Of the fifteen that increased at an average rate greater thlan two per cent
per year, most of the largest gains were achieved by unions organizing government
workers. See also M. ESTEY, THE UNIONS: STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT, AND MANAGEMENr
10-11 (1967).
35. The AFL-CIO no raiding agreements, BNA LAU. REL. Rat,., L.R.X. 336a, are
credited with eliminating union rivalry among AFL-CIO affiliates. BOK & DUNLOI, supra
note 20, at n.167; Krislov, Organizational Rivalry Among American Unions, 13 INn. & LAnU.
REL. REV. 216 (1960) indicates that even before the AFL-CIO no raiding agreements,
there was little rivalry among their affiliates.
36. LMRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), providing for NLRB supervised
elections to rescind union security agreements, has been rarely used. During the first
ten-year history of Taft-Hartley, less than 10,000 workers in the entire country were
involved in such deauthorization elections. Morgan, The Union Shop Deauthorization
Poll, 12 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 79, 80 (1958). Less than one per cent of the cases received
by the NLRB in fiscal year 1968 were deauthorization petitions. ANNUAL REtOn" orP
'riE NLRB FoR 1968, table 5, at 208-09.
LMRA § 9(e)(l)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(A)(ii) (1970), giving workers the oppor-
tunity to decertify their collective bargaining representatives, has rarely been invoked,
and relatively few members of unions have been involved in any such elections, Krlslov,
Union Decertification, 9 IND. & LAU. REL. REV. 589, 590 (1956). The ANNUAL RtrorT o1
•riE NLRB FOR 1968, at 208-09, table 5, shows that less than three per cent of all cases
received by the NLRB in the 1968 fiscal year involved decertification petitions.
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constituents. 37 They have higher salaries,38 do more interesting work,
and enjoy a higher status.30 The leader develops a class point of view
different from that of his members.40 It is not surprising that union
leaders tend to become relatively conservative.
Responsibility sobers them. As soon as they engage in negotia-
tions they realize the power of the employers, and the limitations
of employers in the ability to meet their demands. Moreover,
when the leaders get away from the bench, their environment
becomes more of the character of the employer's than of the
worker's.
.. [A]lmost inevitably they develop something of the employer's
viewpoint and feeling, and thus become unable to see things from
the workers' angle and to feel with and for the workers as before."
The distance between the leadership and the rank and file may lead
to a divergence between leaders' and members' perceptions of mem-
bership needs. This disparity can lead to disenchantment with the
leadership.
Incumbents may feel forced by such disenchantment to change their
position on significant issues facing the union. A problem with the
bureaucratized union, however, is that the leadership is often able to
retain office without making such changes. Through their virtual
monopoly over the means of communication within the union, its
physical and financial resources, and its leadership and administra-
37. A survey of national union presidents in 1965 found that the typical union
leader is over fifty and had secured his first union post before reaching thirty. Perline
& Mosier, Background of American Labor Union Presidents: A Preliminary Study, 49
PERSONEL J. 329, 331 (1970). Thus, a president who had continuously held full.time
elected or appointed posts would be likely to have been out of the shop for some twenty-
five years. According to the 1969 DiREcroRY, supra note 29, at 83, twenty.dtree per cent
of union members belonged to nationals whose president in 1969 had been first elected
to office before 1956; forty-seven per cent belonged to nationals whose president in 1969
had first been elected in 1960 or before. Only thirty per cent belonged to unions wvhose
president had been first elected after 1965. At most, thirty per cent of all members
belonged to nationals whose president had been out of the shop for only four )ears
or less. Moreover, several presidents were first elected in te 1930's: Joseph Curran of
the National Maritime Union, Sal B. Hoffman of the Upholsterers, and Harry Bridges
of the International Longshoremen were first elected in 1937; J.P. Tahney of the Amer-
ican Railway and Airline Supervisors Association and Eric W. Lindberg of the Machine
Printers and Engravers Association assumed office in 1934. Id. at 83.
38. See Stein, The Dilemma of Union Democracy, 350 ANNALS 46, 51-53 (1963); R.
Lasm, As UNIONS MATURE 27-29 (1958); HOWE & WIozoC, supra note 27, at 256.57; Lipset,
The Political Process, supra note 32, at 216, 222.
89. Id. at 221-25; HowE & WircK, supra note 27, at 248, 257.
40. See G. TYLER, THE POLITICAL IMPERATIvE 285 (1968); LEsr, supra note 38, at
27-29, 69, who notes union officers advance in hierarchical fashion, and those "seeking
to advance to the charmed circle at the top tend to conform to the aims and viewpoints
of their supervisors"; HowE & Wxianc, supra note 27, at 250, 257.
41. R. HoxiE, supra note 20, at 179-80. See also G. TYLER, supra note 40, at 285.
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tive skills, 42 incumbents possess a significant advantage in any electoral
contest.43
The unresponsiveness engendered by union bureaucratization is
made more acute by the trend toward centralization of collective
bargaining. 44 Labor agreements are increasingly negotiated on the re-
gional or national level. As a consequence, the contract terms suggested
by labor are being written not by local union officers, who are most
closely tied to the rank and file, but by the more distant national
officers and the non-elected union bureaucracy. This trend places the
responsibility for determining the conditions of employment in the
hands of those people least accessible to the demands of the rank and
file.45
There are indications that the resultant lack of responsiveness is an
increasing problem for the labor movement. In several union elec-
tions, unsatisfied needs and demands have been a basis for opposition
movements." Contract rejections have increased and at least one study
attributes a significant number of these rejections to the leadership's
failure to understand the feelings of the membership and, to a lesser ex-
tent, to their failure to keep members informed during negotiations.4 7
42. Lipset, The Political Process, supra note 32, at 216, 220-21.
43. The evolution of large appointed staffs also serves to insulate union leadership
from rank and file pressure. A staff in effect becomes an independent constituency en.
dowed with aims and interests of its own. R. MiciELs, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 373, 389, 401, 402 (1915).
See also HoWE & WIDICK, supra note 27, at 248. Although one function of the adminis.
trative staff is to service the needs of the membership and mediate between the conflicting
demands of various sub-groups within the union, staffers are not directly accountable to
the union electorate and their own distinct interests may blind them to the needs of
the rank and file. Taylor, The Public Interest: Variations on an Old Theme, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL IMEETING OF TIlE NATIONAL ACADEMIY OF ARDITATORS,
1965, at 191, 195 (1965).
44. Increasing centralization of collective bargaining has been linked to the develop.
ment of regional or national product markets, thereby necessitating regional or natlonal
cooperation for effective collective bargaining. ESTEY, supra note 34, at 61-65. He notes
that in the housing and construction industry, where the product market and wage
competition are local, the local union remains in control of collective bargaining. See
also Shister, The Locus of Union Control of Collective Bargaining, 60 Q.J. EcoN. 513,
515-17 (1946).
Complete centralization of collective bargaining has not yet occurred. A majority of
all employees in unions are covered by single plant or single employer contracts; forty
per cent of collective bargaining contracts involve multiple negotiation, largely in one
metropolitan area. In contrast, European collective bargaining is more centralized and
tends toward decentralization. BOK & DUNLOP, supra note 20, at 208-09.
45. A unique analysis of contract rejections in 1967 revealed that Federal Mediation
Service officers thought that dissatisfaction of workers with the agreement or leadership
failure to understand the members' real feelings were factors in a considerable number
of rejections. Simkin, Refusals to Ratify Contracts, 21 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 518, 528
(July 1968).
46. See note 49 infra.
47. Simkin, supra note 45, at 518, 528. An empirical connection has been shown be-
tween propensity to strike and plant size. The distance between a worker and his super.
visor produces a feeling of arbitrariness and lack of confidence because managerial rep-
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Wildcat strikes may be another indication of a failure of union respon-
siveness; many of these strikes have been attributed to membership
dissatisfaction with the union's response to specific demands.48
Recent labor agitation suggests that union members are becoming
less willing to defer to their leadership and are demanding greater
participation in decisionmaking.a9 Whether this trend will continue
is uncertain, but it has already forced one major national union to
shift much of the responsibility for the negotiation of its contracts
to the local union level in an effort to meet the particular, non-eco-
nomic demands of rank and file locals.5°
D. Achieving Responsiveness
Some students of union government have argued that responsive-
ness can be assured only when a functioning two-party system under-
lies a union's political structure.51 Yet only one major national union
has such a system, and a study of that union suggests that the two-party
system resulted from historical and social factors that rarely appear in
other union organizations. 52 If a two-party system is a prerequisite, the
prospects for democratic, responsive unionism are bleak.
This study assumes, however, that a simpler mechanism can provide
a sufficient measure of responsiveness within unions. The function
of this mechanism would be to reconcile the divergences between
membership and leadership objectives as they develop. Membership
access to union decisionmaking need only be periodic to correct the
priorities of leadership when they stray from the demands of the rank
and file. The continuous participation of a two-party system is assumed
to be unnecessary if a mechanism for such periodic entrance is avail-
able. The intervening periods of membership passivity might then be
characterized not as evidence of rank and file apathy or political
resentatives are not close enough to know the real work situations, or to be able to
render assistance to the production process. Revancs, Industrial Morale and Size of Unit,
27 POL. Q. 303 (July-September 1956), reproduced in GALENSON & Ltsr, supra note 32.
at 295.
48. Bor & DUNLOP, supra note 20, at 77.
49. See, e.g., The Blue Collar Worker's Lowdown Blues, T. mtE. Nov. 9, 1970. at 68-78;
Conti, Militant New Leaders of Steel Union Locals Challenge Old Policies, Wall St. J.
March 2, 1971, at 1, col. 8; Gooding, It Pays to Wahe-Up the Blue-Collar Worher, Fort-
TUNE, Sept. 1970, at 132; Gooding, Blue-Collar Blues on the Assembly Line, FortUNE,
July 1970, at 69; Henle, Some Reflections on Organized Labor and the Xew Militants,
92 MONTHLY LAB. REV., July 1969, at 20.
50. Salpukas, Steel Chief Acts to Share Burden, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1971, at 13. col. 1.
51. S. LlPsET, M. TRow & J. COLE.MAN, UNIoN DEMOCRACY passim (1956).
52. Id. at 17-68, 393-400.
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incompetence, but rather as intervals of trust in the existing leader-
ship.53 Such a mechanism should:
(1) discover the grievances and demands of the members which
are not being satisfied;
(2) embrace all possible sources of discontent in this discovery
process;
(3) encourage the formulation of various policy alternatives to
meet these grievances;
(4) permit the expression of membership preference as to the
desirability of policy alternatives;
(5) give binding force to this expression so that the leadership
is obliged to act upon it; and,
(6) cause only minimum disruption of the union, labor-manage-
ment relations, and the public economy.
Several institutional devices have been suggested as ways to ac-
complish these functions. They include informal consultation between
leaders and members, 54 debate at meetings, r contract ratification
procedures, 50 referenda on important matters,5 7 and officer election
and recall procedures. In addition, various non-institutional devices
are available to the membership to coerce greater attention and re-
53. Members may be satisfied with the symbols or rituals of democracy without de-
manding the substance. Coleman, The Compulsive Pressures of Democracy in Unionism,
61 AM. J. oF Soc. 519, 525-26 (1956), reproduced in GALENSON & LirsrT, supra note 32,
at 207, 213-14 (1960). This may be the normal situation, but when an interval of dis.
satisfaction arises, the democratic practices otherwise exercised only ritualistically will
be available for meaningful use by disgruntled members.
54. Although informal consultation may uncover sources of grievance, permit men-
bets to express their policy preferences, and cause only minimal disruption, it fails to
embrace all possible sources of discontent, to encourage formulation of policy alternatives,
or to give binding force to membership desires. The success of informal consultation
depends completely on the competence of the leaders in seeking out public opinion.
Although informal consultation has a place, it is an inadequate guarantor of responsive
ness unless combined with a means by which members also choose their leaders.
55. Union meetings, traditionally poorly attended, would be an inadequate guarantor
of responsiveness even if they drew packed houses. Debate at meetings lacks binding
force and is unlikely to generate policy alternatives or to permit all members to have
their preferences expressed. As with informal consultation, such debate can be valuable
in maintaining a level of communication within the union, but it is inadequate to con-
trol the leadership.
56. Contract ratification votes are "yes" or "no" decisions made under the threat
of strike if the "no" votes prevail. This one vote cannot express member preferences on
a number of collective bargaining issues facing the union, let alone the multitude of
non-bargaining questions relating to the union's pension, recreational, educational, and
other activities. Such votes are made after the fact, yet it is before bargaining begins
that rank and file referenda would be most helpful in conveying membership preferences
to the leadership. The opportunity for opposing views to crystallize is also very limited
in the crisis environment of a strike deadline.
57. Referenda involve some of the same limitations as do contract ratification votes,
Members can only express "yes" or "no" preferences as to pre-formulated policy alter-
natives. The impossibility of holding referenda on every policy question makes it un.
likely that all grievances and demands will be discovered.
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sponsiveness from the leadership, such as low morale, absenteeism
and wildcat strikes. 8
Although all of the institutional devices can be useful in improv-
ing union responsiveness, the election of union officers is the single
most important mechanism, because fair elections can accomplish all of
the foregoing functions.59 Unlike the other institutional devices, an
election campaign can raise as an issue any aspect of the conduct of
union affairs, economic or non-economic. In an open campaign, can-
didates are forced to discuss such issues with the rank and file to de-
termine the scope and intensity of its discontent. In this discussion,
alternatives for dealing with issues are formulated by each candidate
and commented upon by the membership; a candidate can then
act to implement these alternatives should he be elected. Even if a
candidate does not gather enough support to gain office, the portion
of the vote he receives will warn the elected officers of the level of
concern within the union about the issues and problems he has raised.
58. Member dissatisfaction with union leadership may well be indicated by low
morale, absenteeism or wildcat strikes, but these are poor means for telegraphing to
leaders the desires of their constituency. Wildcat strikes are illegal; strikers may lose
their jobs. Strikes and absenteeism are disruptive of labor-management relations, and
the aim of labor policy should be to provide reponsiveness without such side.effects.
Although these indicators of discontent are dramatic, they are poor means of articulating
problems; union leaders may be left perplexed rather than inforned.
59. The LMRDA allows officers of intermediate labor organizations to be elected
directly or by delegates elected by the members. Officers of national organizations can
be elected at a convention of delegates chosen by the members, as well as by direct
referendum vote of all members. LMRDA § 401(d), (a), 29 U.S.C. § 481(d), (a) (1970).
National officers are elected at conventions in 138 of 189 national unions. 1969 Dncrony,
supra note 29, at 80, table 15. This Note, however, primarily considers the LIRDA
provisions as they relate to referenda, despite some evidence that confvention abuses do
exist. See Hearings on UMT Election, supra note 2, at 123-30, 144-47. 150 (Feb. 5, 1970)
(testimony of Louis Antal and William Savitsky). Interview with union officer M.
Many union members appear to disfavor referenda because they claim their poten-
tial for splitting the union in a disruptive political battle undermines bargaining ef-
fectiveness and destroys rank and file confidence in leadership. Interviews with union
attorneys U, W, and AA. On the other hand, referenda seem more likely to fulfill the
responsiveness functions of the electoral process. Referenda allow candidates to bring
the issues directly to the voters and provide an opportunity for insurgents to make their
grievances well-known throughout the union. Interviews with union officer A and
union attorney II; questionnaire from complainant union member Il. This responsiveness
seems particularly important if the national organization negotiates the collective bar-
gaining agreements.
The lesser effectiveness of the Title IV enforcement mechanism in correcting cam-
paign violations in convention elections also militates against the desirability of this
election method. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970) demands that violations "may
have affected" the election outcome before a rerun may be ordered. Even if violations
are found in a number of delegate elections, there is often little likelihood that the
improper election of any one delegate would have affected the convention's choice.
Holding a new convention in the event that violations are found would often be very
costly, if not impossible. Interview with union attorney X. See full discussion of the
consequences of the "may have affected" test on referenda elections at pp. 515-18 infra.
Despite these apparent faults of the convention method, it is impossible to draw any
conclusions about desirable legislative or judicial responses to the particular problem
of convention elections without more investigation.
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Unlike the non-institutional devices for insuring responsiveness,
officer elections entail minimal disruption of the public economy.
The work schedule of the membership is uninterrupted. Labor-man-
agement relations are disturbed only if the election happens to occur
around the time of contract negotiations. An election does unsettle
the internal processes of the union; but it is a disruption programmed
at regular intervals, which, by airing discontent, minimizes disruption
of union affairs between elections. o
Officer elections appear to be the most effective means for achiev-
ing internal responsiveness. Furthermore, the other institutional de-
vices will be adopted only when union officers are already sensitive
to the need for communicating with the rank and file. Union officer
elections must therefore be a central part of any mechanism designed
to bring about democratic, responsive unionism.
E. Methodology
In recognition of the importance of officer elections in insuring
responsiveness, Congress enacted statutory provisions, primarily in
Title IV of the LMRDA, which seek to insure fair and honest elections.
These provisions could fail to achieve this objective in two general
ways: their coverage might exclude significant phenomena which in-
terfere with fair elections, or the enforcement process might subvert
the protections promised by substantive law. It was the object of this
study to explore these possibilities with respect to the election pro-
visions of the LMRDA. Field interviews were relied upon to obtain an
understanding of the kinds of practices which may taint a union elec-
tion and the way in which internal union and statutory remedies are
implemented.
The effort to discover obstacles to responsiveness relied on inter-
views and questionnaires directed to individuals who had been parties
to election disputes which later gave rise to protests of illegal con-
duct. Of the ninety-four Title IV election cases in which judicial
decisions were rendered during fiscal years 1967-69, fifty were selected,
and attempts were made to contact the four primary participants
in each case: the complainant, his attorney, the incumbent union
officer at the time of the challenge, and the union attorney involved
in the case.0 0 This sample is not fully representative, but no attempt
60. All Title IV election cases in which a judicial decision is obtained are indicated
and summarized each year in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT AND RE.
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is made here to generalize as to the frequency of the abuses which
were alleged. Rather, the information obtained is employed merely
to delineate the kinds of problems and abuses which those close to the
election process claim arise in at least some elections. This study as-
sumes that the statutory protections can in some sense be termed in-
adequate if they fail to address these abuses.
Since the LMRDA relies heavily on internal union procedures and
the Department of Labor for enforcement of its substantive guaran-
tees, additional interviews and questionnaires were directed to Depart-
ment officials, labor leaders, and their attorneys. A description of the
Department's enforcement process was obtained by consulting Depart-
ment employees in the Solicitor's Office and in the Bureau of Labor-
PORTING UNDER THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND Dis:.osrRE Acr. The cases cov-
ered in the three years preceding the time of the interviews were chosen because of the
greater probability that the participants could be contacted and would recall specific
details of proceedings. Of the ninety-four cases, rift) werc chosen on a random basis,
with the exception that cases with a single violation alleged were generally eliminated
on grounds that the exposure of the participants to the provisions and workings of the
statute would be too limited to warrant an attempt to consult them. All four participants
were sought for interviews in ten of these cases, which were chosen primanly by con-
siderations of geographic convenience so that expenses could be minimized. In these ten
cases, interviews were actually conducted with five union officers, eight union attorne)5,
nine complainants, and seven complainants' attorneys. The participants in the remain-
ing forty cases were either interviewed or contacted by mail, the method of contact
depending on geographic factors and ability to obtain appointments. Where contact was
by mail, the participant was sent a letter explaining the project and a questionnaire
duplicating the questions asked in the interviews.
While many of the persons contacted were quite willing to assist the study, response
to the initial inquiries was diminished somewhat by an inability to locate some partici-
pants and an unwillingness on the part of others to cooperate.
The only source of information as to the identity of the four participants in each case
was the information contained in the complaint filed with the Department or, alterna-
tively, in the complaint filed by the Department at the conimencement of litigation. The
Department cooperated freely with the study and examined its files to obtain the names
of the four participants in each case, and their addresses. Of necessity, this was the
participant's address at the time the suit was filed. Many of the participants had moved
since that time and could not be contacted. In addition, some participants refused to
aid the study in any way. Finally, in some instances a case rile indicated no record of
one or more of the participants.
Nevertheless, enough responses were obtained from each category of participants to
support informed comment on the substantive provisions of the LMRDA.
Ultimately, 103 participants in the election process were contacted and either inter-
viewed or sent a questionnaire which they completed and returned. The distribution of
these responses over the four categories was as follows: twenty union officers (incum-
bents at the time of the election challenge): seventeen interviewed, three question-
naires; thirty-five union attorneys: twenty-four interviewed, eleven questionnaires; thirty-
one complainant union members (union members who filed the initial complaint with
the Department): sixteen interviewed, fifteen questionnaires; seventeen complainant at-
torneys: fifteen interviewed, two questionnaires.
Fewer responses were obtained in the union officer and complainant attorney cate-
gories, but for different reasons. Union officers were more reluctant to cooperate in
the study than any of the other participants. The most significant problem in obtaining
responses from complainant attorneys was an inability to physically locate them.
To encourage frank discussion with all the participants, it was necessary to agree to
keep their identities confidential. It is this concern which necessitated the use of the
coded system herein employed when refering to responses of specific participants.
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Management and Welfare Pension Reports (LMWP).6' Participants
in recent Title IV cases were also surveyed for descriptions of their
experiences with this enforcement.02 Information regarding internal
union appeals procedures was obtained from interviews with union
legal counsel, particularly national union counsel,08 and from addi-
tional mailings seeking specific information as to the disposition of
election complaints within unions.0 '
This study is not a statistical analysis of union election procedures
or an attempt to make generalized statements about the frequency of
election abuses, union attitudes, or the amount of sentiment which
exists in favor of reform. Rather, it has sought through direct contact
with those people who have had experience with the LMRDA to ex.
plore the statute's reach in light of the congressional policy of insuring
fair elections, and to recommend ways in which the statutory policy
might be better effectuated. 5
61. Officials in the central offices of these divisions were interviewed, as were se-
lected area and regional personnel for each office. Interviews were conducted with
Henry A. Queen, the head of the elections and trusteeship division of LMWP, and
informally with members of his office over a two-week period. Interviews were also
held with Miss Beatrice Block and Mr. Tom Barnard in the central Solicitor's Office,
and with Mr. Charles Donahue, former Solicitor of Labor, and Mr. Thomas Donahue,
former Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations.
An attempt was made to contact all of the Area and Regional LMWI' offices and
Regional Solicitor's offices either by mailed questionnaire or by interview. Responses
were obtained from: eight of the seventeen Area Offices (LMWP), two of the five
Regional Offices (LMWP), and four of the eleven Regional Solicitor's Offices.
62. These participants were questioned both as to their specific experiences with the
Department, their general evaluation of the enforcement process, and their suggestions
for modification or reform. These responses form the core of the information from which
the evaluation and suggestions in part III of this Note are drawn. They were, of course,
supplemented by available secondary source materials regarding the activities of the DOL.
In addition, various reports and records of the DOL were examined, and statistical
material was developed to aid the evaluation. This material is reproduced at Appendices
A-E infra.
63. Thirty-eight union attorneys were consulted through interviews or completed
questionnaires. See note 60 supra. Twelve of these were national union counsel, and
discussions with them covered both specific experience in election disputes with the
Department and general information as to the union's own internal appeals structures.
64. Initially a general questionnaire was sent to the national president and legal
counsel of 55 national unions selected at random from the list of 191 national unions
listed in U.S. DEIT oF LABOR, DIREcTORY OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAuOR UNIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES 1967 (1968). Twenty of these unions received additional questions
concerning the procedures used by the national in handling pre- and post-election appeals,
the frequency of receipt and disposition of such cases, and the forms of relief available
to the national. Only four responses were received. A subsequent mailing was made
under a cover letter from Michael Gottesman who was then preparing to represent the
United Steelworkers before the Supreme Court in the case of Hodgson v. Local 6799,
Steelworkers (subsequent decision at 403 U.S. 333 (1971)). A request was again made
for the above information on union appeals, both to aid the instant study and to assist
Mr. Gottesman in preparing his brief in the pending litigation. Responses were received
from only ten nationals, but the information received, when combined with the inter.
views with other national union attorneys and secondary materials, furnished an adequate
basis for making some assessment and recommendations regarding internal union appeals.
65. In addition to the contacts with participants in Title IV cases and with Depart-
ment of Labor personnel, interviews were also conducted with persons in agencies or
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II. The LMRDA and Officer Elections: Substantive Provisions
If the officer election process is to perform the responsiveness func-
tion attributed to it, elections must be fair and democratic. The fol-
lowing characteristics are essential prerequisites:
(a) the voting unit must be free of internal group discrimina-
tion;
(b) members must be able to participate in the process, and that
participation must be free from coercion;
(c) mechanisms of communication must exist within the union
to facilitate a flow of information between the candidates
and the membership and among the members themselves;
(d) the campaign must be free of the discriminatory use of union
resources; and
(e) the vote count must not be fraudulent.
Labor elections occur at all three levels of the typical national union:
local, 0 intermediate (district),0 7 and national; 8 and obstacles to re-
sponsiveness may surface at each or all of these levels. This section will
draw on allegations made by various participants in union elections at
each level of union governance to outline particular ways in whid
the goal of responsiveness may be frustrated. It will also explore the
relevant provisions of the LMRDA in an effort to determine which
of the obstacles to electoral responsiveness can be remedied by the
statute, either as currently or potentially interpreted. Where the statu-
tory coverage appears inadequate, proposals for amended judicial con-
struction or for legislative revision will be made.
activities involved in the union electoral process. These intericws included two regional
directors of the AFL-CIO representatives of the Honest Ballot Association, the American
Arbitration Association, the New York U.S. Attorney's Office, and the New York Regional
Office of the NLRB. Prominent academicians in the field of union elections were also
contacted, including Benjamin Aaron, Archibald Cox, Joel Seidman, Theodore St. Antoine,
Clyde Summers, and Philip Taft.
66. Historically, American labor unions began as locals, organizations which brought
together workers in a common trade or industry in a coherent geographic area; trade
unions developed through conglomeration of locals. Today, the local is the functional
unit upon which unions are built. J. B. AR&s, A.IEMC.4N U.Nios: STsuzcrmu, Govmsuv-
MENT, AND POLmcs 4 (1967).
67. The structure of intermediate bodies varies greatly among unions depending on
size, worker constituencies, markets, administrative convenience, political considerations.
and the collective bargaining environment. Some intermediate organizations are nation-
wide. Some unions have several overlapping intermediate groupings, each of wv'hich
serves different goals. Intermediate functions include collective bargaining, legislative
lobbying, organizing, and servicing locals. Id. at 55.68.
68. The designation "international" recognizes that man) unions have Canadian af-
filiates, but in practice American national and international unions are similar in
structure. Id. at 4-5. The term "national" will be used in this Note to refer to both
types of organizations.
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A. Freedom from Internal Group Discrimination
Although labor unions are typically denominated "interest groups,"
with members sharing similar objectives, 9 they are often themselves
coalitions of different constituencies with varying concerns. 0 Internal
political responsiveness to the demands of competing groups, via the
electoral process, can be accomplished only when incumbent of-
ficers are forced to assemble coalitions to retain power.7 1 The pre-
condition to a sub-group's continued support will be a correlation
between the incumbents' policies and the group's demands. To insure
that all groups within an electoral unit are included within this proc-
ess of internal responsiveness, all union members must possess the
franchise, so that any group within the union has the power to influ-
ence an election's outcome should its preferences be ignored.
1. Exclusion of Interest Groups
Some unions have constitutional provisions barring certain member-
ship classes from voting 7 2 These classes include apprentices, super-
visors, part-timers, and those holding membership under limiting
conditions because of age, membership in another union, or employ-
ment outside the jurisdiction of the union. Employer members, in-
cluding self-employed persons who still hold union membership, are
also frequently denied voting rights. 73
Groups excluded from voting often have different economic perspec-
tives from the remainder of the membership. Part-timers may favor
69. In considering the degree of opposition to the election of general officers within
a labor union, it is necessary to keep in mind the difference between a labor union
and society at large. A union, unlike civil society, is a single-purposc organization.
The protection of the economic interests of its meinbers is the principal objective
of a union. Moreover, in carrying out this task, a union must be pJrepared to take
defensive or offensive economic action involving discipline and sacrifice by its incn-
bers, in contrast to society at large where there are conflicting interests that must
be protected.
P. TAFT, THE STRucTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 38 (1954).
70. For the sources of interest group cleavage within unions, see BARBASII, ,supra note
66, at 127-30.
71. Id. at 134-36; A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC TtIEORY OF DEMOCRACY 51-74 (1957); E.E.
SCHATrSCIINEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 17-34 (1942); R. WALTON & R. McKERSiE, A Bt-
IIAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 281-351 (1965).
72. Apart from excluding whole classes, the only general requirement for voting in
most unions is that a member be in "good standing." Good standing normally refers to
timely payment of membership dues and the absence of a disciplinary suspension. Axelrod
v. Stoltz, 264 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1967), afj'd, 391 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1968). See U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, STUDY OF UNION CONSTITUTIONS 29-33 (1965). In addition, a few unions
require a specified length of membership in the union before conferring voting rights,
Id. at 36-37. The DOL study examined the constitutions of seventy-three international
and national unions with a combined membership of 15,600,000 workers. It collected
data on requirements for local elections in national constitutions. Additional voting
nomination and candidate eligibility requirements may be imposed by local bylaws.
73. For a summary of the various classes excluded from voting, see id. at 34-36.
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featherbedding and oppose automation, while full-timers would trade
the inefficient employment of others for more pay.74 Unskilled helpers,
while in the same bargaining unit as skilled tradesmen, perform tasks
which are often treated differently in collective baraining.-
When a constituent sub-g-roup is disenfranchised, it continues to
pay union dues and to be represented by union leaders, but it has no
control over union policies or its officers. The leadership has little
incentive to respond to the interests of the group. Since members of
the group have no vote, obtaining their support will not help an
aspiring candidate win election. Similarly, by ignoring the group the
candidate runs no risk of losing votes. There are simply no votes to
be had.
Statutoly Provisions. Section 401 (e) of the LMRDA provides that
"every member in good standing .. shall have the right to vote.""0
The statute relies on the union to define its membership criteria. 7
Once having conveyed membership status, the voting right appears to
be automatic,78 though union constitutions are in fact permitted to
74. For example, in the early 1950's John L. Lewis decided to permit coal operators
to automate. He hoped the result would be higher wages for his men. even though lie
knecw it would mean unemployment for at least 100,000 members. While the decision
may have been unavoidable, many miners have not been able to get jobs elewhere and
remained in Appalachia, willing to work but only infrequently cmployed. Miners with
full-time jobs heavily favor continued mechanization which will increase producthity
and hence wages. Part-time workers, or those in less efficient mines, resist the trend
that is likely to cost them their jobs. M. BARaTz, TnE UNIoN AND TitE COAL 1%uusTnr
71-72 (1955); H. CAUDILL, NIcirT COMES TO TIlE Cu.MtuERLNDS 278 (1963); Anarchy Thrcat-
ens the Kingdom of Coal, FORTUNE, Jan. 1971, at 78.
75. One court has noted the special economic interest of semi-skilled members and
in dicta suggested that a refusal to allow semi-skilled workers to vote was unreasonable.
Acevedo v. Bookbinders & Machine Operators Local 25, 196 F. Supp. 308, 312 (S.DN.Y.
1961).
76. 29 US.C. § 481(e) (1970).
77. Section 3(o) of the Act states that a "member" for purposes of the statute shall
include:
any person who has fulfilled the requirements for membership in . . . [a labor]
organization, and who neither has voluntarily withdrawn fro mcninbershbp nor has
been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate procedings con-
sistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws of such organization.
29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (1970). The only court which appears to have passed on the issue
indicated that
it is not for the Court to upset such membership requirement unless it be deemcd
arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unreasonable.
Goldberg v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 204 F. Supp. 8441 (N.D. Cal. 196-). Con-
gressman Landrum, commenting on a proposal forbidding labor organizations to dis-
criminate in the admission of members on the basis of race, stated that:
We do not seek in this legislation, in no way, no shape, no guise, to tell the labor
unions of this country whom they shall admit to unions ...
This law is designed only to say that, if he is a member of a union, lie shall
have equal rights ....
105 CONG. REc. 15722 (1959).
78. For an argument that the statute, in light of its legislative history. penits no
union restrictions on the franchise of union members, see Bcaird, Union Officer Election
Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51 VA. L.
Rsv. 1306, 1313 (1965).
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impose reasonable rules and regulations on the right to vote.70 The
Department of Labor has defined a narrow range within which the
union may exercise such authority to limit the franchise and has con-
cluded that "a union may not create special classes of non-voting
members."8' 0 Courts have rarely passed upon constitutional provisions
barring certain membership classes from voting,', but commentary on
the Act has rightly argued that any such discriminations should be
considered suspect8 2
2. Manipulation of Interest Groups
The adequacy with which the political process articulates and me-
diates between particular demands of competing interest groups within
the union is obviously a function of the groups' power. In several elec-
tions studied, insurgents alleged that incumbent officers had, to their
own advantage, unfairly manipulated the representation afforded to
various groups.
Manipulation of sub-groups was most blatant where election pro-
cedures were designed to favor a group allegedly controlled by the
incumbents. In one electrical workers local, for example, two registra-
tion tables were used in the poll ballot election. One table was for
transients, working in the union's jurisdiction by permission of the
incumbent officers. These workers were thought to favor the incum.
79. Id.
80. (a) All members in good standing are entitled to vote in required elections
which are held by secret ballot. Members in good standing are persons who have
fulfilled the requirements for membership and who have neither voluntarily with-
drawn nor been expelled or suspended from membership after appropriate proceed-
ings consistent with lawful provisions of the constitution and bylaws. A labor
organization may, however, prescribe reasonable rules and regulations with respect
to voting eligibility. Thus, it may, in appropriate circumstances, defer eligibility to
vote by requiring a reasonable period of prior membership, such as 6 months or a
year, or by requiring apprentice members to complete their apprenticeship training,
as a condition of voting. While the right to vote may thus be deferred within rea-
sonable limits, a union may not create special classes of nonvoting members,
29 C.F.R. § 452.10 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
81. See Acevedo v. Bookbinders, 196 F. Supp. 308, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), where union
membership division between artisans and unskilled workers, with the latter paying
lower assessments and electing only minor union officials, was declared by the court In
dicta to be in violation of the LMRDA because it created a "permanent special class of
membership not entitled to an equal vote .... ." But see Villiams v. International
Typographical Union, 423 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970), uphold.
ing a union's right to classify part-time members as "not working at the trade' and,
as a consequence, prohibiting them from voting on wage scales.
82. See Berchem, Labor Democracy in America: The Iniact of Titles I and 11' of
the Landrum-Griffin Act, 13 VILL. L. REv. 1, 36 (1967); Bealrd, supra note 78, at 1316.
The latter article argues, based partly on LMRDA legislative history, that any restriction
upon a union member's right to vote should be struck down if it disenfranchises a large
proportion of the employees who pay dues. The payment of dues is the key indication
of sufficient stake in the union to warrant the franchise. Id. at 1317.
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bents because of the latter's control over their job permits. The second
table was for all other union members. As this was a far larger group,
long lines formed at the polling place, and many of these members al-
legedly became discouraged and left without voting.83
A second variation of the problem of manipulation is the separation
of groups within an electoral unit, either by type of employment or
by geography. In the United Mine Workers, for example, pensioned
miners were set up in separate locals composed exclusively of pen-
sioners. Their ability to communicate with other locals was limited,
and information on union affairs was received solely through the
incumbent-controlled union newspaper.8
The third type of manipulation alleged was tile use of financial
incentives and sanctions to produce "safe" blocs of support. Complain-
ing members of the Mineworkers contended that because of the pen-
sioned miners, incumbents had the exclusive support of thirty-eight
per cent of the union electorate.8 5 The loyalty of the pensioners was
allegedly guaranteed by raising the level of pension payments shortly
before the election campaign" and by threatening to withhold indi-
vidual payments to pensioners who supported the opposition.8 7
83. Interviews with complainant attorney Q and union attorney T.
84. Interview with complainant union members D, K, and JJ. Critics of the locals
suggest merging them with working locals so that working members will be able to
acquaint the pensioners with conditions within the mines. Supporters of the present
system of pensioner locals argue that pensioners receive better service than they would if
merged into locals with significant working membership. Interview with union officer M.
A similar situation appeared in a large maritime national where "shorcside workers"
were included within the union, though engaged in different tasks from the sea.going
rank and file. Such workers were subject to different initiation fees and dues. rarely
came in contact with principal union officers, and were separated geographically from
the sea-going membership. Interview with complainant union member 1'. Opposition
within the union charged that the inclusion was a violation of the national constitution.
However, the national president, under his exclusive authority to interpret the consti-
tution, disagreed and permittef the shoreside workers to attain membership status. Order
to Show Cause, Wirtz v. National Maritime Union. Civ. No. 66-4519 (S.D.N.Y.. filed
Oct. 15, 1970). Insurgents believe that the loyalty of the shoreside workers to the in-
cumbent president was thereby assured.
85. Pensioners comprise 70,000 out of a total UMW membership of 185,000. Letter
from Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman, to members of the Senate Subcommittee on
Labor, June 24, 1970.
86. On June 24, 1969, just two weeks before the conumencement of nominations for
national officers, the pension payments to bituminous coal miners were increased $35
a month from $115 to $150. The pension fund is administered by three trustees, one
from the coal industry, one independent, and one from the United Mine Workers. John
L. Lewis had been the union trustee until his death on June 12, 1969. On June 23, IVA.
Boyle, the president of the union, was appointed to fill the vacancy. The pension increase
occurred the next day, in the absence of the neutral trustee, Miss Josephine Roche.
Shortly thereafter, Boyle began his campaign for re-election. Hearings on UMW Elecion,
supra note 2, at 7-8 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski). The
impact of pensioners in the electoral process was significant; the incumbents obtained
eighty-seven per cent of the pensioner vote but only fifty-two per cent of the working
rank and file. Id. at 256-57 (March 18, 1970) (testimony of Frederick R. Blackwell,
Counsel to the Subcommittee).
87. Id. at 7-8 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
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Statutory Provisions. Where manipulation of sub-groups occurred,
as indicated in the preceding examples, various members contacted
suggested that the cause of the problem was the improper inclusion of
the manipulated gToup within the union. The remedy, according to
these members, was a judicial declaration compelling the exclusion
of the suspect group from membership. Yet the question of member-
ship within the union has been specifically left for decision by the
union,88 and courts are unlikely to attempt to mediate between oppos-
ing factions in a political struggle.8 9
There is also the related problem of the organization of local unions
into larger political units at the intermediate organization level. Abuses
could arise in this process analogous to conventional gerrymander
problems in public sector elections. But, as with the issue of union
membership qualifications, the LMRDA is silent on the matter, leav-
ing the question of internal political apportionment to the tender
mercies of the political process itself.0o
88. See note 77 supra.
89. The only court that appears to have been presented with such an opportunity
emphatically declined. In Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964), Local 802 of the
Musicians had conducted a mail referendum in which the membership of 28,000 had
approved a proposal to conduct all future officer elections by mail ballot by .a vote of
12,654 to 2,206. Plaintiffs proposed a bylaw amendment for consideration at "-the next
membership meeting which would have (1) rescinded the referendum and returned
election of officers to voting in person, and (2) required registration at the local during
business hours to qualify to vote in the mail ballot election. Plaintiffs' action reflected
an attempt on the part of the full-time musicians to gain control of the local from the
part-time musicians who, being employed in other lines of work, would be unable to
either vote or register in person. By court action, Gurton v. Manuti, 235 F. Stipp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), plaintiffs were able to force the bylaw amendments onto the agenda
of the membership meeting and they were adopted by the 1500 members in attendance.
The International Executive Board then intervened and declared the bylaw amendments
to be null and void. The court in Gurton v. Arons refused to prevent the International
from implementing its ruling and rejected plaintiffs' claim of a denial of their right to
vote under § 101 of the Act. The court held that the issue of whether the full- or
part-time musicians were to control the union
is surely an issue for the union to decide for itself and not an issue on which the
power of the courts should be enlisted on one side or the other. So long as tile
union in reaching its decision violates no provision of law, we judges should reso-
lutely keep hands off.
Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964). Cf. Vestal v. Teamsters, 245 F. Supp. 623(M.D. Tenn. 1965); Orchestra Comm. v. Local 4, Musicians, 303 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1962).
90. In the public sector, the Supreme Court has required that constituencies be or.
ganized into electoral units on the principle of one man-one vote, See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 537, 562-64 (1964). Such a standard could be imposed on labor unions if
courts were willing to read the one man-one vote requirement into the § 101(a)(l) guar-
antee of the equal right "to nominate candidates, [and] to vote in elections . . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970). It cannot be suggested that the authors of the LMRDA be-
lieved that § 101(a)(1) contained the one man-one vote requirement, nor can it be
implied that deviation from that requirement is impermissible tinder the equal protection
clause. What could be suggested, however, is that the congressional intention that the
statute be interpreted by looking to other areas of the law, see p. 558 and note 692 inIra,
warrants adopting the one man-one vote requirement of the public law of elections as
the proper interpretation of the "equal rights" provision in § 101(a)(l). The argument
would then be that since malapportionment violates the equal right to vote in either
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What the LMRDA is designed to do, however, is to protect the
integrity of that process of internal resolution-to establish fair and
uniform ground rules. Through enforcement of the provisions of the
Act, courts can deprive an incumbent of the tools of manipulation
that serve to isolate interest groups from political currents within the
union or to render them dependent on the continued favor of the
incumbents:
(1) Election procedures that favor the challenged interest group,
such as the two-table voting example, should be deemed contrary to
the statute.9 '
(2) Where the challenged interest group is isolated from tie rank
and file due to different employment circumstances or geographic
separation, 92 a court should be sensitive to the need for insuring that
candidates have available to them maximum access to facilities for
communication with the entire membership.13
(3) Where financial devices are used to curry the support of the
challenged interest group, a court should be sensitive to the political
significance of the financial manipulation and be responsive to an
election challenge based either on the use of union funds for campaign
purposes or a breach of fiduciary duty.04
general [Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 537 (1964)] or primary elections [Gray v. Sanders.
372 U.S. 368 (1963)] protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, departure froi one
man-one vote similarly violates the union member's equal rights to vote and to nominate
as protected by the LMRDA.
Few cases appear to have dealt even indirectly with the issue of one Inan-one vote in
union electoral processes. In American Federation of Musicians v. Wittstein. 379 US.
171 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld a union's system of weighted voting under which
convention delegates cast a number of votes equal to the membership of the local union
they represented.
The pervading premise of both these titles [Title I and Title IV] is that there should
be full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the union. We
think our decision today that the vote of an elected delegate may reflect the size
of his constituency is wholly consistent with that purpose.
Id. at 183. A district court heard argument as to alleged nmalapportionmenut of a general
grievance committee, but then dismissed that action on the grounds that the action
should be resolved under Title IV where the expertise of the Secretary of Labor would
be available. Spivey v. Grievance Comm., 69 L.R.R.M. 2709 (N.D. Ga. 1968). Cf. Lear
Siegler, Inc. v. United Auto Workers, 287 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
While courts could adopt the one man-one vote principle as the required guideline
for the organization of constituent groups into electoral units, it has been persuasively
argued that such a principle may be inappropriate to the political representation of
interest groups. See A. BicKEL, TiIE SUPRFME COURT AND TIlE IDEA OF I'nOG.Ss 151-81
(1970).
91. See pp. 428-30 supra. Such procedures would appear to deprive members of the
equal right to vote under LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) (1970), or of the
right to vote guaranteed in LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 4181(e) (1970).
92. See pp. 430-31 supra.
93. See pp. 452-60 infra.
94. See pp. 460-68 infra. In Blankenship v. Boyle, Civ. No. 2186-69 (D.D.C.. filed
Apr. 28, 1971), VA. Boyle was ordered removed as a trustee of the UMW Welfare and
Retirement Fund for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with his administration of
the fund. See note 86 supra.
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By depriving incumbents of the devices for manipulating groups
within the union, the political process may be permitted to resolve
the issues of who should be admitted to membership and how local
unions should be organized into intermediate level units. The vehicle
for forestalling incumbent manipulation is the Act itself. While the
provisions of the statute are phrased in terms of the rights of indi-
viduals, they should be employed in this context to insure the ability of
groups to participate effectively in the political process within the
union.
B. Membership Participation in the Electoral Process
Union members can participate in the electoral process in a number
of ways-by running for office, nominating candidates, expressing their
views, and casting their ballots.00 If union restrictions or coercive
practices prevent or discourage participation, the value of officer elec-
tions in achieving union responsiveness will obviously be impaired.
Union election participants related a number of ways in which mem-
bership participation can be stifled.
1. Candidate Eligibility Requirements
Union constitutions and bylaws normally specify limitations on
who may be a candidate, some of which overlap with restrictions on
voter eligibility.90 A candidate may be required to have been in good
standing regarding dues payment for some specified period, a re-
striction often found on the suffrage right as well.0 7 Members of cer-
tain sub-groups within the union, such as apprentices, supervisors, self-
employed persons, or members who also belong to other unions, may
be completely barred from both voting and candidacy.08 The candidacy
95. Although some theorists have stressed the importance of citizen participation II
politics as a means of allowing the constituency to feel a part of the process of gov-
ernance, see, e.g., Summers, The Eublic Interest in Union Democracy, 53 Nw. U.L. RV.
610, 611-13, 622-24 (1958), the emphasis here is oil participation as a way of effectuating
the goal of responsiveness.
96. DOL CoNsrITTrrON STUDY, supra note 72, at 37.
97. Sixty-four of the seventy-three national unions in the DOL survey, covering
ninety-five per cent of the total membership within the study, had provisions rendering
a candidate ineligible if he was in arrears in payment of his dues for a specified period
of time. Forty-six of the sixty-four also required qualified candidates to have completed
a stated period of membership in the union during which they remained in continuous
good standing.
If good standing is required for several years and one late payment of dues at any time
during those years ruins "good standing," many members will fail to meet the require-
ment. Id. at 38-39, 42-43.
98. As of the 1965 study, forty of the seventy-three constitutions surveyed excluded
one or more classes of members; ten million members, sixty-five per cent of those In
the study, were in unions with such disqualifications. Id. at 43-48.
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restriction in such instances is justified on the theory that supervisors,
self-employed persons, and members of other unions have conflicts
of interest which might compromise their bargaining duties, and that
apprentices are unlikely to represent the views of a majority of the
members. 99
Because it is believed that officers should be especially familiar with
the union and its members and capable of administering and nego-
tiating contracts,100 most unions impose on officer candidates require-
ments in addition to restrictions normally imposed on the suffrage
right. Most unions have minimum length of membership require-
ments.' 0 ' Many impose minimum meeting attendance requirementso'
or make prior office-holding a prerequisite for higher office.'0 3 It is
difficult to assess union arguments in favor of such restrictions. Al-
99. Other formal eligibility requirements exclude members affiliated with subversic
organizations, convicted of crimes, or found guilty by the union disciplinary structure of
violations of union rules, or those who are foreign citizens or who have worked in the
local's jurisdiction for less than a minimum time. Id. at 44-49. The restrictions on mem-
bers of subversive organizations and previously convicted criminals arc similar to those
in LMIRDA § 504(a), 29 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1970). This provision was held unconstitutional
as it relates to membership in the Consunist Party. United States v. Brown, 381 US.
437 (1965).
100. Interview with union attorneys IV and GG and union officers E and F.
101. Of seventy-three unions surveyed, forty-seven have length of membership re-
quirements for local officers. The requirements range from four months to three )ears.
All but five constitutions require one year or more of membership. DOL Co.siTrrsnov
STUDY, supra note 72, at 40-43.
Length of membership requirements have not been widely challenged by the DOL.
Unions insist these requirements are valid means of insuring that all candidates have
a minimum acquaintance with the union and its members. If such familiarity is desired.
a requirement of no more than three years seems reasonable. A three year requirement
would insure that a candidate would have participated in at least one preious union
election, since 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (1970) requires that local elections be conducted at
least once every three years. Also, it is likely that the member will have watched at
least one collective bargaining session in three years. The "contract bar" rules of the
NLRB prohibit a challenge to a unit's bargaining representative for three years if the
life of a contract is for that period or longer. General Cable Corporation, 189 N.L.R.B.
1123 (1962). These contract bar rules and general industry practices have made the three
year contract predominant.
However, in light of the arguments made against eligibility requirements, see pp.
436-38 infra, it is doubtful that unions can justify the imposition of any membership
requirements as necessary to guarantee quality officers. If a candidate is "inexperienced,'
the membership should be free to make that determination at the polls. But see Wirtz
v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47, 61-63 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d
Cir. 1968) (upholding a five-year membership requirement); Wirtz v. letroleum Workers
Union, 75 L.R.R.M. 2341 (N.D. Ind. 1970) (upholding three.)ear continuous membership
requirement which excluded less than thirty per cent of the membership).
102. Fifteen unions, with one-third of the membership studied, have meeting attend-
ance requirements. Most of the constitutions require fifty per cent attendance at the
meetings held six, twelve, or twenty-four months before the nomination. DOL CoNS'n-
TUTION STUDY, supra note 72, at 49-50.
103. Only one national union, the International Ladies' Garment Workers. mandates
prior officeholding for local office, but many have such requirements for intermediate or
national office. In that union, taking a union leadership course is an alternative may to
meet the requirement. Further, a random sample by DOL indicated that a few locals of
other national unions had at their own initiative adopted such restrictions. U.S. DEVr OF
LABOR, QUALIFICATIONS FOR UNION OFFIcE, Appendix B, tables 8-12 (1970).
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though some qualifications for office are no doubt required to assure
competent leadership, no one has documented the superiority of leader-
ship in those unions with strict eligibility requirements. Candidate
eligibility is sufficiently important to achieving electoral responsive-
ness that restrictions on candidacy must be given close scrutiny.
Statutory Provisions. Section 401 (e) of the LMRDA provides that
"every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate
and to hold office" subject to "reasonable qualifications uniformly
imposed."'104 The statute thus leaves open the most difficult question
--which qualifications are "reasonable." Many eligibility requirements
would probably not pass the strict scrutiny applied by the Supreme
Court in Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees.oa In Local 6, the Court
struck down as "unreasonable" a union provision which, in requiring
prior office-holding experience for candidacy, had the effect of ren-
dering ninety-three per cent of the union members ineligible for of.
fice.10 The Court reasoned that union members could be trusted to
choose competent officers without prior screening through eligibility
requirements10 7 The ruling lends credence to the belief of other
104. In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot
a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every
member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office(subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly ira.
posed) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or
candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper
interference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof.
Not less than fifteen days prior to the election notice thereof shall be mailed to
each member at his last known home address. Each member in good standinu shall
be entitled to one vote. No member whose dues have been withheld by his em-ployer for payment to such organization pursuant to his voluntary authorization
provided for in a collective bargaining agreement shall be declared ineligible to vote
or be a candidate for office in such organization by reason of alleged delay or
default in the payment of dues. The votes cast by members of each local labor
organization shall be counted, and the results published, separately. The election
officials designated in the constitution and bylaws or the secretary, if no other official
is designated, shall preserve for one year the ballots and all other records pertaining
to the election. The election shall be conducted in accordance with the constitution
and bylaws of such organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this subchapter.
LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970).
105. 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
106. Id. at 502.
107. Id. at 504. In affirming the district court, the Supreme Court accepted its view
that:
The philosophy adopted by Congress in the Act is well expressed in a motto used
by a newspaper and said to have been inspired by, or translated from, Dante(Divine Comedy, Purgatory, canto XXII, lines 67-79): "Give light and the people
will find their own way." The members of a union must have a free choice to give
such weight to experience, inexperience, or to other factors as they see fit.
Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees, 265 F. Supp. 510, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
This principle is sound. Although the right to be a candidate is an individual right,
it is also critical to all union members if they are to have a wide pool from which to
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courts,108 the DOL,109 and scholars1 ° that the real purpose of such
requirements is to limit potential opposition to the incumbent ad-
ministration.':'
When courts have scrutinized other candidate eligibility require-
ments closely, they have often held them to be unreasonable. Require-
ments of pre-nomination declaration of candidacy have been disal-
lowed, courts viewing them as devices which permit incumbents to
harass prospective candidates for long periods before an election. '2
Dues pre-payment requirements have been struck down as being un-
related to officership qualification."13
Although early challenges to the exclusion of certain sub-groups
from candidacy were fruitless," 4 the recent decision in Hodgson v.
Local 18, Operating Engineers"zi is a sensitive response to such restric-
select officers. See Summers, supra note I 1, at 293. In Wirtz v. National Maritime Union,
284 F. Supp. 47, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968), another prior office-
holding requirement was found unreasonable.
108. See, e.g., Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D..Y.), afl'd,
399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 262. Glass Bottle Blowers, 29t0 F. Supp. 965
(N.D. Cal. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631, 631 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), vacated as moot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966); Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union
of Florida, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2110 (M.D. Fla. 1967); contra, Shultz v. Local 6799. Steel-
workers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), afj'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 969 (th
Cir. 1970), afrd, 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
109. DOL QUALtFICATioS STUDY, supra note 103, at 70.
110. Kleiler, The Impact of Title I-MI of the Landrum.Griffin Act, 3 GA. L. R.
378, 387 (1968); St. Antoine, Landrum-Griffin 1965-1966: A Calculus of Democratic
Values, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. o-% LAn. 35, 49 (1966); Beaird, supra note 78, at 1319.
111. The DOL's test for evaluating eligibility rules has four questions: (1) What has
been the effect of the rule-does it make it easy or difficult to run for office? (2) What
is the union rationale for the rule and is this legitimate? (3) Is the rule realistic in terms
of the normal behavior and interests of the union member? (4) Does the rule serve
some positive institutional need in terms of this particular union or unions in general?
DOL QUALIFiCATIONS STUDY, supra note 103, at 3. These tests, particularly the last one,
were argued to the Supreme Court in the Local 6 case. Brief for the Petitioner at 16,
Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
112. Wirtz v. Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, 64 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2457 (N.D.N.Y. 1966),
partially rev'd on other grounds, 381 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 406, Oper-
ating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962, 966 (E.D. La. 1966); Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs,
242 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), vacated as moot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 196b).
113. Wirtz v. Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 2954 F. Supp. 980 (D. Colo. 1965), ali'd, 366
F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1966), dismissed as moot, 387 U.S. 96 (1967). See also Wirtz v. Local
406, Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962, 965 (E.D. La. 1966); Wirtz v. Local 410, Oper-
ating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631 (N.D.N.Y. 1964), vacated as moot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1966). At the time of these suits only the Railway Trainmen and Locomotive Firemen
had similar requirements not allowing any arrearage period. In most unions sixty to
ninety days is the permissible arrearage period before a member is no longer in good
standing. DOL QUALIFICATIONS STUDY, supra note 103, at Append x B. table 3.
In addition, the DOL has announced it will not tolerate racial eligibility distinctions.
The courts may soon face this question squarely. Shultz v. Local 1291, Longshoremen.
299 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd and remanded for trial on nerit , 429 F.2d 592
(3d Cir. 1970) (claim was made that officers were apportioned on the basis of race in
violation of § 401(d)).
114. Wirtz v. Local 406, Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962, 966 (EMD. La. 1966); Wirtz
v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47, 62 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1968).
115. 440 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1971).
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tions. The case involved workers who, although long-time union mem-
bers, did not belong to the "parent branch," the only branch whose
members were allowed to be candidates. The other branches of the
union included members who did not choose to pay the high initia-
tion fee required to join the parent branch or who worked in trades
excluded from it. The court held that neither the failure to pay the
higher initiation fee nor the different trade classification was a "rea-
sonable" ground for disqualification. 116
Meeting attendance requirements, however, have not been classi-
fied unreasonable. Courts have struck down these requirements only
when they disqualify an undue pioportion of the membership. 117
While this test offers some protection for potential candidates, it avoids
the question of whether meeting attendance has any rational relation
to candidate competency. One court, for example, upheld a Steel-
workers meeting attendance requirement that did not result in wide-
spread disqualification largely because a liberal work excuse provision
gave members credit for meetings they could not attend. 118 Yet, if
meeting attendance has any relation to preparing potential candidates
for officership, members who have not attended meetings because of
work are no better qualified to be officers than those who have been
absent for other reasons. While meeting-goers are likely to be initially
more familiar with union procedures, it would seem that others could
acquire a similar familiarity in a very short time. Meeting attendance
requirements should therefore be viewed with the same skepticism as
other eligibility restrictions. Eligibility requirements should be found
reasonable only if they can be shown to have a direct relationship with
officer competency. Otherwise, it should be left to the membership
to weed out incompetent candidates at the ballot box. 110
116. Hodgson v. Local 18, Operating Eng'rs, 440 F.2d 485 (6th Cir.), cert. dcnied,
404 U.S. 852 (1971).
117. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 405 F2d 176 (3d Cir.), on remand from
389 U.S. 463 (1968); Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of Florida, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104
(M.D. Fla. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass Bottle Blowers, 290 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal.
1968); Wirtz v. Local 66, Glass Bottle Blowers, 268 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Pa. 1967). Meeting
attendance requirements were upheld in Martin v. Local 636, Boilermakers, 245 F. Supp.
375 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (even though the requirement made ninety-two per cent of the
membership ineligible); Shultz v. Local 420, Aluminum Workers, 74 L.R.R.M. 2281,
2282 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Shultz v. Local 1299, Steelworkers, 324 F. Supp. 750, 756.57 (E.D.
Mich. 1970), aff'd, Civ. Nos. 71-1293, 71-1297 (6th Cir., filed Dec. 29, 1971); and Shultz
v. Local 1150, Steelworkers, 75 L.R.R.M. 2869 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
118. Schultz v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), all'd, 426
F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), af'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 333 (1971).
119. If this standard is the rule to be applied after the Local 6 case, it will be nearly
impossible as a practical matter for any union to meet the burden of proving that an
eligibility requirement is necessary to guarantee quality officers. This rule, however,
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2. Fraudulent Disqualification of Candidates
Eligibility under good standing or meeting attendance requirements
is determined by the union election committee based on records kept
by the incumbents. Two types of abuses were alleged. First, records
of an insurgent candidate can be altered to keep him from satisfying
eligibility requirements. 120 Second, ineligible insurgent candidates may
be disqualified while equally ineligible administration candidates are
allowed to run.12 1
Statutory Provisions. Section 401 (e) of the LMRDA states that
"every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate"
subject to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed,"' 2 2 and
§ 101 (a) (1) grants every member "equal rights . . . to nominate
candidates."'' 2 Both provisions would appear to be violated if a quali-
fied candidate is declared ineligible or if unions discriminate in their
treatment of ineligible candidates. Courts have reversed discriminatory
denials of eligibility in both Title 1124 and Title IV12 suits.
But, although statutory provisions prohibiting fraudulent exclusions
of candidates exift, complainants face difficult proof problems. The
would permit a union to exclude those with true conflicts of interests, such as members
of other unions, supervisors, or members who are also employers. See pp. 434-35 supra,
describing these eligibility requirements.
For a pre-Local 6 argument that the union interest in restricting candidacy should be
balanced against the degree to which the restriction limits the pool of possible candidates,
see Note, The Election Labyrinth: An Inquiry Into Title IV of the LMRDA, 43 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 336, 340-46 (1968) [hereinafter cited as NYU Note].
120. Interview with complainant union member B.
121. Questionnaires from complainant union members EE, GG and HH and inter-
views with union attorney GG and union officer E. See also Wirtz v. Local 705. Hotel
Employees, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968), where such an
allegation was made. The case, however, was dismissed for failure to exhaust internal
remedies.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970).
123. Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges
within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums
of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in
the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reason-
able rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws.
LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970).
124. DePew v. Edmisten, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967). Contra, Calhoon v. Harvcy. 379
U.S. 134 (1964). See full discussion of Title I eligibility suits at pp. 550-51 infra.
125. Title IV challenges of eligibility disqualifications have had differing results de-
pending on how the "may have affected" test (see pp. 515-18 infra) was applied.
Courts have resorted to either (1) a per se test, on a theory that "where there is exclu-
sion, reasonable probability [that the excluded candidate may have won] is presumed."
Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.). afJ'd, 399 F'±d 544 (2d
Cir. 1968); and similar holdings in Wirtz v. Local 559. Carpenters, 60 L.R.R.M. 2522(W.I. Ky. 1965); Wirtz v. Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 58 L.R.R.M. 2551 (D. Colo. 1965).
af.rd, 366 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1966). vacated as moot, 387 U.S. 96 (1967); or, (2) courts
have required a showing of the probable vote-drawing power of the excluded candidate
and a determination of whether this would be sufficient to upset the election, Wirtz
v. Local 410, Operating Eng'rs, 61 L.R.R.M. 2396, 2398 (N.D.N.Y. 1965), vacated as moot,
366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966).
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unions will probably have sole possession of the records necessary to
show discrimination. This circumstance could be accommodated by a
judicial willingness to put upon the union the burden of proof that
its eligibility requirements were not discriminatorily applied. Such
a shift would also be an effective judicial response to the suspect qual-
ity of meeting attendance and dues payment requirements and to the
incumbents' incentive to disqualify prospective opponents.
3. Barriers to Nomination
Nominations for local offices 120 are normally accepted from the
floor in a regular or special meeting of the local's membership. A num-
ber of methods may be employed to prevent members from exercising
their rights at these local nomination meetings. Members may be de-
nied adequate notice of the time and place of nomination proceed-
ings.1 2 7 In some unions, allegations were made of even more blatant
conduct. In one instance, the meeting was held during a work shift
to exclude certain members' attendance.22 8
Local nomination meetings are important not only for selecting can-
didates for local office but also for selecting intermediate and national
level candidates. To gain nomination for such higher offices, a candi-
date is often required to obtain the endorsement of the membership
of a specified number of local unions.1 29 Names of prospective candi-
dates are placed in nomination, and the local membership votes among
them. The winner is the local's endorsed candidate.
The same abuses which disrupt the nomination of local union can-
didates may also plague the endorsement process, which is often con-
ducted at the same meeting of the local. Additional allegations were
heard, however, in connection with local meetings held exclusively
for the purpose of endorsing candidates for higher office. In one in-
126. A candidate is usually nominated by the simple act of having his name advanced
and seconded. However, a few unions require a greater showing of support. The Ladies'
Garment Workers national permits its locals to require that a candidate be endorsed
by a specified number-no more than five per cent-of the members at the meeting.
DOL CONSTITUTION STUDY, supra note 72, at 51-52.
127. Hearings on UMW Election, supra note 2, at 11 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of
Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
128. Interview with complainant union member HH.
129. See DOL QUALIFICATIONS STUDY, supra note 103, at Appendix B, table 15, for
local endorsements required for candidacy in referenda for national offices. Endorsements
of locals for officer candidacy in district referenda were required in the districts of six
officers in three national unions interviewed. The prime example is the Steelworkers.
To be nominated for district office, a candidate must win at least five locals plus one
for every 10,000 members in the district. Interview with union officer A.
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stance, the time of the endorsement meeting was changed without
notice. 130 In more extreme instances, tactics have allegedly included
such successful devices as setting the meeting hall clock forward and
holding the meeting before insurgent supporters arrived, 31 hiring
thugs to push insurgent supporters back into their seats when they
rose to make a nomination,13 2 and failing to inform the national of a
local's endorsement of insurgent candidates until after the filing dead-
line.133 An additional objection was that prospective candidates were
denied information as to the time and place of endorsement meetings,
thus depriving them of the opportunity to insure tie presence of their
supporters, send observers, or speak on their own behal. 134
Even if the endorsement meetings are procedurally fair, candidates
for intermediate or national level office can be effectively excluded
by varying the number of local endorsements required for nomination.
Exclusion can also be accomplished by giving equal weight in the
nomination process to locals of varying size. An intermediate level
organization requiring a fixed number of local endorsements may
have one or two dominant locals containing the bulk of the member-
ship. There, a candidate favored by one of these large locals may not
be nominated-even though he may be the choice of a majority of the
membership-unless he can also win the endorsement of some of the
smaller locals.
To obtain such endorsements, a prospective candidate must be al-
lowed to solicit support, a task which can become impossible if poten-
tial nominees are unable to send campaign literature to the members.
Yet many unions refuse to give prospective candidates copies of the
union membership list.13
Statutory Provisions. While the LMRDA does not explicitly demand
notice to the membership of nomination or endorsement meetings,
130. Letter from Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., to George P. Shultz, Secretary of Labor July
9, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Rauh-Shultz letter], in Hearings on UfuW Election, supra
note 2, at 4041 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
131. Id. at 439-41 (Sept. 9, 1970) (testimony of Julius Savitsk)).
132. rd. at 11-12 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
133. Rauh-Shultz letter, supra note 130.
134. Interview with union officer 0; Hearings on UMwJ Eection, supra note 2. at
12-13 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski), indicating that in addi-
tion to the difficulty in getting a list of local nomination meetings, "The Sccretary.
Treasurer of the UMW organization didn't know how man) locals he had, didn't know
how many members he had, didn't maintain a list of members, as the Landrum-Griffin
Act required him to do for ten years."
135. Because they lacked mailing lists, potential nominees sought to have unions mail
out their literature in three cases: Schonfeld v. Rarback, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. J 19,039
(1964); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers. 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1969); Webb v.
Teamsters, 55 L.R.R.M. 2762 (S.D. IlL. 1963).
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Title IV requires "reasonable opportunity ... for the nomination of
candidates,"1 36 and Title I guarantees "equal rights . . . to nominate
candidates."'137 The DOL has interpreted the statute to require "rea-
sonable notice ... of the time, place, and proper form of submitting
nominations."' 38 There is thus a statutory basis for challenging a lack
of proper notice to the membership.
Nowhere in the LMRDA, however, is there recognition of the can-
didate's need for such information in intermediate or national level
nomination proceedings. The DOL has formally considered this prob-
lem only once. In reaching a consent agreement with the Steelworkers
to rerun a district election, the DOL insisted that any candidate meet-
ing eligibility requirements be provided with the names and addresses
of local union recording secretaries, from whom he could request in-formation regrding endorsement meetings.130 The difficulty of qual-
ifying as a candidate without such information suggests that a right
to obtain it should be read into the LMRDA provision for a "reason-
able opportunity ... for the nomination of candidates."' 40
Manipulation of nomination or endorsement meetings appears even
more clearly to be a violation of the equal right to nominate guaran-
teed by Title I and the reasonable opportunity to nominate candidates
provided by Title IV. Courts dealing with challenged nomination pro-
cedures should be careful to scrutinize their actual effects on the can-
136. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970). Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 242 F. Supp. 631
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), vacated as moot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966), held that the union's
failure to give notice about the need for a pre-nomination declaration of candidacy was
a § 401(e) violation of the right to a reasonable opportunity to nominate, but because
no outcome effect was demonstrated did not order a rerun. Inadequate 401(e) notice
of the actual election was found in Shultz v. Independent Employees Union of Packer
land Packing, 74 L.R.R.M. 2137 (W.D. Wisc. 1970) (mere posting in plant is insufficient
notice) and Wirtz v. Local 1622, Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (notice
to only 2319 of the 2700 members in the local was insufficient), but denied in Wirtz v.
Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 58 L.R.R.M. 2550 (D. Colo. 1965), alf'd, 366 F.2d 911 (10th
Cir. 1966), vacated as moot, 387 U.S. 96 (1967) (not sending notice to 141 members whose
addresses were not known is not a violation). For further discussion, see NYU Note,
supra note 119, at 339-40.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970). For an example of a court which found that inade-
quate nomination notice and procedure could infringe on equal rights, see Mamula v.
United Steelworkers, 198 F. Supp. 652 (W.D. Pa. 1961). Use of Title I to remedy such
violations, however, was denied in the case's reversal. 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 823 (1962). For further discussion of Title I, see pp. 549-53 infra.
138. 29 C.F.R. § 452.8 (1971).
139. This right is now included in UNImT STEELWORKERS, INTERNATIONAL UNION ELEC-
TIONS MANUAL, Part II § F and G (1968).
140. Incumbent candidates normally have a list of the time and place of all nouinat.
tion meetings. Unless other candidates are given the list, there would seem to be a
violation of the § 401(e) requirement that "every member in good standing shall be
eligible to be a candidate .. . subject ... to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed,"
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970), since denial of the list to the candidate might be held to be
a non-uniformn application of a qualification.
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didates seeking nomination. Nomination procedures which seem per-
fectly reasonable on their face are often in fact quite burdensome for
some candidates. Courts in Title IV cases can fashion an adequate
remedy for these situations by reading the Title I equal rights notion
into the Title IV reasonableness standard. 141
Exclusion of candidacies at the intermediate or national level
through the device of strict endorsement requirements is open to
challenge under both the § 401 (e) right to nominate and the
§ 101 (a) (1) equal rights provisions. Both sections contain a reason-
ableness standard. In considering the reasonableness of a challenged
endorsement requirement, courts should examine the amount of sup-
port received by an unsuccessful candidate. If the candidate received
nomination votes amounting to a significant proportion of the votes
cast in the last union election, then the endorsement requirement
should be considered unreasonable.142 The union's legitimate interest
in eliminating insignificant candidacies would be protected by the re-
quirement of a substantial amount of support. While further study
would be required to decide what should count as a "significant pro-
portion of the votes," it would seem that any candidate who can attract
five to ten per cent of the votes cast in the last election possesses
enough support to be allowed to run for office. 43
It should also be noted that by employing the concept of reasonable-
ness to disallow endorsement requirements which are too restrictive
due to the equal weighting of locals of widely disparate sizes, courts
would in fact be nudging nomination procedures in the direction of
the one man-one vote principle.144
141. A good example of the need to read the equal rights provision into the reason-
ableness standard is in Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47. 59.60
(S.D.N.Y.). aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968). In dealing with a requirement that insur-
gents, but not incumbents, had to personally circulate nominating petitions, the court
found that the one month period in which to get petitions signed %%-as not unreasonable
under § 401(e) because there was no showing that it imposed hardships on an)" candi-
dates. The court nonetheless struck down the requirement under § 401(c) because to
require the petition procedure of insurgents and not incumbents imposed unequal bur-
dens to nomination. Thus the court read the equal rights language of § 101(a)(l) into
the reasonableness requirement of § 401(e).
142. The turnout in the last election is suggested as a base rather tian the total
membership of the electoral unit because the former figure more accurately reflects the
number of people in the union actively interested in its affairs and the number who
are likely to vote in the upcoming election.
143. Five to ten per cent may be too high given the fact that many fewer people
are likely to vote in a primary than in a regular election. This is especially true if
nominations are decided at nomination meetings rather than by poll ballot, as attendance
at meetings is often quite low.
144. For a fuller discussion of the possible application of the one man-one vote prin-
ciple to unions, see note 90 supra.
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Sensitivity to the problem of gaining endorsements from dispersed
locals was demonstrated in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers1 45 in
granting a potential nominee mailing rights under § 401 (c).1 40 Relief
of this kind had been denied in previous cases on the grounds that
the statute provided mailing rights only to "bona fide candidates."
1 7
Relying on the DOL's Interpretive Manual which states that potential
nominees qualify as "candidates," Yablonski held that the endorsement
phase in intermediate or national elections was sufficiently critical that
the same communication rights granted during the actual campaign
must be afforded.148
4. Coercion in the Exercise of Rights
Participation in the electoral process can be greatly impaired if the
membership is subject to coercion during the nomination process, the
campaign phase, or in the formal balloting. Although actual coercion
may be infrequent, mere fear of reprisal may cause individuals to with-
draw from the electoral process or to hide their actual preferences.1 4
Field interviews suggest that candidates and their supporters may be
subjected to two types of coercion: financial and physical. 1 0
145. 71 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.D.C. 1969).
146. Every national or international labor organization, except a federation of
national or international labor organizations, and every local labor organization,
and its officers, shall be under a duty, enforceable at the suit of any bona fide
candidate for office in such labor organization in the district court of the United
States in which such labor organization maintains its principal office, to comply
with all reasonable requests of any candidate to distribute by mail or otherwise at
the candidate's expense campaign literature in aid of such person's candidacy to all
members in good standing of such labor organization and to refrain from discrhni.
nation in favor of or against any candidate with respect to the use of lists of menut-
bers, and whenever such labor organizations or its officers authorize the distribution
by mail or otherwise to members of campaign literature on behalf of any candidate
or of the labor organization itself with reference to such election, similar distribution
at the request of any other bona fide candidate shall be made by such labor organi-
zation and its officers, with equal treatment as to the expense of such distribution.
Every bona fide candidate shall have the right, once within 30 days prior to in
election of a labor organization in which he is a candidate, to inspect a list containing
the names and last known addresses of all members of the labor organization who
are subject to a collective bargaining agreement requiring membership therein as a
condition of employment, which list shall be maintained and kept at the principal
office of such labor organization by a designated official thereof. Adequate safeguards
to insure a fair election shall be provided, including the right of any candidate to
have an observer at the polls and at the counting of the ballots.
LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
147. Webb v. Teamsters, 55 L.R.R.M. 2672 (S.D. 111. 1963); Schonfeld v. Rarback, 49
CCH Lab. Cas. 19,039 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
148. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.D.C. 1969).
149. Interviews with complainant union members A, F, and N and union officer C.
150. A third variety of coercion can take the form of union discipline for comments
critical of incumbents. Because the case law seems to adequately protect member free
speech, this Note did not focus on the free speech problem. A look at the case law,
however, demonstrates the ability of courts to fashion LMRDA remedies in areas where
familiar adjudicative standards are involved.
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A frequently encountered allegation was that potential candidates
were offered money or high-salaried union positions to abandon plans
to run against incumbents.1a31 Supporters of Joseph Yablonski in the
1969 Mineworkers campaign were allegedly induced to change their
allegiance by offers of union jobs, lucrative part-time positions with
minimal responsibilities, lobbying trips that were actually paid vaca-
tions, and cash payments. 152
When positive inducements fail, some incumbents may induce em-
ployers to fire opposition members and "blackball" them from getting
subsequent employment. Complainant union members indicated that
this was the most frequent form of political intimidation.253 Most
often, this coercion was directed against the dissident candidate him-
self,154 but supporters have also had their jobs threatened. 1 5 Coercion
Free speech is guaranteed by LMRDA § 101(a)(2). 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970). The
right was broadly construed in Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). which decided that robust, even libelous, speech was char-
acteristic of internal union politics and should be protected from union discipline. Later
cases protected even statements the union characterized as "malicious vilification."
See, e.g., Cole v. Hall, 339 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1965). The Supreme Court's standards for
libel and slander in the public sector, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 209 (1971),
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which have been applied to the union
context, Lynn v. Local 114, Plant Guards, 383 U.S. 53 (1966), leave little room for union
punishment of member speech about either issues or candidates. Courts have thus almost
without exception reversed member suspensions for campaign statements. See Boiler-
makers Union v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307 (9th Cir. 1965); Grand Lodge, Machinists v. King.
335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964); Addison v. Grand Lodge, Machinists, 300 F.2d 863 (9th Cir.
1962); Sheridan v. Local 2, Liquor Salesmen. 303 F. Supp. 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Giordani
v. Upholsterers Union, 68 L.R.R.M. 2648 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 403 F.2d 85 ed Cir. 1965);
Archibald v. Local 57, Operating Eng'rs, 276 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967); Deacon v. Local
12, Operating Eng'rs, 273 F. Supp. 169 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Nix v. Fulton Lodge 2, Machinists,
262 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Barbour v. Sheet Metal Workers Union, 263 F. Supp.
724 (E.D. Mich. 1966), rev'd, 401 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1968); Amondo v. Urbach, 236 F.
Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Farnum v. Kurtz, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. f 13,216 (L.A. Mun. Ct.,
L.A. Jud. Dist. 1968). In Semancik v. District 5, Mineworkers, 324 F. Supp. 1292 (.D.
Pa. 1971), the union's election discipline provision was so broad that the court struck
it down entirely.
Although union officers complain that Saizhandler and the cases following it hase
undermined unions at the bargaining table, they cannot relate any examples of union
loss of effectiveness because of an abundance of free speech. Interview with union at-
torney IV. See also AFL-CIO MARrMME TRADE DEPAn TMEE"T, A REvouT AFra Emrr
YEARS OF THE LANDRUm-GirFiN Aar 3 (1967).
151. Interviews with complainant union members I and N and complainant attorney
G; Verick, Rebel Voices in the NMU, NEw PoLrrIcs, Summer 1966, at 33.
152. Hearings on UMW Election, supra note 2, at 138-39, 415-18 (testimony of Thomas
Hudock, June 25, 1970, and Louis Antal, Feb. 6, 1970).
153. Eleven of the thirty-one complainant union members contacted suggested that
candidates were subjected to threats of the loss of their jobs either when announcing
their candidacy or during the campaign. Eight of the thirty-one suggested that a candi-
date's supporters were subject to the same harassment. Fourteen complainant union
members said job discrimination and other forms of intimidation discouraged union
members from being candidates themselves or actively supporting candidates of their
choice.
154. Complainant union member F contended that two men on his slate would not
participate in the DOL-sponsored rerun because of violence in the first election.
155. Interview with complainant union members H, I. L, and S. Three members
alleged it was relatively easy to single out key supporters by looking at nominating
petitions.
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of this type can be most effective when the member's job depends on a
hiring hall or an informal referral system where a company comes to
the union for employees.150 Employers may be willing to cooperate
with such union intimidation because they view insurgent candidates
as trouble-makers or they do not wish to impair relations with existing
incumbents157 More subtle discriminations against opposition candi-
dates may take the form of transfers to a different work shift, which
prevents the candidate from attending union meetings,5 8 or the
union's deliberate failure to process a prospective candidate's griev-
ances.', 9
If the candidate or his supporters are union staff members, as often
is the case in intermediate or national elections, they may lose their
jobs.1 60 Candidates may alternatively be transferred to an area or ac-
tivity which separates them from rank and file contact.' 1
156. M. Schimpff, Brotherhood of Painters, District Council 9: Case Study 79 (1963)
(unpublished student essay in Yale Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as Plaintcr's
District 9 Study]; interviews with complainant union member L and union attorney 0,
Four of twenty union officers who responded believed such harassment might be a
problem at times. Complainant union member I summarized the effect of losing a job
on election campaigns: "Every working stiff is two weeks from being broke."
The great potential for discrimination in hiring halls was stressed in interviews with
complainant union members H and 0. One union member filed suit with the NLRB.
The NLRB trial examiner concluded that the sole reason for his dismissal was that he
dared oppose the incumbents. Initially, the union attempted to dissuade him with
threats and later with an actual beating. It was found that this conduct violated his
rights. See text of the Trial Examiners Report in Daily Labor Reports, March 7, 1969,
§ A, at 13-17.
Member H's income varied from $18,000 to $1800 per year depending on whether
he was in active opposition to the incumbents. He too went to the NLRB, but without
relief.
Union officer B, the leader of a large building trades association, conceded that busl.
ness agents may give the best jobs to their supporters. He believes the NLRB has hn.
vestigated complaints about this practice, but rarely if ever files suit. Complainant union
member A noted that in his union, fellow union members do the hiring. As a conse-
quence, insurgents often find it difficult to find work. Complainant union members
H and S raised much the same problem in their construction unions.
157. Interviews with complainant union members A, H, and N; Hearings on UMW
Election, supra note 2, at 117-22 (Feb. 6, 1970) (testimony of Karl Kafton).
158. Interview with union officer N.
159. Interview with complainant union member H.
160. Interview with complainant union member G; Hearings on UMWI Election, supra
note 2, at 9-10 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski), discussing his
father's dismissal from a union job after announcig his candidacy for national president:
"[T]he union's International Executive Board . . . passed a resolution, a resolution
granting Tony Boyle the authority to discipline my father in any way he saw fit."
Boyle said Yablonski was unable to carry out the union's policies. Id. at 210 (March
18, 1970).
Even if the firing will not take place until after the election, staff members will
hesitate to support an insurgent if they fear re-election of the incumbent will mean dis-
missal from their jobs. See Local 648, Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Union, 299 F. Supp.
1012 (D.D.C. 1969).
161. Interview with union officer N and complainant union member G. Member G
had a major staff position with his national but was suddenly demoted to a minor job
that kept him tied to one office when he announced his candidacy for national president.
He has not been reinstated. For charges of politically motivated demotions, transfers and
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Physical coercion may also interfere with membership access to the
electoral process.' 0 2 While several persons interviewed claimed to have
been victims of brutal physical violence,10 3 the more usual complaint
was that threats of violence were used to intimidate candidates and
their supporters. 64 In one such instance, threats were allegedly em-
ployed against a newly elected local officer to force him to resign in
favor of his opponent. 0 5 The prospect of violence was dramatically
underscored by the deaths of Joseph Yablonski, his wife and his daugh-
ter, shortly after his unsuccessful campaign for the presidency of the
Mineworkers. Allegations of union complicity in the murder were
numerous.1 60 Nor was this the first time that an insurgent candidate
had been murdered.0 7 The union members surveyed who complained
reassignments of staff members supported by the evidence, see Ccfalo v. District 50,
Mineworkers, 311 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970).
162. Although most coercion in union campaigns takes the forn of attacks on persons.
we found evidence of several other forms of coercive harassment. One candidate for
national office found an envelope containing marijuana in his post office box; he im-
mediately turned it in to postal inspectors who found it was part of an attempted
frame-up. Verick, supra note 151, at 30. Another candidate's wife who received threat-
ening phone calls suffered a nervous breakdown. Interview with complainant union
member N. An insurgent attorney's summer home was blown up shortly after he began
work on an election complaint. Interview with complainant attorney J. In yet another
election, the candidate and his supporters had their automobile windshield wipers and
antennae broken, tires slashed and brakelines cut. Interview with union officer N.
163. James Morrissey, candidate for Secretary-Treasurer of the National Maritime
Union, was attacked on leaving the union hall on September 14, 1966, by three men
armed with lead pipes wrapped in brown paper bags. His skull was fractured and his
leg badly injured. Verick, supra note 151, at 30. Gaston Firmin.Guyon, ranning for New,
York Port Patrolman on the same ticket, was beaten in the union hall. Interview with
complainant union member 0.
A candidate for district office in a large industrial union was punched and later his
car was followed by three "henchmen." The FBI investigated the incident and while
affirming its occurrence, concluded that it was merely a "private, altercation." Grand
jury inquiry into the event was abandoned, allegedly due to the influence of the district
attorney, a friend of the incumbent. Interview with union officer N.
164. Interviews with complainant union member N and complainant attorncys J
and Q. Six of the thirty-one complainant union members indicated that both the candi-
date and his- supporters were subject to physical threats and intimidation. However, of
the twenty union officers contacted, only three suggested that such intimidation might
be directed against a candidate or his supporters. Seven indicated that there was no
intimidation or harassment of any kind during election campaigns.
165. The officer-elect was kept in the union hall and not permitted to see any
visitors or make any phone calls to his family or supporters. The threat of ph)sical
harm was not explicit, but was felt by the individual to be implicit in his captivity.
He was also threatened with union discipline and with the suggestion that the national
union would withdraw the charter of the local if he should take office. Interiew with
complainant union member F.
166. See B. HUME, DEATH AND THE MINES 245-50 (1971). One person has pleaded
guilty and two others have been convicted to date for the Yablonski murder, but no
connection of the union to his death has been proven. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1972, at
13, col. 1; id., March 5, 1972, § 1, at 50, col. 3; id., May 1, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
167. Dow Wilson, reform leader of Painters Local 4 in San Francisco, and his collabora-
tor, Lloyd Green of Local 1178, were murdered in April and May, 1966. Tried for both
murders and convicted of the second was Painters' District 16 Secretary-Treasurer Ben
Rasnick. Testimony at Rasnick's trial indicated the murders were planned to destroy
the insurgent movement. Union Democracy in Action, April, 1966, at 1, col. 1; May, 1966,
at 1, col. 1; July, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
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of campaign abuses indicated that physical coercion, real and threat-
ened, is the greatest single obstacle to honest elections.' 08
Although physical coercion can have an impact at any point in the
electoral process, a particular problem may exist at the nomination
stage. Both typical nomination methods-petitions and nomination
at local union meetings-reveal an insurgent's supporters and leave
them open to reprisals. 169
Statutory Provisions. LMRDA provisions exist which substantively
meet the problems of financial and physical coercion. A buy-off which
used union funds would constitute a violation of § 401(g).17 0 A com-
plainant may have great difficulty, however, in proving the violation.
Even when direct cash payments are made, it may be exceedingly dif-
ficult to trace the money back to the union treasury. If the buy-off
takes more subtle forms, such as a paid vacation, the difficulty for the
complainant will come in proving that the trip was not made for
legitimate union purposes. Furthermore, as compared with negative
coercion, complainants are likely to have difficulty finding people
who are willing to testify about being the subjects of a buy-off. It is
not surprising, therefore, that there has been virtually no judicial or
administrative action with respect to buy-offs.
Several provisions of the LMRDA deal with negative coercion aimed
168. Complainant union members were asked to indicate the abuses which they felt
most influenced the outcome of union elections. Seventeen of the thirty-one members
contacted indicated that intimidation or discipline of members for supporting the candi.
dates of their choice were most influential.
169. In one union surveyed, a member complained that he had great difficulty find-
ing anyone to sign his nominating petitions because people were afraid of possible re-
prisals by the incumbent officers. The man had previously received considerable support
in the local's elections and expected to find the necessary signators. Interview with
complainant union member 0. Intimidation of members who voted in a show of hands
primary was claimed in Hearings on UMW Election, supra note 2, at 11 (Feb. 5, 1970)
(testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
170. LMRDA § 401(g), 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1970) prohibits use of union funds to sup.
port any candidate:
No moneys received by any labor organization by way of dues, assessment, or
similar levy, and no moneys of an employer shall be contributed or applied to
promote the candidacy of any person in an election subject to the provisions of tls
subchapter. Such moneys of a labor organization may be utilized for notices, factual
statements of issues not involving candidates, and other expenses necessary for the
holding of an election.
As most buy-offs involve manipulation of union job opportunities to gain support for
the incumbent, they involve use of union funds. However, cash buy.offs may involve use
of funds from sources outside the union; the LMRDA does not explicitly make bribery
illegal, although bribery could be considered within an expansive reading of § 401(e),
29 U.S.C. § 481(e), which grants a "right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate
or candidates of his choice, without being subject to . . . improper interference." See
also pp. 465-68 infra.
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at the employment status of non-staff union members. Section 401 (e)
guarantees members the right to campaign and vote without being sub-
ject to reprisals,171 and § 609 explicitly prohibits fines, expulsion, or
other discipline for the exercise of LMRDA rights.' -" In a number of
cases, courts have deferred to the NLRB on questions of rank and file
job discrimination, shifting the question to one of fair representation
under the NLRA.'7 3 But none of these cases involved § 609 allegations.
The job dismissals in question in these cases were not alleged to be
connected with political discrimination,'-- and the cases should not be
given precedential weight in adjudication of claims of job discrimina-
tion brought under § 609 for infringement of voting, nominating, or
free speech rights.175
171. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970).
172. It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop
steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to
fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any
right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter. The provisions
of section 412 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.
LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
"Discipline," as used here, and in § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 481(a)(5) (1970), has been
found to include job discrimination. Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 682 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Detroy v. Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961); Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); contra, Allen v.
Armoured Car Chauffeurs, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960). See also Berchem, supra note
82, at 26-28; Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members Under Title I and Section
610 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 52 GEo. L.J. 339, 356-59 (1964).
173. NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
174. The cases involving deference to the NLRB were all brought solely under various
provisions of Tide 1. It is unclear whether these decisions hold that Title I is to be
construed narrowly such that the job discrimination claim is not a Title I violation at
all, or that when a Tide I claim overlaps with an NLRA unfair representation claimjurisdiction is in the NLRB. See Knox v. Local 900, Autoworkers, 351 F.2d 72 (6th Cir.
1965); Barunica v. Local 55, Hatters, 321 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1963); Green v. Local 705.
Hotel Employees, 220 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Rinker v. Local 24, Lithographers,
201 F. Supp. 204, 206 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Beauchamp v. Weeks, 48 L.R.R.M. M048 (S.D. Cal.
1961); Allen v. Armoured Car Chauffeurs, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960).
The narrow reading of Title I in these cases has been approved, but the deference
to NLRB jurisdiction criticized. See Thatcher, supra note 172, at 361-62.
175. In a case which was brought under § 609, and which involved intra-union po-
litical disputes, the court found no reason to defer to the NLRB in disposing of job
discrimination claims. Parks v. Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 920-23
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963). Even in the absence of a § 609 claim, a
court assumed jurisdiction over a job discrimination claim under § 101(a)(5) in Rekant
v. Shochtay-Gasos Local 446, Meatcutters, 320 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 193).
Although the policy of judicial deference may be wise in the absence of a § 609
claim that LMRDA voting, nominating or free speech rights are being infringed throughjob discrimination, the policy is not wise when such claims are made. The Board can
be expected to view the problem in the context of collective bargaining between union
and employer, ignoring the fact that the discrimination may have been motivated by
internal union political disputes. Section 609 exists specifically to take into account such
discriminatory actions which have a coercive effect on the responsiveness of electoral
politics.
Several individuals complained of bringing job intimidation suits to the NLRB without
success. Interviews with complainant union members H, L, and 0, complainant attorney
L, and union attorney AA.
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Courts already appear quite willing to intervene under § 609 to
protect union staff employees from negative job sanctions imposed be-
cause the staffer has exercised his LMRDA rights.1 0 Section 609 has
been applied to shield staff members from politically inspired job
dismissals" 7 and transfers that undermine the staffer's ability to cam-
paign for the candidate of his choice.178 Despite the appointive nature
of most staff positions, courts have not permitted the union staff to
become an exclusive resource of the incumbents. Job dismissals are
tolerated only when true misfeasance can be proved."a 0
The LMRDA also contains substantive protections from physical
coercion. Section 610 makes it a criminal offense to use violence or the
threat of violence to intimidate union members 180 While there have
been some prosecutions under § 610,181 they have been rare enough
176. Courts have not, however, applied to dismissal of union staffers the procedural
protection of LMRDA . 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970), which provides that:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer
thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B)
given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair fheariug.
(b) Any provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor organization which
is inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall be of no force or effect.
For legislative history supporting this position, see CONF. REP. ON S. 1555, H.R, 1147,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1959); for cases, see note 177 infra.
177. Grand Lodge, Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
920 (1964); Cefalo v. District 50, Mineworkers, 311 F. Supp. 946, 953 (D.D.C. 1970);
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, Civ. No. 1799.69 (D.D.C., filed July 7, 1969); Local
648, Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Union, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1020.21 (D.D.C. 1969);
George v. Bricklayers' Union, 255 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Wisc. 1966); cf. DeCampli V. Greeley,
293 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1968).
In the Retail Clerks case supra, the reprisals against staff were found by the court to
be violations of the fiduciary duty of officers imposed by LMRDA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501
(1970). Noting that reprisals against staffers were a means for incumbents to maintain
control of the union, the court, at 1021-22, held that this result was incompatible with
the officer's responsibility to manage the union's funds and property for the benefit
of all members.
178. Cefalo v. District 50, Mineworkers, 311 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970); Yablonski v.
United Mine Workers, Civ. No. 1799-69 (D.D.C., filed July 7, 1969).
179. One unsettled point is who bears the burden of proof when a staffer challenges
his dismissal or other reprisal. Some cases have held that the dismissal is presumed
valid; others have required that the incumbents show cause for the dismissal. See note
177 supra for cases. The latter position is preferable, as incumbents are probably better
able to bring forward evidence if cause for dismissal exists.
180. It shall be unlawful for any person through the use of force or violence, or
threat of the use of force or violence, to restrain, coerce, or intimidate, or attempt
to restrain, coerce, or intimidate any member of a labor organization for the purpose
of interfering with or preventing the exercise of any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of this chapter. Any person who willfully violates this section
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year,
or both.
LMRDA § 610, 29 U.S.C. § 530 (1970).
181. United States v. Bertucci, 333 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor,, Doherty
v. United States, 379 U.S. 839 (1964); United States v. Raganovich, 318 F.2d 167 (7th
Cir.), cert..denied, 375 U.S. 911 (1963); cf. Huddleston v. Costa, 314 F. Supp. 278, 279
(W.D. Pa. 1970) (permit extradition of defendant charged with violation of § 610). B)ut
see Vestal v. Hoffa, 329 F. Supp. 801, 813-14 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
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to persuade the union members interviewed that the statute does not
deter campaign violence.'82
Coercion during the nomination process might be minimized
through the use of secret ballots when a vote is required to select can-
didates'8 3 as, for example, in the process of endorsing candidates for
intermediate or national office. Secret ballots at the nomination stage
are not, however, required by the statute.8 4 Coercion during the elec-
tion campaign is even less amenable to statutory control.'8s Alleged
violations of § 610 are now referred to the Justice Department and are
pursued independently of the DOL's investigation of other aspects of
a challenged election. 80 This separation of the inquiry may obscure
the impact of coercion on the electoral process, and the question of
physical coercion m2y be ignored by the DOL in determining whether
to sue to compel a rerun. 8 7 The DOL has also exhibited some in-
sensitivity to the impact of physical coercion on the electoral process.
Commenting on a DOL finding that an assault on Joseph Yablonski
during the 1969 Mineworker election did not constitute a violation of
§ 610,188 Secretary of Labor Shultz stated that the violence was an
"individual, spontaneous" act. 89 The Secretary noted that the Depart-
ment considered the statute to be violated only if the assault were made
with an intent to interfere with a right protected by the LMRDA.200
A narrow construction of this kind, no less than an inefficient investi-
gative arrangement between the DOL and the Justice Department,
may serve to vitiate the protection from coercion provided by the Act.
182. Interview with complainant attorney E. See also pp. 447-48 and note 168 supra.
183. See the discussion of secret voting at pp. 468-72 infra.
184. Opinion letter of Commissioner, U.S. Dep't of Labor Release, B.L.M.R. (anu-
ary 5, 1961); Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 198 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
185. A barrier to use of Title I suits in seeking injunctions to prevent intimidation
or violence in elections comes from the holdings in Tomko v. Hilberg, 288 F.2d 625(3d Cir. 1961) and Kalish v. Hosier, 256 F. Supp. 853 (D. Colo. 1963). afI'd, 364 F.2d
829 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 944 (1967), that only unions, or union officers
acting under color of their office, can be sued in Title I litigation. See the criticism of
these decisions in Thatcher, supra note 172, at 341. But see Johnson v. Local 58, IBEW,
181 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1960), where the court refused to dismiss a suit for an in-junction against intimidation of union members who were holding political neetings.
186. Memorandum of Understanding between Departments of Justice and Labor,
Feb. 16, 1960, signed by James T. O'Connell, Acting Secretary of Labor, and William
P. Rogers, Attorney General, 25 Fed. Reg. 1708 (1960).
187. This need not necessarily be the result, as, at least fornally, the results of the
Justice Department investigation are reported to the DOL. Hearings on UMIV Election,
supra note 2, at 342, 359-63 (May 4, 1970) (testimony of George P. Shultz).
188. In June, 1969, Yablonski was attacked and knocked unconscious at a meeting
in Springfield, Ill. Id. at 10, 35-36 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
189. Id. at 359-60 (May 4. 1970) (testimony of George P. Shultz).
190. This interpretation of the statute was criticized by the chairman of the Senate
subcommittee conducting the UMW investigation. Letter from Harrison A. Williams,
Jr., Chairman, to members of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, June 24, 1970.
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C. Mechanisms of Communication
Communication is at the heart of electoral responsiveness. The
function of opening the leadership to membership demands can only
be performed through a flow of information between the aspiring
candidates and the rank and file. Regardless of which candidate is
elected, an election characterized by a substantial amount of communi.
cation regarding union policies should indicate to the victor the sources
and depth of rank and file discontent and the level of existing support
for alternative policies. Despite this importance of communication,
the problems detailed below were found in almost all unions. Unlike
some abuses discussed in the previous section, communication failures
existed in "clean," honest unions as well as in those where "dirty,"
unfair politicking was the norm.
In local union elections, the most important campaigning device is
face-to-face contact between officer candidates and union members.101
In most industrial locals and those craft locals organized around a few
central work areas, candidates are able to talk with members as they
enter and leave work.1 92 Face-to-face campaigning is often supple-
mented by inexpensive leaflets which can be distributed by the candi-
dates themselves. 193 Field interviews revealed no special problems for
candidates in securing access to these modes of communication. 194
Union meetings are also a potential vehicle for communication,195
but few unions structure local meetings to permit much campaign de-
bate, and meetings are typically not well attended.19 0
At the intermediate level, face-to-face contact between the candidate
and the membership is also important; 19 7 but such contact becomes
very difficult to achieve at this level (or in large locals, for that mat-
191. Interviews with complainant union members F, N, and R and union officers
B and C. Thus, the members most likely to become candidates are those who are free
to move around while on the job. L. SAYLES & G. STRAuss, TnE LOCAL UNION 83.84 (1967).
192. Interviews with complainant union member R and union officers D, I, and J.
In addition, several candidates attributed their success to having organized supporters
within each plant or worksite in the local. Interviews with complainant union member
F, complainant attorney I, and union officer I.
193. Interviews with complainant union members F, N, and R and union officer D.
194. The only allegation concerning the prevention of handbill distribution was that
management permitted incumbent candidates to take literature into the plant, while
dissidents had to distribute literature outside the plant gate. Interview with complainant
union member N.
195. Union meetings were used for political discussion in several locals. Interviews
with union officer B, complainant union members A, H, and R, and complainant at-
torney I.
196. Interviews with union officers I and H, and complainant union member A.
197. Interviews with union attorney AA and union officers A and 0.
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ter). 98 Consequently, mailings must be relied upon as an important
means of communication. 90 Depending on the size of the electoral
unit, however, mailings can become prohibitively expensive for poorly-
financed candidates.2 00 One way to reduce the cost of mailings would
be for the candidate to obtain a copy of the union's membership list,
particularly if the list indicates the member's local affiliation or place
of employment.20' Candidates could use such lists to concentrate their
mailings and build support among particular, favorable constituen-
cies.20 2 Lists are also necessary to build worksite organizations, which
can wage face-to-face and telephone campaigns. 203 Although a few
unions provide candidates with copies of the membership list, most
officially bar its use by any candidate. 20 4 Both dissident candidates and
union officers interviewed, however, reported that incumbents often
have informal access to the list.2°5
When the cost of a general mailing is prohibitive and copies of the
membership list are unavailable, the only means of communication
available may be the union newspaper. Some unions have recognized
198. The largest craft locals are in the IUOE. Its Local 12 embraces 20,000 members
and covers southern California and southern Nevada. The problems of communication
in such a local are similar to those in industrial districts. A typical Steelworkers district
will contain 100 locals and 35,000 members.
199. Interviews awith complainant union member A and union officers C and H.
200. Interviews with complainant union members I and S, union officers F and B,
and union attorney AA.
201. The importance of the mailing list as a campaign tool is noted in Cox, Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 M2acu. L. RE%. 819, 844
(1960) and in Summers, supra note 11, at 293.
202. A recent candidate for national office stated that he would have liked to sup-
plement his advance publicity with special messages, but had no way to do so without
sending a mailing to his entire national. Interview with complainant union member G.
Large craft locals which stretch across several states make complete mailings futile, since
candidates must spend great amounts of money to send the mailings to areas where
they can garner few votes. Interview with complainant union member L.
203. Interviews with complainant union member A and complainant attorney 1.
204. Three union officers indicated that each candidate had a right to possess and
use a membership list during the campaign beyond the use that is implied in the right
to mailings guaranteed by § 401(c). (See pp. 455-60 infra.) Seven officers indicated that
candidates had no such right. Only one of the thirty-one complainant union members
indicated that the list was available for campaign purposes; eleven indicated that it was
not available. In one local a complete mailing list is published and given out as a
directory. During the election, the union prints a set of membership tags and sells them
to any candidate for $11 per set. Interview with complainant union member A. In
another local, the membership votes before each election to detenine whether the list
should be available to candidates. Interview with complainant union member R and
questionnaire from complainant union member C.
205. Eight of the thirty-one complainant union members alleged that incumbents
had access to the membership list during the campaign. Incumbent access to the list
was confirmed in interviews with union officers D and N. For illustrations of how in-
cumbents can discriminatorily use the list, see Wirtz v. Guild of Variety Artists, 267
F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) and Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2606
(D.D.C. 1969).
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this fact and provide free space in the paper to all candidates, 200 rang-
ing from relatively small articles to "battle pages" on which candidates
are given equal space during the campaign. 207 This equality of treat-
ment, however, is far from universal. Most union newspapers are con-
trolled by the incumbents208 who appoint the editors, author articles,
and are the subject of most of the newspaper's material. 200 Some papers
are nothing more than partisan pamphlets for administration-supported
candidates.210 Newspapers of general circulation usually do not have
enough labor coverage to make up for the one-sided coverage in the
union newspaper.211
206. Interviews with union officers E, G, and I, and complainant union member A.
Battle pages have been used in some locals of the American Federation of Teachers,
the American Federation of Musicians, the United Auto Workers and the United Steel.
workers. Functioning battle page arrangements are used at the national level In the
American Federation of Teachers and the International Typographical Union. Inter.
views with union attorney X and union officer H.
207. The DOL has approved of battle pages and does not consider them illegal Cx.
penditures under § 401(g) of LMRDA. They are a logical extension of U.S. Dep't of La.
bor Release, BLMR-41/USDL-4438 (Mar. 14, 1961), which approved the spending of tnon
funds to promote debate between candidates. The battle page may function to legitimize
opposition, a necessary step if responsiveness is to be enhanced. The union in which
this legitimization is most apparent is the International Typographers Union. See gen.
erally S. LiPsar, M. TRow, & M. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1954).
208. Professor Archibald Cox told the Senate Labor Subcommittee in 1959 that one.
sided control of newspapers undermined the responsiveness of the electoral process.
Hearings on Labor-Management Reform Legislation, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 134 (1959).
See also H. WILENSKY, INTELLECTUALS IN LABOR UNIONS 92-94 (1956).
209. Not all locals have newspapers although they usually appear when the local
reaches a substantial size. Most intermediate organizations have such publications. litter-
views with union officers A, B, C, D, E, M, and 1' and questionnaires from union officer R,
and complainant union members H, T, and U. Even if the editor is elected by the
membership, the local or intermediate level president can retain control over the news.
paper's content by retaining for himself the associate editor post. Interview with union
officer 0. The primary function of such papers for incumbent officers is to provide a
vehicle for reaching non-meeting-going members. Its value is indicated by the fact that
one officer suggested that incumbents in his district will print local papers at substantial
financial losses to the union, sometimes amounting to as much as $75,000 a year. Inter.
view with union officer 0.
210. Complainant union members almost uniformly criticized the domination of union
papers by the incumbents. Interviews with complainant union members A, I, M, and
S, and questionnaires from complainant union members X, Y, and CC. While sonic
union officers contended that the paper could remain neutral (interviews with tnion
officers A, C, and P), others suggested that the papers became propaganda organs for
the incumbents. Interviews with union officers B, D, and 0.
Political theory on the formation of public opinion demonstrates the effectiveness of
communication media like the union newspaper. Political scientists have found that: (a)
repetition of a name or of an opinion is an effective means of forming favorable opilions,
L. DooB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 317-18, 348-49 (1948), V.O. KEY, PUIILIC
OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 402-03 (1961); (b) propaganda printed in a form of
straight news is very effective, DooB, supra at 323-30; and (c) propaganda disseminated
between elections when the constituent defenses are down is apt to be more effective
than campaign literature, KEY, supra at 403. However, some public media newspapers
are distrusted by the readers, and to the extent this is true of union papers, the three
effects above may be reversed. KEY, supra at 355-56.
211. At least one union member interviewed suggested that union incumbents had
sufficient power to compel the local media to exclude information about insurgent can-
didates' campaigns. Interview with complainant union member M.
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Mailings and the union press are also the most important communi-
cations devices in national elections. The problems of access are even
more onerous for candidates at this level because campaign costs in a
large national are enormous. A mailing in a large national cm cost
between $60,000 and $80,000.212 The need for fair coverage by the
union newspaper is thus even greater than at the intermediate level,
but allegations of one-sided coverage were common.213 Particularly
important and controversial national elections attract coverage by the
general news media, but that coverage rarely centers on campaign is-
sues and is no substitute for intra-union communications.2'4
Statutory Provisions. Several LMRDA provisions protect campaign
communications. The Title I freedom of speech and assembly rights2 1
assure access to face-to-face campaigning, leaflet distribution, and cam-
paign discussions at union meetings. The minimal amount of litiga-
tion regarding these modes of communication suggests that candidates
do not usually encounter difficulties in pursuing them.210 The lack of
cases involving union meetings, however, may be due to the minimal
use of such meetings as campaign communication devices. Neverthe-
less, it would be advisable for unions to institute special meetings for
candidate debate,217 in order to facilitate upward as well as downward
communication within the union.218
The critical importance of mailings is recognized by § 401 (c) of
212. Interview with union officer 0.
213. Interviews with complainant union members G, I, and 0; Hearings on UMIt'
Election, supra note 2, at 11, 41 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
214. The candidates in one election, however, possessed suficicnt financial resources
to pay for radio, television and newspaper advertisements. The cost involved is probably
prohibitive in most national elections. Confidential Study of the 1965 Steelwyorkers Na-
tional Election [hereinafter cited as 1965 USWA Study].
215. 29 U.S.C. § l01(a)(2) (1970).
216. In three cases involving face-to-face campaigning or campaign literature dis-
tribution, union suspensions were overturned, or disciplinary proceedings enjoined, by
the courts. Sheridan v. Local 2, Liquor Salesmen, 303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (plain-
tiff had published a critical article); Archibald v. Local 57. Operating Engr's, 276 F. Supp.
326 (D.R.I. 1967) (plaintiff distributing an allegedly "libelous" progress report); and
Gartner v. Soloner, 54 L.R.R.M. 2146, 2149 (E.D. Pa. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 384
F.2d 348 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1040 (1967) (plaintiff had picketed union head-
quarters), where the court stated:
The plaintiff represents a small dissenting group within the Local who may
provide the checks and balances on the operations of this Local which are needed
in any well run democratic organization.
217. The use of special meetings avoids the problem of political debate disrupting
the transaction of routine union business.
218. For the insurgent candidate, an opportunity to state his views at a union meet-
ing may tend to give those views an aura of legitimacy. Normal meetings tend to be
one-sided presentations by incumbent officers. Officers have to make policy statements
as part of their reports to the membership, but their presentations arc often also directed
toward having the best political effect. Insurgent candidates are rarely permitted to
make similar statements. Interview with complainant union member H.
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the LMRDA. 219 That section requires unions to mail campaign litera-
ture at the candidate's expense, 220 and further provides that when the
union mails literature for one candidate, a similar distribution at
equivalent cost must be made for all other candidates.2 21 Courts have
become increasingly sensitive to the importance of these provisions.
Section 401 (c) rights have been granted to prospective candidates
actively seeking nomination even when the union constitution has
sought to restrict the term "candidate" to only those members already
nominated for office. 222 Another court insisted that distribution be
effective and refused to accept distribution by incumbent local of-
ficers rather than through the mails, in view of a history of union oppo-
sition to insurgent candidates.22 3
Courts have not yet addressed the question of whether § 401 (c)
provides for selective mailings. As noted above, the ability to mail to
selected constituencies within the union membership may figure im-
portantly in the success of a poorly-financed candidate. The critical
question in interpreting the statute will be whether such a request
is "reasonable," for it is only "reasonable requests . . . to distribute
• . . campaign literature" which the union must recognize. It would
seem that, unless the mailing list is kept in such a way that the par-
ticular sample sought is unobtainable, a request for a selective mail-
ing should be reasonable per se. Candidates already pay for the mailing
expenses the union incurs on their behalf, and they could be required
219. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
220. Courts ordered the union to mail literature at candidate's expense in Yablonski
v. United Mine Workers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.D.C. 1969) and ordered insurgents be al-
lowed to use union mailing plates in Antal v. District 5, Mineworkers, 61 L.R.R.M.
2222 (W.D. Pa. 1966). A court enjoined an election because the union had refused to
mail out candidate literature in Backo v. Local 281, Carpenters, 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971), afj'g 308 F. Supp. 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1969). For
many candidates, it is necessary that the union mail literature because the union may
have the only existing membership list, and the candidates have no right to It under
§ 401(c).
221. In Backo v. Local 281, Carpenters, 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 858 (1971), aff'g 308 F. Supp. 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), the court enjoined an election
when one of the charges was that the union had sent out literature of one candidate
but had refused to do the same for plaintiff. In Antal v. District 5, Mineworkers, 64
L.R.R.M. 2222 (W.D. Pa. 1966), the court order that plaintiff be allowed to use the
union addressograph seemed to be aimed at giving plaintiff the same treatment as in.
cumbents. And, in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C.), order
clarified, 305 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1969), the court found discriminatory use of the mailing
list through inclusion of campaign propaganda in the union newspaper. However, relief
has been denied where actual, not just potential, discrimination could not be proven.
Conley v. Aiello, 276 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Litch v. United Steelworkers, 69
L.R.R.M. 284 (W.D. Pa. 1968). For an election declared void in a post.election suit for
discriminatory use of the mailing list, see Wirtz v. Guild of Variety Artists, 267 F. Supp.
527 (1967).
222. See pp. 441, 444 and notes 135, 145-48 supra.
223. Antal v. District 5, Mineworkers, 64 L.R.R.M. 2222 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
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to absorb whatever additional costs might attend selective mailings. 22 4
Candidates could conduct their own selective mailings if they were
given copies of the union membership list. Such provision, however,
is not contemplated by the statute. Although § 401 (c) prohibits dis-
criminatory use of the membership list, candidates have a right only
to inspect the list, and then only once within the thirty days just prior
to the election. The right of inspection does not include the right to
copy the list.225 This limited right of access indicates a congressional
desire to keep the membership list out of the hands of partisans in an
election campaign.2 26 In view of the importance of the membership
list to candidates, however, the statute appears inadequate as to this
feature of the conduct of responsive elections..2 27
Although the LMRDA does not directly define the proper role of
the union newspaper, several of its provisions appear to be applicable.
Because the newspaper is normally mailed through use of the union
membership list, one-sided coverage in the union newspaper is argu-
ably a violation of the § 401 (c) ban on discriminatory use of member-
224. LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970) gives all candidates the right to sue
the union to compel it "to comply with all reasonable requests to distribute by mail or
otherwise at the candidate's expense campaign literature in aid of such person's candi-
dacy to all members in good standing of such labor organization." Although the statute
speaks of mailings to "all members," it seems clear that the statutory purpose is to
require mailings to all members if the candidate wishes, but not to limit the candidate
to mailings to all members.
225. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970). See Conley v. Aiello, 276 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
and cases cited therein. See also note 637 infra.
226. The list inspection provision was a compromise to adjust several competinginterests. Congress recognized that the list was a vital aid in a campaign. As Senator
McClellan believed that incumbents were likely to be able to use the list, he saw no
alternative to giving the list to all candidates. The rest of Congress, however, largely
accepted the arguments of organized labor that freely dispensing the list opened thedoor to abusive use of the list by employers, communists and unscrupulous hucksters.
105 CONG. Rac. 6031-32 (1959).
227. The possibilities for stimulating campaign communication far outweigh the tra-
ditional evils feared by union officias and Congress. The alleged danger of emplo)yee
coercion is obviously mooted by the fact employers already possess names of all employees
covered by the union security agreement. Raiding by other unions or communist sub-
version is highly unlikely. And the incremental burden of additional junk mail, if third
parties obtain the lists, would be small. In three unions where such lists are provided,
none of the members interviewed complained of any invasions of privacy as a result.Cf. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1965). The use of membership lists is
sufficiently important for Congress to reconsider its 1959 deletion of such a right from
Title 1. As proposed in the original McClellan amendment, § 101(a)(7) read:
Any candidate for office in any such labor organization or his agent shall have the
right to inspect and reproduce, for purposes relating to his candidacy, a list of the
names and last known addresses of all members of such organization. Such list shall
be maintained at the principal place of business of such organization by a designated
official thereof.
If Congress is still concerned about misuse of the list, it could make the use for other
than campaign purposes a federal crime and a basis for disqualification under LMRDA§ 504, 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970), which provides for the disqualification for five years from
union office of persons convicted of various felonies.
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ship lists. 228 This was precisely the basis of decision in Yablonshi v.
United Mine Workers. 220 Alternative statutory bases for reaching dis-
criminatory use of the union newspaper are § 401 (g), which prohibits
use of union funds to promote a particular candidate,2 30 and, arguably,
§ 501, which imposes a fiduciary duty upon union officials to spend
union funds only for the benefit of all the members.2 31
In Yablonski, five campaign issues of the union paper contained 166
references to and sixteen pictures of incumbent candidate W.A. Boyle,
as compared to only one reference to his opponent Joseph Yablonski.
228. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
229. 305 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C.), order clarified, 305 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1969).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1970).
See the court's description of the aim of § 401(g) as prevention of entrenchment of
incumbents in Local 648, Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Union, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1023
(D.D.C. 1969). However, in Shultz v. Local 1299, Steelworkers, 324 F. Supp. 750, 757.58
(E.D. Mich. 1970), aJJ'd, Nos. 71-1293, 71-1297 (6th Cir., filed Dec. 29, 1971), no violation
of § 401(g) was found although the union newspaper, which was published for the first
time in five years right before the election, included many pictures of the incumbent
officers, and although the court found "the motive of the officers may not have been
the best."
231. (a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its mem-
bers as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account
the special problems and functions of a labor organizaton, to hold its money and
property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage,
invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and
any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing
with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an adverse party in any
matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or
personal interest which conflicts with the interests of such organization, and to
account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity In
connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of
the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitution and bylaws
of such a labor organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing
body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for breach of the duties
declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.
(b) When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organi|-
zation is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section
and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue
or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a
reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organiza.
tion, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in
any district court of the United States or in any State court of competent jurisdiction
to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit
of the labor organization. No such proceeding shall be brought except upon leave
of the court obtained upon verified application and for good cause shown, which
application may be made ex parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of
the recovery in any action under this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecut-
ing the suit at the instance of the member of the labor organization and to compen-
sate such member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection
with the litigation.
(c) Any person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully and willfully abstracts or con.
verts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys, funds, securities,
property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or by
which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
LMRDA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
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This was held to be a clearly partisan use of the newspaper.232 Al-
though the court did not articulate standards for determining what
constituted "partisanship," two criteria appear to have been employed.
The first looks to quantitative imbalance in the amount of material
published regarding the various candidates; the second examines im-
balances in editorial fairness.
The Yablonski court merely enjoined future biased coverage and
ordered the union to send a copy of the court opinion to all its mem-
bers.2 33 The court refused to order publication of material dealing
with Yablonski's campaign, reasoning that to do so would violate the
First Amendment and LMRDA § 401 (g). Also, the court found that
§ 401 (c) did not authorize such relief.234 The court appears to have
misconstrued the two LMRDA provisions. The DOL has specifically
ruled that § 401 (g) only prohibits discrimination in the use of union
funds.23 5 Because the union in Yablonski had already favored the in-
cumbents in the pages of the newspaper, an order to print pro-
Yablonski material would have merely compensated for past discrim-
ination. Moreover, it appears that § 401 (c) requires such relief. The
excessive coverage of incumbents in the Yablonski case effectively
turned the newspaper into campaign literature distributed at union
expense. The statute provides that:
whenever such labor organization or its officers authorize the
distribution by mail or otherwise to members of campaign litera-
ture on behalf of any candidate . . . similar distribution at the
request of any other bona fide candidate shall be made ... with
equal treatment as to the expense of such distribution.2 30
The Yablonski court's analogy to the First Amendment protection
of newspapers also seems inapposite. Unlike the public media of gen-
eral circulation, union newspapers have no effective competition.
Hence it cannot be assumed that untruths conveyed by them will be
corrected by other information sources. Also, union newspapers are
not established by private parties to serve the public, but by labor
unions to serve the union membership. Officers run the newspapers
232. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 305 F. Supp. 868, 874 (D.D.C.), order clarified,
305 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1969).
233. Id. at 875-76.
234. Id. at 872. See also Cefalo v. District 50, Mineworkers, 74 L.R.M. 2045 (D.D.C.
1970).
235. 29 C.F.R. § 452.9 (1970).
236. 29 US.C. § 481(c) (1970).
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only as fiduciaries for the members.23 7 Because union newspapers
have a "natural monopoly" on the communication of intra-union news,
it seems more appropriate to analogize them to the airwaves, which
are subjected to public regulation because of the scarcity of space on
the electro-magnetic spectrum. 238 If this analogy is correct, the Yablon-
ski court should not have rejected the FCC "fairness doctrine" as a
model on which to fashion full and free discussion of important is-
sues.2 39 On this basis, the court should have ordered inclusion of pro.
Yablonski material in the UMW Journal.
In order to avoid court battles over the newspaper, unions would
be wise to institute battle pages. Although many union people deplore
them as a waste of both space and money,240 their operation in the few
unions which have them appears beneficial.24 1 As devices for facilitat-
ing communication and legitimizing opposition, battle pages are valu-
able tools in achieving responsiveness.
D. Discriminatory Use of Union Resources
The responsiveness function of officer elections can be significantly
hindered if one candidate has at his disposal a disproportionately large
share of campaign resources. In public elections disparities in available
campaign resources have been a source of deep concern, and Congress
237. Expenditures for, and control of, the newspaper should fall within the fiduciary
duty imposed on union officers to expend union funds "solely for the benefit of the
organization." LMRDA § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). See further discussion at p. 465
infra.
238. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969).
239. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 305 F. Supp. 868, 872 (D.D.C. 1969). The
court said the doctrine was inapplicable because union papers, unlike the airwaves, are
not part of the public domain and have a specialized circulation. But the union news.
paper is part of the union domain, and union internal activities are regulated by tile
LMRDA for the protection of the specialized audience, the members, who read and
through their dues pay for the paper. The fairness doctrine was approved in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969). The doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970),
reads in part:
If any licensees shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.
For a discussion of the position of trust in which a licensee must be considered and the
need to prevent a limited group from exerting undue political control, see Barrow, The
Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 447, 449-52 (1968). Both
considerations are also relevant to the conduct of union officers overseeing newspapers.
240. In addition to the general complaint that members do not read the newspaper
(interviews with union officers A and H and union attorney P), at least one local officer
indicated that in his union the candidates were too numerous to permit use of this
device. Interview with union officer G. Perhaps for this reason, one district officer in.
dicated that while several locals within his district had used the battle page at one
time, the institution had not "caught on." Interview with union officer A.
241. One district official noted that the battle page constituted the first place dissent
had been officially recognized in his union. He added that it was better to have dis.
content debated openly than left unarticulated. Interview with complainant union
member Q.
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has recently acted to limit campaign spending.2 2 In union elections,
these disparities normally arise from the incumbent's control of union
resources. Like the problems found in the communications area, the
problems detailed here existed in almost all unions surveyed.
At the local level, where face-to-face campaigning and leafletting are
the norm, the cost of campaigning is minimal, and the candidates'
relative strength in resources and funds is unlikely to skew the elec-
toral process. It has been alleged, however, that incumbent-supported
candidates can cut leafletting costs considerably by using union du-
plicating machines or by using union funds to pay printers.'' 3
In larger locals and at the intermediate level, where campaign costs
may run to several thousand dollars,244 the problem of incumbents
using union facilities is more serious. Many of the candidates inter-
viewed had relied primarily on their own salaries and savings to finance
their bid for office.2 45 Campaigns financed in this way are clearly no
match for an incumbent who, in addition to enjoying the usual bene-
fits of being better known, may meet his campaign needs free of charge
by using union facilities. 2 40 Moreover, an incumbent comes into con-
242. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-2"25 (Feb. 7, 1972).
243. Unions often permit candidates for office to freely use xcroxes, addressographs
and other facilities for printing campaign material. Of the twenty union officers, ive
suggested this was established practice, and five indicated it wvas expressl, prohibited.
Of the thirty-one complainant union members, seven indicated the availability of these
facilities, but twelve indicated they were "off limits" to the candidates. In those cases
where use of the facilities by candidates generally was prohibited, five comlplainant
union members indicated that incumbents nonetheless used these facilities in their
campaigns. More covert practices were alleged in two instances. In one, the incumbents
avoided using their own local facilities by taking material for printing to a nearby
local. When the other local had its election, the favor was returned. Interviev with
complainant union member D. In a second local, printing was done privately and
allegedly paid for with union funds drawn not front the incumbent's local, but front
the funds of a sister local. The advantage of this practice is that tile expenditurc never
shows on the first union's book if the election should be challenged for § 401(g) viola-
tions. Interview with complainant union member N.
244. While in most local elections candidates tended to spend between $300 and $500,
in larger locals costs range from $1500 to $12,000. The primary expense is postage for
mailing literature. Interviews with union officers D, E, F. G. and 0 and complainant
union member H. District costs are likely to be $10,000 to $20,000. Intervies with union
officers A, M, and N and complainant union member M.
245. Seventeen of the thirty-one complainant union members indicated that money
- comes mainly from the wages and savings of the candidate himself; seven indicated
that money was voluntarily contributed by other union members. Of the tnion officers
contacted, nine stated that personal sources predominated, and four acknowledged con-
tributions from supporters. fen of the thirty-one complainant union nimnbers indicated
that their resources were inadequate. Six suggested that these sources were fully adequate.
While insurgents suggested that incumbents had access to union funds, see note 246
infra, some union officials indicated that insurgents may also have outside fund sources.
Such sources allegedly include other unions, criminal racketeers, and employers. Inter-
view with union attorney HH; questionnaire from union attorney G.
246. Ten of the thirty-one complainant union members also alleged that incumbents
had direct access to union funds to finance their campaign at the district or local level.
Five of the twenty union officers indicated that union funds were used in the election
contest, but three stated that the funds were used to benefit all candidates by financing
a newspaper battle page or use of the union hall for campaign meetings. Interviews
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tact with many members as part of his job and can campaign, in effect,
on union time, while a non-incumbent candidate usually must con-
tinue working to be able to pay for his campaign.2 "4
The most significant resource bias at the intermediate level, how-
ever, comes from campaign participation of the union staff. Staffers are
hired for secretarial and clerical chores, for specialized work as in
accounting and law, and to service the needs of the local unions. The
service staff is often made up of former local officers who have proved
themselves to be effective and popular with the rank and file. They
are each given a small group of locals which they provide with admin-
istrative advice, information on district activities, and assistance in
processing grievances. This role brings the service staff into continu-
ous contact with local officers and members.248
It is thus not surprising that union service staffs tend to dominate
intermediate level politics. Opposition to incumbent intermediate
officers will normally come from either staff members or a local presi.
dent.249 Unless the local is unusually large, however, local officers do
not pose a serious threat to incumbents, since they are rarely known
outside of their own constituency. The staff member, on the other
hand, has a base of support in the cluster of locals he serves. His con-
tact with other staffers allows him to build a coalition to support a
bid for office.
Obtaining the support of a staff coalition is important for any can-
with union officers A, G, and I. Only two of the union officers suggested that funds
had been used exclusively for the incumbent's benefit. In both instances, the union
placed on its payroll persons allegedly performing legitimate part-time jobs who were
in fact campaigning full-time. Interviews with union officers N and o. For a discussion
of the related problem of union loans to candidates, see NYU Note, supra note 119, at
349-50.
247. Interview with complainant union member M. This problem was mitigated in
one case where a successful candidate for district president arranged to have his vacationjust prior to the election. Interview with union officer 0. See Daniels, Union EilectLions
and the Landrurn-Griffin Act, 13 N.Y.U. CoNF. oN LAB. 317, 321 (1970).
248. District organizations which "service" locals in negotiation of contracts and ad-
ministration of grievances, as found in the Autoworkers and Steelworkers, are only one
of three types of intermediate bodies. Intermediate organizations in unions such as the
Operating Engineers and Retail Clerks serve only as information clearing houses. The
third type of intermediate, evidenced in the Teamsters and Carpenters, is a legislative
lobbying organization. BARBASH, supra note 66, at 63. Despite the fact that staffs hit
"non-service" intermediate organizations may be separated from members and play only
a small role in union politics, many such unions have medium or large sized locals with
substantial staffs. These local staffs play a significant role in local and intermediate level
politics. Interviews with complainant union members H and I and union officer G. In a
large local, service staffers may be given sub-units of the local for which they perform
these services. See a description of such an arrangement in M. HARRINtoN , TE R mtAl
CLEims 49-51, 61-62 (1962). Because the size of these locals approaches that of many dis.
tricts, local staffers play political roles similar to that of district staffers. See G. MANGUtM,
THE OPERATING ENGINEERS 229-30 (1964).
249. Interviews with union officer N, union attorneys 0, S, and AA, and complaintt
attorney E; 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214.
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didate.2 50 A candidate who can organize a face-to-face campaign by
having union staff working for him in every local will have a tremen-
dous advantage over the candidate who has no campaign organization
and is unable to personally meet the union electorate. - 2 Tile effec-
tiveness of union staff support is indicated by the recurring pattern
in at least one union of the local officers supporting the choice of their
staff member, and the local membership voting accordingly.- 52 The
pivotal role of the service staff in an election campaign becomes a
serious problem for electoral responsiveness if staff sympathies tend
to systematically favor incumbents. This seems often to be the case,
as staff members are generally appointed and owe their jobs to the
incumbent. An insurgent must present a very credible challenge in-
deed before he can amass substantial support among the service staff.
Union politics at the national level also centers substantially on the
union staff, with intermediate level officers becoming crucial partici-
pants. Most opposition to national incumbents comes from such of-
ficers, who can build on the power base within their own constituency
and seek support from other intermediate level executives. - 3 The
power of such officers will vary with the way in which their position
is achieved. If appointed, such an officer risks loss of his job and thus
is unlikely to oppose the incumbents. But if elected, and particularly
if elected by a geographical subdivision rather than on a national basis,
250. Interviews with union officers A, F, N. and P.
251. One district president suggested that the staff felt their jobs were dependelt on
the district director being re-elected and were usually willing to work for his re.election.
Interview with union officer N. As another district president said, "The staff owes me
allegiance, and they campaign like hell or I would fire them." Interview with union
officer F. Complainant union members at both the local and district levels stated that
staffers were very active in the election campaign. While one member indicated that
staff were prohibited from -campaigning and two suggested that staff preferred not to
do so, eleven complainant union members alleged that the staff campaigncd, sometimes
while performing union business, and eleven more indicated that staffers campaigned
full-time during the election period and used union printing and telephone facilities to
aid the campaign. Staff participation in the election campaign was confirmed by eight
of the twenty union officers.
252. Interview with union officer N. The importance of service staffers in forming
voter opinions within constituent locals is not surprising if one accepts the "two-step"
theory of public opinion. Political scientists have found that public opinion is normally
formed, not through direct reading or viewing of the media, but through the influence
of persons with great knowledge of community affairs who act as conduits. See, e.g.,
V.O. KFY, supra note 210, at 359-66.
253. In three of the four unions studied, opposition to an incumbent national presi-
dent came from either a district director or a lesser national officer. In the 1965 Steel-
workers campaign the victor IAV. Abel had been Secretary-Treasurer of the national
and a district director. In the 1969 Mineworkers election, Joseph A. Yablonski, Inter-
national Executive Board member and chief of the union's legislative lobb)ing organi-
zation, ran against the incumbent W.A. Boyle. Yablonski had been President of District
5 of the UMW. In the 1964 International Union of Electrical Workers election, Paul
Jennings successfully opposed the incumbent Edward Carey from his position as Ex-
ecutive-Secretary of District 3. See also BOK & DuNLOP, supra note 20, at 56.
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the intermediate level officer is freer to align himself with an insur-
gent candidate.2 5 4 This alignment tends to filter down within the sub-
division. In the national election of one industrial union, which is
subdivided into geographical districts, a majority of members voted
against their district director's candidate in only five of twenty-nine
districts.255
Union staff not only contribute their time during campaigns, but
they are also substantial financial contributors. 0r Staff support also de-
creases the costs of campaigns by providing campaigners who make free
use of intermediate level offices' printing, telephone, mailing, and trans-
portation facilities. - 57 An additional bias alleged most frequently at
the national level, although it was also claimed occasionally in inter-
mediate elections, 258 is the direct use of union funds, as distinguished
254. This pattern is best exemplified in the 1965 Steelworkers elecetion: "Each di-
rector is politically independent of the president, having his own political base, this
arising not only because the district directors are elected, but also because the election
is confined to the district involved, as opposed to being union-wide. In addition, most of
the district directors are politically secure in their districts, not only because there are
relatively few challenges to an incumbent director, but also because there are even
fewer overthrows of incumbents." Orr, The Steelworker Election of 1965-The Reasons
for the Upset, 20 LAB. L.J. 106 (1969). Usually the district staff will follow the lead of
the director, but occasionally the staff may be strong enough to force the adoption of
their preference among the various candidates. Interview with union attorney AA.
255. 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214. After the 1969 defeat of Joseph A. Yablonski,
his supporters continued to function as an established opposition group within the
Mineworkers under the name "Miners for Democracy." They considered their most
important objective the capturing of control of district level positions in order to build
an organization which would have a chance to capture national offices. For this reason,
they focused on the election in District 5, the largest working member district in the
UMW, and contested the continuing trusteeships exercised by the international over
most other UMW districts. Interview with complainant attorney Al.
256. In the 1969 United Mine Workers election, Boyle's incumbent ticket is esti-
mated to have spent in excess of $1,000,000. Yablonski, running without significant
staff support, allegedly spent only $60,000. Yablonski supporters alleged that there was
an understanding among union employees that if they would contribute to the Boyle
campaign, he would raise their salaries upon re-election. Hearings on UMW Election,
supra note 2, at 18-24 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski). The
salary increases did occur but Boyle answered Yablonski's charge by stating that the
raise was consistent with the union policy of granting raises after collective bargaining
increases had been gained for the miners. The bituminous miners had received such
a raise just before the election. Id. at 210-12 (March 18, 1970) (testimony of W.A. Boyle).
Sometimes both candidates may* have staff financial support. In the 1965 Steelworkers
election, incumbent McDonald suggested to staffers that they contribute $100 down
and $100 per month during the three-month campaign; clerks and secretaries were
asked for $25 down and $25 per month. His opponent Abel's campaign committee so-
licited $2,000 contributions from district directors and $200 from district staffers. Na-
tional staffers contributed greater amounts. 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214.
Substantial employee donations were received by incumbent Carey in his bid for re-
election in the 1964 IUE election. Interim Report on the UE Election, 88 MlONrllLY
LAB. RE v. 565 (1965).
257. Allegations of staff use of district and local facilities were made in all four of
the national union elections examined. Interview with complainant union member P;
Hearings on UMW Election, supra note 2, at 24-26 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph
A. "Chip" Yablonski); 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214; 1UE Interin Report, supra
note 256.
258. See note 246 supra.
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from use of union facilities. Allegations in one national election cen-
tered on hiring popular rank and filers for part-time union work,
which was effectively payment for full-time campaigning.250
Statutory Provisions. The LMRDA provides a basis for policing
candidate use of union funds or facilities. Section 401 (g) prohibits
use of union funds "to promote the candidacy of any person."*'10 Section
501 also prohibits such use of funds or facilities by making union of-
ficials fiduciaries in the handling of union money and property; -2 0 1
presumably it is a violation of a fiduciary duty to spend funds ille-
gally.20 2 Despite these statutory provisions, scholars have questioned
whether campaign expenditures can ever be policed 3 because of the
difficulties in detecting20 and proving205 impropriety.
259. Hearings on UMIV Election, supra note 2, at 138.39 (Feb. 6, 1970) (tstilmony
of Louis Antal). Secretary of Labor Shultz acknowledged that such part-timers had been
employed by the union during the election period. He refused to find the practice a
violation of the LMRDA because, "[ajlthough some of them did, at timtes, campaign,
there was no evidence that they engaged in campaigning to the exclusion of or, in such
manner as to interfere with, their regular assigned duties." Id. at 346 (May 4. 1970)
(testimony of George P. Shultz). Shultz ignored evidence that the part-timers were hired
primarily where Yablonski was strong and not in pro-Boyle areas, and that union or-
ganizers were added to Yablonski's home territory in western Penns)lania. which uas
predominantly organized, but not in areas where many unorganized mines existed.
Similar practices were mentioned in another national union investigated. Intceriictw
with union officer N.
260. 29 U.S.C. § 481(g) (1970).
261. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
262. The legislative intent behind § 501 stresses the duty of the union officer to act
within the union constitution and bylaws. See U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NXEws, 1959 (86th
Cong. 1st Sess.) at 2480. It would be unlikely that a union officer charged with
spending union funds on an election campaign could point to union endorsement for
this explicit violation of the LMRDA. Moreover, it might be argued that the very fact
that Congress has determined that such expenditures are not in the interest of all union
members and hence has outlawed them is enough to defeat an) claim by the officers
that the expenditures are "solely for the benefit of the organization and its members"
as § 501 requires. Cf. NYU Note, supra note 119, at 349.
263. Cox, supra note 201, at 844; Summers, supra note I1, at 294; Daniels, supra
note 247, at 321; NYU Note, supra note 119, at 350.
264. Membership access to union records for "just cause" is provided by the statute.
LMRDA § 201(c), 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1970); but several candidates complained that
unions employed complicated clearance procedures before opening their books for in-
spection. Interview with complainant union members H and I and complainant attorney
I. Another administrative difficulty encountered in some unions was that some members
were not allowed to bring accountants to help them inspect the books. Courts have struck
down such ground rules, holding that the only way to fulfill congressional purpose was
to permit union members as much assistance and time as they needed to carry out a
reasonable review. Antal v. District 5, Mineworkers, 451 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); Local
1419, Longshoremen v. Smith, 301 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1962); Coratella v. Roberto, 56
L.R.R.M. 2068, 2071 (D. Conn. 1964); Deacon v. Local 12, Operating Eng'rs, 236 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 46 Cal. Rptr. 11 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 103 (1966).
Even if problems of access do not arise, it may be difficult to sort out improper front
proper expenditures. Where incumbents have hired supporters for part-time union jobs,
for example, the money paid those employees will appear on the records as a simple
salary expense. One avenue of inquiry for the DOL or a court in weighing a complaint
of improper expenditures should be the timing of expenditures. Unions might be made
to produce justifications for sudden increases in expenses during campaign periods.
265. Any Title IV litigation, including § 401(g) violations, must meet tile § 402 re-
quirement that reruns will be ordered only if the illegal expenditure "may have affected"
the election outcome. (See full discussion of this standard at TAN 481-85 infra.)
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The LMRDA provides no solution, however, to the more serious
problem of the bias imported into the officer election process by a
service staff loyal to incumbent officers. A staff member campaigning
on union time would appear to violate § 401 (g), 200 and any officer
who orders such activity would arguably be in violation of his fidu-
ciary duty under § 501.207 These violations would be virtually impos-
sible to prove, however, as the legitimate function of the service staff
is to circulate among the membership. Indeed, the most difficult aspect
of the problem posed by the service staff is that their function is un-
avoidably political. In fact, responsiveness in non-election periods vill
depend on an interplay among the membership, leadership, and service
staff.
In the public sector, the problem of campaigning by federal govern.
ment employees is met by an attempt at de-politicization. Employee
Union officials and lawyers contend that requiring a showing that the illegal Ise of
funds may have affected the outcome is proper because the union should not be forced
to undergo a new election for inadvertent expenditures, which may be made frequently.
However, to place on enforcement officials the burden of discovering illegal expenditures
and proving that they "may have affected" the outcome would make their task almost
impossible, as they have great difficulty finding and relating expenditures to specific
member votes. LMWP officers tend to regard any illegal expenditures uncovered is
just the "tip of the iceberg," believing that if they find such violations there are prob-
ably more to be discovered.
Courts have two possible approaches to the problem. One is the Local 6 device of
shifting the burden of proof to the union once a violation of speculative effect has been
proven. The union would then have to show that the expenditure did not affect the
outcome. The other approach, adopted in Shultz v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 403 U.S.
333 (1971), would ascertain how many possible ballots the expenditure could have af-
fected, and, if that number is more than the margin of victory, order a rerun. This
approach presumes an ability to measure an effect which in fact cannot be measured,
In that case a $13 expenditure for 1200 handbills was the basis for overturning an elec.
tion'where the victory margin was considerably less than 1200 votes. Yet it is not clear
that 1200 handbills had affected 1200 votes. Handbills may be read by no one, or by
two or three people each. With expenditures for items such as paid campaigners being
even less quantifiable, the test makes almost no sense. Therefore, the Local 6 test, which
makes no pretense to mathematical accuracy, may in the end be fairer to the union.
Title V suits, which can be brought at any time, are not subject to proof of an
outcome effect. One recent decision permitted plaintiff to forego internal union appeals
because of the political nature of the issue, granted immediate leave to sue, and issued
a preliminary injunction against union expenditures to support candidates. Cefalo v.
District 50, Mineworkers, 73 L.R.R.M. 2964, 2970 (D.D.C.), permanent injunction denied
for lack of adequate evidence, 311 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970). Cf. Wirtz v. Independent
Workers Union of Florida, 272 F. Supp. 31 (M.D. Fla. 1967) (enjoining expenditure of
union funds on behalf of incumbent in a DOL supervised rerun).
266. Only one court has explicitly accepted the argument that paid staff campaign.
ing on union time is an illegal expenditure of union funds. See Shultz v. Local 6799,
Steelworkers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820 (C.D. Cal. 1969), af'd on other grounds, 426 F.2d 969
(9th Cir. 1970), afJ'd, 403 U.S. 333 (1971), where "secretarial help" to a candidate was
part of an illegal expenditure of union funds. However, the logic seems rather coin.
pelling, and the fact that no other court has dealt with the issue would thus appear to
suggest the difficulty in bringing such actions rather than anything about their intrinsic
validity.
267. See note 262 supra.
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campaigning is illegal under the Hatch Act.208 A similar statutory
solution might be feasible in the union context, at least for the pro-
fessional members of union staffs. These employees might be barred
from partisan election activities and protected from political re-
prisals.2 9 If the bureaucratic nature of unions were so recognized by
protecting the professional staff from union politics, union admin-
istrative and bargaining expertise might be enhanced.270
A solution which insulated the professional staff from union politics,
however, would cope with the least important part of the problem.
The service staff, whose regular contact with the membership makes
them the more politically potent group of union employees, should
not be de-politicized. The service staff is often a source of opposition
to incumbents, and is especially well situated to focus membership
discontent and suggest alternative policies to the leadership. A prom-
ising statutory alternative might be to broaden the definition of "of-
ficer" to include the service staff, thereby making all service staff posi-
tions elective.271
268. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08, 7321-27 (1970). See full description of thse prohibitions in
Friedman & Klinger, The Hatch Act: Regulation by Administrative Action of Political
Activities of Governmental Employees I and 11, 7•FED. B.J. 5 and 138 (1941.46) and
Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986, 990-91 (1951). The dual aim
of the Hatch Act-improvement of government administration and prevention of the
use of civil service as a political machine-is detailed in Epstein, Political Sterilizatiou
of Civil Servants: The United States and Great Britain, 10 Pun. ADn. REv. 281 (1950).
269. The Hatch Act represents an uneasy compromise between public demands for
a politically impartial civil service and private freedom of speech. See Esman, supra
note 268, and Note, The Hatch Act-Political Immaturity, 45 GEo. .J. 233 (1957). The
Act has been unsuccessfully challenged as a violation of the First Amendment. United
Public Workers, CIO v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Oklahoma v. United States Civil
Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
This conflict of fundamental interests is much less sihmificant in unions, where pro-
fessional employees are usually not union members, unlike government employees who
are also citizens of the town, state, or nation for which they work.
270. Several of the union officials in this study suggested that the union may at times
be "outgunned" at the bargaining table by the management collective bargaining team.
Interviews with union attorney W and complainant union member H. Provision for
expert staff would also mitigate the union criticism of governmental limitations on per-
missible eligibility requirements for office, for knowledge of contract matters would be
less important for the elected officers since an experienced staff would be present to
provide expertise. Elected officials would then be the prime vehicles for electoral re-
sponsiveness, and the professional staff the source of technical expertise.
For further discussion of the need for more professionals in unions, see W IL, xV,
supra note 208, and Beirne, supra note 26, at 135, 193.
271. (n) "Officer" means any constitutional officer, any person authorized to perform
the functions of president, vice president, secretary, treasurer, or other executive
functions of a labor organization, and any member of its executive board or similar
governing body.
LMRDA § 3(n), 29 U.S.C. § 402(n) (1970). Union officers must be elected. LMRDA§§ 401(a), (b). (d), 29 U.S.C. § 481(a), (b) (d) (1970).
The DOL has interpreted § 3(n) to exclude "[pirofessional and other staff members
... who do not determine the organization's policies and who are emnployed to imple-
ment policy decisions and managerial directives established by the governing officials."
29 C.F.R. 452.4(e) (1970).
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If service staff members were elected by their constituent locals,
each would be dependent for support on the members he serves. This
would probably improve the responsiveness of the staff to the rank
and file. The stratum of service staff employees would also be likely
to develop as a fertile ground for opposition candidates, since staffers
would enjoy a measure of independent political power within the
union. Although intermediate and national candidates might run on
tickets with service staff candidates, the independent local strength
of incumbent staffers would make it difficult for a "machine" to de-
velop. Even if service staffers were elected not by their constituent
locals but on an intermediate or district-wide basis, and staff tickets
resulted, strong support in the staffer's own locals might overcome
the strength of an opposing slate candidate. Aggregate internal respon-
siveness might well be enhanced. 27 2
E. Fraudulent Tally of Votes
Fraud in the tally of ballots represents an obvious perversion of the
electoral process. Methods of election fraud have been widely docu-
mented in public sector election studies278 and need not be extensively
rehearsed in the union context. The occurrence of these practices
would appear to be limited to those few union organizations properly
characterized as "corrupt."
Courts have construed the statute in three cases. Welfare fund trustees were found
not to be officers because they lacked "executive functions" in Tucker v. Shaw, 308 F.
Supp. 1, 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); business representatives were found to be officers because
they served on the union's executive committee in Sheridan v. Local 626, Carpenters,
194 F. Supp. 664, 665 (D. Del. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962):
and field patrolmen, branch agents and port patrolmen, all union men in charge of their
respective ports with duties not strictly ministerial, were found to be officers in Wirtz v.
National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 50, 67-68 (S.D.N.Y.), a! 'd, 399 F.2d 544, 551-52
(2d Cir. 1968).
In McArthy v. Wirtz, 65 L.R.R.M. 2411 (E.D. Mo. 1967), the DOL concluded that
the Directing Business Manager of a district of the International Association of Machinists
was not an officer. The decision came as a great shock to the insurgent who thought
he was running for the most powerful position in the district and to the incumbent wo,
believing that the insurgent's victory would be a severe blow to the affiliation of tile
district, had waged a bitter electoral struggle. Interview with complainant attorney I.
272. In discussing the necessary elements of a democracy, V.0. KEY, supra note 210,
at 536-43 notes several factors relevant to the union political process. He notes a need
for a lack of cohesion among the activist elite; without division and competition, the
democratic process cannot occur. To make competition possible, lie sees a need for a
multiplicity of leadership and political activity, including jobs for those out of power.
There must also be ease of access to politics and to leadership posts. In one-party unions,
cohesion, multiplicity of power bases and jobs, and easy access to politics are often
lacking. However, if staff posts were made elective on a local electoral unit basis, co-
hesion might be lessened and power bases increased.
273. See, e.g., J. HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN TIlE UNITED STATES (1934), E.
LOGAN, SUPERVISION OF THE CONDUcT OF ELECTIONS AND RruirNs (1927).
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Unions typically employ either mail or poll balloting techniques.274
Mail balloting raises two major problems. First, there is little visible
control of the ballots between the time they are sent to the members
and the time of their return.2 75 Concern was expressed by some inter-
viewees that ballots could be collected and marked by one individual-
the mail ballot equivalent of ballot stuffing.270 Second, despite use of a
double-envelope ballot, some members voiced doubt about the secrecy
of their votes;277 fear of this kind could prevent voters from expressing
their true preferences. Although the DOL has approved the double-
envelope method as an adequate means of insuring secrecy, the fact
that members must put their names on the outside envelope raises the
possibility that ballot counters will be able to trace how various mem-
bers voted.278
The integrity of poll balloting can be insured by competent elec-
tion observers. Observers oversee checking of voter eligibility, deposit-
ing of ballots in the voting box, counting of ballots, and marking of
tally sheets.2 79 Observers, however, have sometimes been unable to
perform these tasks because of harassment or exclusion from voting
areas.280 In some instances candidates were not informed of the time
or place of balloting and thus could not send observers.28' Union rules
274. A third possible method is voting at union meetings. DOL Cos'rnrUrIo.% SwDY,
supra note 72, at 58. However, as LMRDA §§ 401(a) and (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a) and (b)(1970), require that non-convention balloting be done by secret ballot, a show-of-hands
vote is illegal. Voting procedures at union meetings therefore must be much the same
as those at a polling place. For this reason, the comments made about poll balloting
are applicable to meeting votes.
275. One union member indicated the various steps in the balloting process at which
abuse could occur: when the ballots are mailed, filled out by the voter collected at a
post office box, or trucked to the union for counting. Interview with complainant union
member S.
276. Interview with complainant union member I.
277. Interviews with complainant union members H, L, and S, complainant attorney
M, and union attorney BB.
278. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ELECTING UNION OFFICERS BY MAIL: SUGGESTIONs FOn
SAFEGUARDS 5 (1965). This method calls for the union to send out ballots with two
return envelopes. The voter returns his ballot inside an unmarked envelope which is
enclosed in another envelope, on which the voter puts his name. Upon receipt, the union
checks the name on the outer envelope against its voter register and places the unmarked
envelope in a container with other returned ballots. A union bent on identif)iug how
specific voters cast their ballots could look at the ballot inside the inner envelope befor
putting it in the container.
279. The effectiveness of election observers is dependent upon their sensitivity to the
means by which the integrity of the process can be compromnised. In one national election
the salutary function of an observer was vitiated when the observer willingly left the
polls during ballot counting, at a local incumbent officer's suggestion, to get a cup of
coffee. Interview with complainant attorney E.
280. Hearings on UMW Election, supra note 2, at 27-29 (Feb. 7, 1970) (testimony of
Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski); 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214.
281. Hearings on UMV Election, supra note 2, at 26.27 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of
Joseph A. "Chip" Yablonski).
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that observers must be union members may also penalize minority
candidates who are unable to find enough members to staff all polling
places with observers. 28 2
Statutory Provisions. The LMRDA requires that "adequate safe.
guards to insure a fair election" be provided, and gives candidates the
right to have observers at the polls and the tally.28 3 The Act also re-
quires that secret ballots be used28 4 and that votes be tabulated and
published separately for each local. 2 15
The broad LMRDA mandate leaves substantial freedom to courts
to fashion safeguards appropriate to the needs of particular elections.
Courts have not, however, consistently sought to construe the statute
in a way which minimizes the opportunity for fraud and coercion.
Regarding the secrecy of ballots, for example, the DOL position has
been that a ballot is "secret" in the sense required by the statute2 80
only if it is impossible to identify the voter.2 8 7 Yet some courts have
required proof that ballots were actually identified before deeming
282. Restrictions on who can be an observer take two forms. The most stringent
requires that the observer be a member of the local he is to observe. A less restrictive
rule, still considered by complainants to be too inhibiting, requires only that the ob.
server be a member of the union. Complaints against these restrictions were made
primarily at the national union level. Interview with complainant union attorney E;
letter from James Morrissey to William J. Usery, March 25, 1969; 1965 USWVA Study,
supra note 214.
Complaints of other election day abuses were made by participants in national or
intermediate level elections. Some contended that delivery of excess ballots to the polling
place raised an inference of fraud. This practice was justified by union personnel on
grounds that extras were required to account for changes in local membership since the
last membership list had been submitted to the national and to substitute for ballots
which might be damaged. Another charge was that disparity in returns between those
locals where a candidate had his observers and those in which he had none indicated
possible fraud. Yet, to the extent that candidates sent observers only to locals where
they could count on large support, this disparity is not a reliable basis for inferring fraud.
At the local level, several complainant members suggested that it was important 'to
have supporters on the election committee. If committees were controlled by incumbents,
rules unfair to insurgents could be made or rules uniform on their face could be applied
only against insurgents. Interviews with complainant union members I and L and with
complainant attorney L. See also Summers, Judicial Regulation of Union Electionst, 70
YALE L.J. 1221, 1228-30 (1961).
283. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
284. LMRDA § 401(a), (b), (d), 29 U.S.C. § 481(a), (b), (d) (1970).
285. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970). One seasoned national campaigner emphasized that
this was the most important election safeguard in national and district level elections.
If there is any tampering with the local returns at district or national headquarters, It
can easily be discovered by the local when results are published. 1965 USWA Study,
supra note 214.
286. "Secret ballot" means the expression by ballot, voting machine, or otherwise,
but in no event by proxy, of a choice with respect to any election or vote taken
upon any matter, which is cast in such a manner that the person expressing such
choice cannot be identified with the choice expressed.
LMRDA § 3(k), 29 U.S.C. § 402(k) (1970).
287. See Wirtz v. Local 11, International Hod Carriers, 211 F. Supp. 408, 413 (W.D.
Pa. 1962); Beaird, supra note 78, at 1309-11.
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the secret ballot provision to have been violated.28 8 This narrow inter-
pretation overlooks the substantial psychological coercion that may
occur if voters even suspect that their votes can be identified.
Courts anxious to protect against election day abuses might require
any union with sufficient. funds to employ an accounting firm or a
neutral third party to send, collect, and count ballots in the case of a
mail ballot election.28 9 If that is not feasible, unions might be re-
quired to have neutral third parties present at all times when mail
ballots are in the union's possession.2 90
In poll ballot elections, it is crucial that observers be adequately
trained to detect improper practices. Full and effective safeguards
might require unions to provide observers with a manual on election
288. In Wirtz v. Local 11, Hod Carriers, 211 F. Supp. 408 (W.D. Pa. 1962) the court
found that there was no violation of the secret ballot provision although the number of
each member's ballot was recorded next to his name in the dues ledger, and the opposition
poll watcher recorded the identity of each voter in numerical order. The Department
argued unsuccessfully that the mere possibility of discovering the way a man voted
was a sufficient violation of the law, and that the word "cannot" in § 3(k) of the law
suggested that the right was absolute. In Shultz v. Local 420. Aluminum Workers. 74
L.R.R.M. 2281 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), the court also refused to find a breach of the secret ballot
provision even where men had marked their ballots in the open without the use of voting
booths.
289. Absentee ballots may be necessary if members who live far front tie polling
place are to be given a reasonable opportunity to vote. Thus courts have found Tide
IV violations when absentee ballots were not provided for members at sea during an
election. Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 ($.D.N.Y.). aJl'd, 399 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1968); Goldberg v. Marine Cooks Union, 204 F. Supp. 844, 845 (N.D. Cal.
1962); contra, Virtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 196.) (mem-
bets living 80 to 350 miles from polling place found not guaranteed a right to absentee
ballots); Hodgson v. Local 920, Teamsters, 327 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D. Te x. 1971) (holding
polls open for three days found preferable to providing absentee ballots).
Complainant union members H, I, and S claimed members casting absentee ballots
were often intimidated by union officials when they obtained the ballots. Similar prob-
lems were found in the 1970 United Mine Workers District 5 election. N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 1971, at 52, col. I. Even if members are not intimidated on receipt of te ballot,
they may doubt the secrecy of their vote once the ballot is returned and thus fear to
vote against incumbents; Interview with complainant union attorney M. The possibility
of tampering with returned ballots is high as with all mail ballots; the DOL found
many questionable absentee ballots in the 1970 District 5 election. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20,
1971, at 52, col. 1. Thus, the precautions against misuse of mail ballots, as outlined
at p. 469 and note 278 supra, are also relevant to absentee ballots.
290. Use of third parties to oversee election procedures is of limited utility in unions
where supposedly neutral third parties are distrusted. Although some interviewees (con-
plainant union member B and union officers B and K) trusted organizations such as
the Honest Ballot Association or American Arbitration Association or the union bank
or accounting firm, others (complainant union members I and S, union attorners M, 0,
and II and union officers M and N) thought these groups were often either incom-
petent or in league with incumbent officers. For two cases involving misdoing by third
parties conducting elections, see Wirtz v. Guild of Variety Artists, 267 F. Supp. 527(S.D.N.Y. 1967) and Vestal v. Teamsters Union, 245 F. Supp. 623, 624-25 (M.D. Tenn.
1965). This distrust led union officer M and union attorney II to prefer government
supervision. One interviewee (complainant union member A) noted, however, that an
election in his union was handled very satisfactorily by the industrial relations depart-
ment of Loyola University. When third parties cannot be trusted in running an election,
it seems necessary to allow observers of all candidates to be available at all points in the
ballot process.
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day procedures..2 91 Finally, non-union members should be permitted
to act as observers.29 2
III. Administrative Enforcement of LMRDA Rights
In designing a structure to enforce the election rights provided by
the LMRDA, Congress was presented with a number of alternatives.
It could have relied upon the union, an administrative agency, or the
courts. Relief could have been made available either before or after
the election was completed. Responsibility for uncovering and alleg-
ing violations could have been given to union members or to govern-
ment overseers.
To some extent, Congress adopted all of these approaches. With
respect to enforcement of Title IV, which provides the major electoral
safeguards, a structure was created in which an aggrieved union mem-
ber, upon completion of the election and after first exhausting the
appeals process of his union, complains to the Department of Labor
which then has the exclusive authority to sue in federal court to have
the election set aside. The court, upon a finding of statutory viola-
tions and a determination that those violations "may have affected"
the election outcome, will invalidate the challenged election and order
a iew election under departmental supervision.2 93
291. In the 1969 Mineworkers election, the Yablonski forces attempted to train
their observers by printing a booklet on election day procedures and conducting classes
for observers. They printed their own booklet after they were unable to get an adequate
number of copies of the DOL publication. This may indicate that DOL was not aware
of the potential use of the manual as a handbook for observers. Interview with con-
plainant attorney E.
292. The DOL has approved but not required thlis practice. US. Dep't of Labor Release,
BLMR-41/USDL-4438 (March 14, 1961).
293. LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.c. § 482 (1970):
(a) A member of a labor organization-
(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of
such organization and of any parent body, or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision
within three calendar months after their invocation, may file a complaint with the
Secretary within one calendar month thereafter alleging the violation of any pio-
vision of section 481 of this title (including violation of the constitution and bylaws
of the labor organization pertaining to the election and removal of officers). The
challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision thereon (as
hereinafter provided) and in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be
conducted by the officers elected or in such other manner as its constitution and
bylaws may provide.
(b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause
to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied,
he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action
against the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the United States
in which such labor organization maintains its principal office to set aside the
invalid election, if any, and to direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote
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Congressional adoption of this administrative-judicial mechanism for
enforcing Title IV election rights involved a balance between two
sets of competing interests: first, the conflict between effective gov-
ernmental intervention and comprehensive union self-governance; 204
second, the conflict between the individual interests of union members
and the public interest in honest but effective unionism.20
upon the removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary and in accord-
ance with the provisions of this subchapter and such rules and regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe. The court shall have power to take such action as it deems
proper to preserve the assets of the labor organization.
(c) If, upon a preponderance of the evidence after a trial upon the merits, the
court finds-
(1) that an election has not been held within the time prescribed by section .181
of this title, or
(2) that the violation of section 481 of this title may have affected the outcome
of an election,
the court shall declare the election, if any, to be void and direct the conduct of
a new election under supervision of the Secretary and, so far as lawful and prac-
ticable. in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization.
The Secretary shall promptly certify to the court the names of the persons elected,
and the court shall thereupon enter a decree declaring such persons to be the officers
of the labor organization. If the proceeding is for the removal of officers pursuant
to subsection (h) of section 481 of this title, the Secretary shall certify the results of
the vote and the court shall enter a decree declaring whether such persons hale
been removed as officers of the labor organization.
(d) An order directing an election, dismissing a complaint, or designating elected
officers of a labor organization shall be appealable in the same manner as the finaljudgment in a civil action, but an order directing an election shall not be stayed
pending appeal.
294. The findings of labor corruption and autocratic rule made by the McClellan
hearings in 1957-58 convinced Congress that some form of federal intervention was re-
quired. SENATE Comm. oN IMPROPER AcrIvITEs IN TilE LAnOR oR MANAG.tL%T FiE.a
FIRsT INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1957); SEcOND INTEtIM
REPORT. S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958). Yet there was great concern that
such intervention not undermine union independence. The Senate report accompan)ing
a bill which served as a precursor to the LMRDA stated that there were three principles
followed in writing the legislation. The first was:
The committee recognized the desirability of minimum interference by Govemmet
in the internal affairs of any private organization. Trade unions have made a com-
mendable effort to correct internal abuses; hence the committee believes that only
essential standards should be imposed by legislation. Moreover, in establishing and
enforcing statutory standards great care should be taken not to undermine union
self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective bargaining agents.
S. REP. No. 187 oNx S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959).
295. Initially the DOL was to act merely to vindicate the statutory rights of individual
union members. This was the position adopted in the debates by Senator John F.
Kennedy:
In the bill we provide the right to appeal to the Secretary of Labor, whenemer a
member believes that his rights, as provided in the bill in the case of an election,
have been denied to him. Then the Secretary of Labor in effect becomes te union
member's lawyer. Such a provision is infinitely stronger than any provision now
in effect.
104 CONG. REc. 10947 (1958). But very quickly, at least some members of Congress began
to foresee that the Department would be responsive to broader public interests which
might conflict with those of the individual complainanlt. Senator Goldmater, commenting
on public enforcement of Title IV, stated:
Since the election standards are designed to insure honiest elections for the benefit
of all union members as a matter of public policy, their violation is a matter of
public rather than exclusively individual concern . ....
105 CONG. REc. 16489 (1959).
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The enforcement structure in § 402 of the Act accommodates these
competing considerations in uneasy compromise. The tension between
union self-correction and government intervention is reflected by the
fact that the DOL cannot sue for a new election until after the
internal remedies within the union have either been exhausted or
invoked for three months without obtaining a final decision on the
complaint.00 The tension between individual rights and the public
interest is theoretically reconciled by providing for DOL action, but
only after a request by an individual union member.207
In operating this enforcement structure, a natural reluctance of the
DOL to engage in formal litigation has tipped both of these delicate
balances. The Department has adopted an administrative stance which
emphasizes negotiated compliance with LMRDA requirements. The
Department's procedures place far greater reliance on the internal
union appeals process than on litigation and emphasize promotion
of the DOL's conception of the public interest rather than enforce-
ment of individual rights.
An analysis of the Title IV enforcement process can best be con-
ducted by describing the procedures involved at each of the six stages
of a Title IV suit. These stages are: (a) the initiation phase, in which
a union member brings a violation to the attention of his union; (b)
the exhaustion phase, in which the union deals with the complaint
through its established appeals structure; (c) the investigation phase,
in which the DOL intervenes to find evidence of violations and to
seek a voluntary settlement with the union if the allegations are con-
firmed; (d) the prosecution phase, in which the DOL determines
whether litigation is appropriate if voluntary settlement has not been
achieved; (e) the adjudication phase, in which the litigation is ter-
minated either by stipulation between the parties or by court deci-
sion; and (f) the remedial action phase, in which the DOL supervises
a new election pursuant either to stipulation or court decision.
A. The Initiation Phase
The LMRDA designates the individual member as the initiator of
a § 402 action. 298 The forum to which his protest is directed is the
296. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970).
297. Id.
298. The statute specifies merely that "[a] member of a labor organization" may
bring such a complaint. 29 U.S.C. 482(a) (1970). The published regulations of the
Department, 29 C.F.R. § 452.15(a) (1970), rephrase this to read "any member" of a labor
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union itself. Although the statute specifies no role for the DOL in
this initial phase of the enforcement process, tie Department may
nonetheless become involved.
The administrative authority under the statute, vested in the Secre-
tary, has been delegated within the Department primarily to the Office
of Labor-Management and Welfare Pension Reports (LMWP),20 1
headed by a Director and under the general supervision of the Assistant
Secretary for Labor-Management Relations. 300 The LMWP has estab-
lished a field staff of twenty-four Area Offices301 and twelve Resident
Compliance Offices, 302 grouped administratively under six Regional
LMWP Offices. 30 3 These offices are the focus of DOL activities dur-
ing the initiation phase.
1. Pre-Election Advisement of Complainants
When violations of Title IV become apparent before balloting, a
union member may file a pre-election protest with the union. In addi-
tion, he may independently consult the nearest LMWP field office for
advice. The Area LMWP Offices in fact receive many pre-election
organization, and the DOL Interpretative Manual specifically rejects limiting com-
plainant status to members who voted in contested elections, members who were candi-
dates for office, or members who were actually deprived of Title IV rights. U.S. DEPT OF
LABOR, LMRDA INTRPRETATIVE MANUAL §§ 473.650, 474.202 (1970). This position has
been affirmed in the courts. Wirtz v. Local Union 57, Operating Eng'rs (unreported
case cited in INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL, supra, at § 474.202); Wirtz v. National Maritime
Union, 284 F. Supp. 47, 58 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 198). In addition,
courts have extended the right to bring a complaint to members on leave from the union.
Wirtz v. Independent Petroleum Workers, 307 F. Supp. 462, 468 (N.D. Ind. 1969), and
members unlawfully expelled before the contested election, Wirtz v. Local 1377, 1BEW,
63 L.R.R.M. 2029, 2031 (N.D. Ohio, 1966). The Interpretative Manual extends this
latter ruling to include members suspended and expelled from membership after the
contested election as well. INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL, supra, at § 474.200.
299. U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, LABOR-MANAGEMENTr SERVIcES ADMINISTRATION, Co.srLIA'CV E,
ENFORCEMENT AND REPORTING IN 1969 UNDER TIlE L0BOR-,ANAGEME.%NT IRkEvOrmING AND
DiscLOsuRE Acr 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SUMMssARY OF OvERATIONS].
300. By delegation from the Secretary, the Director is authorized to "issue in-
terpretations, on the advice of the Solicitor, with respect to those sections of the
Act for which the Secretary of Labor has responsibility and with respect to regula-
tions which the Secretary has promulgated thereunder;, authorize and institute in-
vestigations and inquiries the Secretary is empowered to institute with respect to
violations of the Act; to issue orders to compel the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of documents; and to make findings of fact and decisions
necessary to carry out the duties and functions vested in him."
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1960, supra note 299, at 54.
301. An Area LMWP Office may have anywhere from three (Seattle) to thirty-four
(New York) professionals attached to it. See LMSA Field Office Staffing, June 14, 1970
(on file at U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of LMWP, Silver Spring, Md.).
302. A Resident Compliance Office contains a single professional staff menber. Such
an office is established in an area where there is not sufficient activity to require an
Area Office, yet the presence of a professional staff person is required to handle any
investigations that may arige. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
303. For the location of the various LMWP Field Offices, see LMWP-Field Directory
(1970) (on file at U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of LMWP, Silver Spring, Md.).
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protests. 30 4 The standard LMWP practice is to advise the complainant
that the Department cannot act until the election has been held and
the complainant has complied with the statute's exhaustion require-
ment. If the protest involves rights that may be enforceable before
the election under other sections of the statute, the complainant will
be so informed. But no legal advice is given by the Department. In-
stead, the complainant is referred to the local bar association for
further information or legal counsel. 30 5
The LMWP field personnel also respond to such complaints by
notifying the union that a charge of improper conduct has been re-
ceived.30 The usual procedure is for the Area LMWP Office to send
a formal letter to the union referring the union to the election require-
ments of Title IV of the Act.30 7 In some cases the union is contacted
informally and advised of the specific charges. The frequency of this
informal communication depends on the nature of the violation al-
leged and the degree of contact that has previously existed between
the union and the Area Office.308
304. Six of the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted indicated that such pre-election
protests were received. One office stated that it received "quite a few" such conplahtnts
and a second suggested that it received them "whenever there is a contest." Fewest cont-
plaints were received at an office with over 3,700 labor organizations in the area-only
five complaints annually. Other offices indicated greater pre.election involvement. One
with 600 elections annually received twelve complaints in 1969. A second with 800 labor
elections within its geographic area received sixty to eighty pre-election protests. A third
area office with about 500 elections annually received 100 complaints in 1969.
305. All eight of the Area LMWP Offices contacted indicated that this was the stantl.
ard practice as regards the complaining party. None of the offices indicated that It
would go farther and conduct a preliminary investigation to determine if the complaint
had any merit. One office did indicate that it would aid the complainant in formulating
his objections to the election in legal terms, but this was the extent of any LMW'
involvement at this stage.
306. Notification is prescribed as standard procedure by the Department's LMWIP
Field Staff handbook. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
307. The letter has the following form:
We understand that your organization is conducting an election of officers In the
near future. As you know, such elections must conform to certain provisions of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
The enclosed booklet, Electing Union Officers, has been prepared by our Technical
Assistance Division to explain the requirements of the law. It also contains a number
of the Department's interpretations of the Act's election provisions.
You may be particularly interested in the Election Procedures Check List on pages
54-55. This will help your organization to determine if all the requirements of the
law have been met.
We will be happy to answer any questions you may have concerning the provisions
of the Act.
308. Several offices indicated that this procedure would be resorted to only whet
the violation alleged involved a substantial violation of the statute, one that would ef-
fectively be per se and clearly warrant a rerun election if a post-election contplaint were
raised. Election day procedures employing unreasonable requremnents that denied people
the right to vote or failed to insure a secret ballot were suggested as such per se viola.
tions. Informing the union gives the union a chance to "head off" the violation and to
avoid the cost and embarrassment of a rerun election. A regional LMWP office stggested
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Whether the union is notified by formal or informal contact, the
Area Office will offer its "technical assistance." This offer is accepted
in a minority of cases and in any event involves only informal advice
on proper conduct of the election.3 09 Occasionally the office will seek
to mediate the protest and meet with the parties to the dispute either
separately or in joint conference.31 0
2. Pre-Clearance of Union Procedures
Several union attorneys indicated that they contact LMWP prior
to the institution of a new electoral procedure to insure that it does
not violate the statute.311 While the LMWP does not consider the
opinions it gives in such situations binding, Area Offices will render
advisory opinions and may encourage pre-clearance.31 2 While some
pre-clearance occurs at the local union level, with advice given by the
appropriate Area LMWP Office, most of it is handled by the national
union counsel directly contacting the main LMWP Office in Wash-
ington.3 :13
that such informal consultation was more common where the offending union had pre-
viously had contact with LMWP. No consultation or clearance from either the Regional
or Washington offices of LMWP is required before an area office undertakes such in-
formal advisement.
309. In one Area Office the offer of technical assistance was accepted only about
twenty per cent of the time.
310. Only one Area LMWP Office contacted indicated that it used this practice to
help settle disputes, and there separate conferences were employexl. But tile two regional
offices contacted suggested that all the Area Offices within their jurisdictions resorted
to this approach, though infrequently. The office is more likely to involve itself in this
way if it has had prior contact with the union involved and the union is located nearby,
so that transportation is not a burden to the union officers or the complainant. Tile
absolute amount of this mediation by the Department is apparently quite small. Only
four of the thirty-five union attorneys contacted indicated that the Department was
willing to contact the parties involved in an election dispute and mediate the problem.
311. Thirteen of the thirty-five union attorneys contacted indicated that the Depart-
ment of Labor was willing to give informal advice on the proper conduct of an upcoming
election. Three indicated that the Department would go further and give a formal
advisory opinion on the legality of a particular procedure.
312. In one region, the Regional Director of LMWP met with many of the labor
lawyers in the area and encouraged them to consult the Department on the legality of
specific electoral procedures. Interview with union attorney 0. But in at least one area.
the LMWP office involved has refused to pre-clear election procedures. Interview with
union officer K. Seven of the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted indicated that they
give technical assistance to the union before an election; live indicated that the) clear
certain procedures before they are used in an election; and three suggested that the)
aid in the actual drafting of bylaws concerning election or equivalent constitutional pro.
visions regarding elections.
313. Where pre-clearance is sought from an Area LMWP Office, that office may on
its own initiative contact the Regional or Washington office if it is uncertain as to the
legality of a particular practice. Much of the pre-clearance is, however, taken directly
to the Washington LMWP Office, usually by counsel to the national union.
Where a local union retains its own attorney, a question on election procedure may
be brought to him, and he in turn will usually consult the appropriate Area LMWP
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The role which the Department has adopted in the pre-election
phase is consistent with its general negotiated compliance approach
to Title IV enforcement. Both devices give the union an opportunity
to avoid questionable election procedures and later suits to set aside
the election. The notice given to the union is informational in tone-
the union is not threatened with either a pre-election investigation or
a post-election suit if corrections are not made.314 No effort is made
by the Department to ascertain whether remedial action has been
taken by the union subsequent to "thd nlotice. Information from the
pre-election complaint is placed in a separate file which is elevated
to the status of a formal case file only if a valid complaint is received
by the Department after the election.31 5 If no such complaint is re-
ceived, the case is not re-opened. 310
3. Pre-Election Investigation
The DOL has adopted a rather passive pre-election stance, but there
exists a statutory basis for a much more active role. Although the
statute provides for an investigation by the Secretary as part of the
standard § 402 enforcement mechanism,3 17 there is an independent
basis for an investigation as well. Section 601 of the statute permits
the Secretary to investigate "when he believes it necessary in order
to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate
any provision of the Act."318 This section would permit investigation
Office. If the local does not have an attorney, then the question will most likely be
referred to the local's national union representative who in turn will consult the na-
tional's legal counsel. His contact will most likely be with the Central LMWIP Office In
Washington. Interviews with union attorneys X, Y, and AA.
314. The most stringent warning given, and this only informally, is that the tulotn
is possibly in violation of the Act and that if there is a post-election complaint, It may
lead to an investigation and perhaps a court suit to overturn the election. No pre.electlon
investigation is threatened because the Department's position is that it has no power
to conduct such an investigation. See pp. 478-80 infra. No post-election investigation
is threatened because the Department will conduct such an investigation only upon
receipt of a valid formal complaint, and such a complaint may not be forthcoming. See
pp. 485-86 infra.
315. Three of the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted indicated that this was stand-
ard practice for pre-election complaints.
316. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
317. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
318. The Secretary shall have power when lie believes it necessary in order to
determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of
this chapter (except subchapter II of this chapter) to make an investigation and in
connection therewith he may enter such places and inspect such records and accounts
and question such persons as he may deemi necessary to enable him to deterine
the facts relative thereto. The Secretary may report to interested persons or officials
concerning the facts required to be shown in any report required by this chapter
and concerning the reasons for failure or refusal to file such a report or any other
matter which he deems to be appropriate as a result of such an investigation.
LMRDA § 601(a), 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (1970).
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of a possible Title IV violation without a prior complaint by a union
member during any phase of the election process. Although the Sec-
retary could not bring a § 402 enforcement proceeding based directly
on his findings, the § 601 provision does permit disclosure "to inter-
ested persons" of the results of the investigation. Such publication
might lead to self-correction by the union, or prompt a union mem-
ber to initiate a formal post-election complaint satisfying tie require-
ments of § 402. Information obtained from a prompt pre-election in-
vestigation might also aid the DOL in its later determination of
whether or not to sue under § 402.
The DOL, however, has taken the position that an election investi-
gation will not be initiated until the prerequisites of § 402 have been
satisfied-the filing of a complaint by a union member who has ex-
hausted his internal remedies.31 9 This stance precludes pre-election
intervention, since the exhaustion requirement has been construed to
refer exclusively to post-election invocation of the union appeals
structure. 2
0
The DOL position of pre-election abstention has recently come un-
der criticism. In 1969, Joseph A. Yablonski asked the Department to
investigate under § 601 alleged pre-balloting violations of the LMRDA
by his opponent, W.A. Boyle.32' The Department refused. In defend-
ing this refusal before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, then Secre-
tary of Labor George P. Shultz emphasized the DOL's consistent prac-
tice of refusing to investigate prior to balloting. While he admitted
that such abstention had previously been considered a matter of policy
subject to exception, the Secretary now asserted that it was required
by "sound statutory construction" and "consistent application of the
principles that guided the Congress in enacting the statute."32 2 Shultz
319. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
320. Various courts have restricted the exhaustion of remedies required by the statute
to the exhaustion of post-election remedies. Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F.
Supp. 47, 58 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 73. Teamsters.
057 F. Supp. 784, 792 (N.D. Ohio, 1966); Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs. 242 F. Supp.
631, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), vacated as inoot, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 196b). A similar position
is taken by the Department of Labor, LMWP. "The three months start to run from
the time the member sends his appeal to the union. He must have waited until tile
election was held, and the result announced before his complaint was filed with tile
union, under the Department's rules." Interview with Henry Queen, as reported in Daily
Labor Report, Washington Daily Reporter System, Mard 22, 1963, No. 54:A-2.
321. The request for an investigation was made on the grounds that only by such
an investigation could the Department "discourage further illegal conduct, and obtain
evidence which would be necessary to petition a court to set aside the election if its
outcome were subsequently found to be affected by improper activities." Hearings on
UMW Election, supra note 2, at 1 (Feb. 5, 1970) (statement of Senator Williams).
322. Id. at 339-40 (May 4, 1970) (testimony of George P. Shultz).
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maintained that DOL investigation prior to balloting would influence
the outcome of the election because it would "publicize the activities
of one faction in an election in order to assist the campaign of the
other," and that such influence was beyond the scope of the "limited
intervention policy" of § 402 and "repugnant to a healthy independ-
ence of unions from governmental interference in their internal af-
fairs." 323 The Secretary nevertheless suggested that a § 601 investiga-
tion might be permissible in cases where the investigation would not
"unduly influence" the election outcome.3 24
Evaluation and Recommendations. Preventing a violation of the
LMRDA election provisions is clearly preferable to remedying a
breach, and the pre-clearance and technical assistance activities of
DOL are perhaps its best opportunity to insure union compliance
with Title IV guarantees. These activities, currently conducted in-
formally and with varying degrees of zeal, should be expanded; indi-
vidual area offices should attempt to cultivate the kinds of informal
contacts with union officials which facilitate such consultation.3 2 One
problem that might attend expanded use of these procedures is a lack
of uniformity in the informal opinions of the LMWP Area Offices.
This can be remedied by improving communication between the
Washington office and the various LMWP field staffs and by refer-
ring the more difficult problems to Washington. Since the primary
advantage of the pre-clearance process is its informality, the forum
of consultation should remain at the Area Office level; decentralization
would appear crucial to achieving maximum consultation with mini-
mum delay.
Simple notice to the union that a complaint has been received by
an LMWP office may encourage voluntary corrective action. At least
some complainant union members, however, viewed the notice not
as a means of settling disputes but as a warning to the union to "cover
its tracks." 320 For this reason, notice should be supplemented by con-
323. Id. at 340.
324. A limitation of our investigative power under section 601 in election cases to
circumstances which will not unduly influence the outcome of the election is a ra-
tional harmonizing of these two different provisions of the statute [the procedural re-
quirements for an investigation under § 402 and the investigatory authority in § 601].Id.
325. Informal pre-clearance may be encouraged by the recent reorganization of the
Labor-Management Services Administration (LMSA) of which LMWVP is a part. Now
the area administrator, in addition to his LMWP duties, will have responsibillty for
other labor activities which will bring him in increasing contact with union offlch1s.
Interview with Department of Labor Official E.
326. Interviews with complainant union members M and N, and complainant attorney
E. One of the complainants alleged that an LMWP office, in contacting the union, dis-
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ferences with union officials, either alone or with the complainant, to
encourage the resolution of election disputes.32 7 Both attorneys and
union members expressed confidence that there was a substantial po-
tential for settlement of such disputes before the election.328
In these ways, the Department could extend its activities prior to a
formal complaint without departing from its general reliance on union
remedial processes. Intervention under § 601, however, would begin
to move the Department outside this role, and this is the stated reason
for avoiding such pre-election activity. Even accepting Secretary Shultz's
rationale for not using the Department's full enforcement powers,32 0
"undue influence" in favor of particular candidates could be pre-
cluded by limiting pre-election action to situations where a request
for intervention is made by both sides. This intervention could take
two forms. First, the Department could agree to supervise an election
upon joint request of the principal contestants. 33 0 Second, the De-
partment could, on joint request, limit its role to one of observation,
closed the complainant's identity to union officials. The Department's policy is that the
name of the complainant is never disclosed. Interview with Department of Labor Of-
ficial A. This is crucial, for if the identity of the complainant is revealed, he may become
the object of coercion or intimidation.
327. Such joint conferences between LMWP, the complainant, and union officials
would not be possible if the complainant objected to his identity being revealed to the
union or if there were a danger of reprisal being directed against him.
328. Nine of the twenty union officers contacted indicated a willingness to settle
disputes concerning election rights and remedies. Two more suggested there were some
matters which they would not be inclined to settle. Union attorne)s also indicated that
the leadership would settle such matters. Nineteen of the thirty.five interview'ed indi-
cated a positive willingness to settle, and none indicated adamant opposition. The com-
plainant union members contacted were more skeptical, with only two indicating that
union leaders were willing to settle election disputes and two more stating that the
union would settle only certain questions. However, nine of the complainants suggested
that, while reluctant to settle election questions, union leaders could be pushed to comply
voluntarily. Only eleven indicated that union officials adamantly opposed any settle-
ment of election matters.
The prospect of settling an issue pre-election within the union may be somewhat
dependent on the nature of the violation. If it is a non-constitutional issue of procedure.
caused by ignorance on the part of the union officials, then the prospects of settlement
are high. If it is a constitutional issue requiring formal amendment procedures, or if
the practice is inspired by malice rather than neglect, then the prospects of pre.election
resolution are small.
329. See p. 480 supra.
330. However, all requests for supervision by the DOL personnel have been turned
down on the grounds that "it has been the Department's consistent policy not to be-
come involved in the initial conduct or supervision of an election of labor organization
officers." On August 17, 1970, Mr. Michael Budzanoski, President of District 5 of the
United Mine Workers, addressed a request to the DOL for supervision of the upcoming
district election. His request was rejected in a letter dated August 26, 1970, from W.J.
Usery, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Labor, from which the above quotation was taken.
Such supervision might be advisable if requested independently by a significant
portion of the union membership. A provision authorizing Department supervision in
such circumstances was proposed by Rep. Braden in 1959, H.R. 4473, 86th Cong.. Ist
Sess. § 101(a)(9)(A). This provision would have permitted outside supervision of union
elections if requested by ten per cent of the members.
The Yale Law Journal
both to gather evidence for a possible post-election suit and, hope-
fully, to deter violations of the Act by its presence.331 Both activities
would appear to be permissible even under Secretary Shultz's standard,
if in response to a joint request by the contestants. 32 The term "in-
vestigation" in § 601 would have to be read broadly to cover actual
supervision, but it would seem clearly to cover the more limited role
of departmental observation.
Without a joint request, the Department should nevertheless con-
sider intervention on a showing of a high probability that the statute
is being violated in a fashion that will inevitably taint the election
to a degree sufficient to satisfy the "may have affected the outcome"
test.333 Such intervention should follow more conventional notions
of "investigation." The policy of § 402 can be respected by waiting
until a request for pre-election intervention has been made by a com-
plaining union member, by notifying the union that such action is
under consideration, and by offering the advice and technical assistance
331. If the Department were concerned that its supervision would not be compiled
with voluntarily by the union candidates, it could limit its role to providing observers.
Such a request was made to the Department in connection with a recent election of
officers for District 50 of the Mineworkers. This request was also denied, on the grounds
that the Department had no business intervening in an election prior to its conduct, even
to the extent of providing observers, and even when so requested by both candidates
for the principal office. Interview with Department of Labor Official A. Other requests
for such pre-election intervention have been made in the past and rejected. Interviews
with complainant attorneys I and 0, and union attorney T.
332. The concern of the Secretary was that intervention would redound to the benefit
of one or the other of the candidates. See p. 480 supra. Yet any factual discoveries
made by the Department could be withheld until after the election so that any adverse
impact upon the election outcome from this source could bc forestalled. The Secretary's
intervention could still bias the election if the mere presence of DOL personnel caused
the rank and file to react unfavorably to the complaining party or his opponent. If
both candidates request the intervention, however, this source of bias is eliminated.
One complaint expressed by members of the Department was that pre-election super.
vision or observation would put too great a strain on their manpower resources. Yet by
limiting such intervention to closely contested elections, the Department would probably
be merely anticipating later Title IV investigation, litigation, and supervision of a rerun.
In both the District 50 and the District 5 cases, where the Department declined to
supervise or observe the election, a Title IV action has resulted. Interview with De-
partment of Labor Official A.
333. This was also the position taken by the Chairman of the Senate Labor Sub.
committee upon conclusion of the UMW election hearings:
While I can understand the Department's long-established general policy of not
conducting such investigations in advance of an election, it seems to me this policy
permitted an investigation when information brought to the Secretary's attention
indicates a pattern of irregularities which, if allowed to continue, will inevitably
taint the election. In such cases, even though the Secretary could not actually go to
court until after the election, a display of the Department's concern, manifested
through investigative activity, may well serve to discourage continued violations of
the law, as well as preserve evidence for later use in court, should that be necessary.
I do not believe that Congress intended that the Secretary's hands should be tied in
the fashion of the Secretary's current interpretation.
Letter from Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman, to members of the Senate Subcommittee
on Labor, June 24, 1970.
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of the Department to aid in voluntary self-correction. Only when
these efforts give no indication of remedying the abuse should tie
Department intervene.334 The Department's desire to avoid influenc-
ing the outcome of an election is legitimate, but it should not be as-
sumed that it consistently prevails over other concerns. 35 The in-
vestigatory presence of the DOL may be the most effective means of
discouraging Title IV violations, in which case the outcome will be
-influenced in the direction of fairness. Pre-election investigation may
also be the only way to garner sufficient evidence for a subsequent
§ 402 suit.
B. The Exhaustion Phase
A member may be permitted by union bylaws to initiate an election
appeal within his union prior to actual balloting,330 but to be eligible
to file a formal complaint with the Secretary of Labor under § 402337
the member must invoke the appeals structure of the union again after
the election a38 After a final decision on his post-election appeal to
334. Union attorneys generally disliked § 601 intervention. Sixteen of the thirty.fivc
union attorneys contacted opposed pre-election investigation by the Department, and
only seven favored it.
335. Even if the request is made by only one of the candidates, the effect it will have
on the outcome is problematical. The complaining candidate will benefit from any
suspicion of wrongdoing cast upon his opponent by the intervention, but he is also the
victim of a general distaste among the rank and file for resort to an "outsider" to
settle an internal election dispute. Although our results are sparse on this question.
they indicate that the complaining candidate may on balance be harmed by a pre.elecion
appeal to the Department. Five of the thirty-one complainant union members indicated
that the rank and file would react adversely to resort to an "outsider," and only three
stated that this tactic would aid the complaining candidate by casting suspicion of wrong-
doing upon his opponent. Three said that the intervention would have no effect. Five
of the twenty union officers indicated that such intervention would have no effect on
the membership; four stated that it would hurt the complaining party; and only two
suggested that it would hurt the non-complaining candidate.
This finding, if generalizable, would indicate that the complaining party undergoes
a great risk in requesting intervention by the Department of Labor. This risk would
serve to deter intervention requests in all but the most serious instances in wvhich the
complaining party foresees little chance of obtaining a fair election. Thus the danger
that the Department would become a "political football" for intervention-minded can-
didates seems small.
336. See pp. 531-33 infra.
337. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
338. Exhaustion of pre-election remedies will not satisfy the requirements of § 402(a).
"There is nothing in Title IV of the Act that requires a union member to wait until
an election has been held before invoking internal remedies. However, once the election
is completed the member must again invoke his internal remedies." 1sruuItrrTATivE
MANUAL, supra note 298, at § 474.305.
By "completed," the Department means that the complainant "must have waited until
the election was held, and the result announced." Only then may he file his complaint
with the union and have it considered an "invocation" of union remedies within the
meaning of § 402(a). Interview with Henry Queen, Chief of LMWP's Branch of Elections
and Trusteeships, reported in Daily Labor Report, Washington Daily Reporter System,
March 22, 1965, No. 54:A-1, at A-2.
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the union, or after having waited for such disposition for three months,
the complaining party has one month in which to file with the DOL.3 D
For at least three months after the election,340 then, a complaint
initiated by a union member remains exclusively within the province
of the union appeals structure.341 During this period of internal union
disposition, the activities of the Department are minimal. If a com-
plainant comes to an LMWP office during the exhaustion phase he will
be informed of his rights under the LMRDA and advised that he must
exhaust his union remedies. 342 The appeal requirements in the union's
,constitution may be interpreted to the complaining party, and LMWP
339. The Department has narrowly construed these alternative requirements of in-
ternal exhaustion. Thus when the initial three months requirement has passed, the
complainant must decide either to file with the Secretary within one month's time or
wait until completion of the internal exhaustion. Once four calendar months have
passed from the time of invocation of the internal union remedies, the complainant is
barred from filing with the Secretary until the gamut of internal appeals has been rn-
often including even an international convention which may be many years in the future.
See note 580 infra. Only then does the complainant get a second opportunity to file with
the Secretary, and then within the same one calendar month tine limit. 29 C.F.R.
§ 452.15(b) (1970); INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL, supra note 298, at § 474.500.
The one calendar month within which the complaint must be filed with the Secretary
has been construed to be "the time from any day of any of the months . . . to the cor-
responding day (if any; if not to the last day) of the next month." Id. at § 474.20. Pro-
vision is made for extending the time of filing if the last day falls on a non-business
day to the next regular business day. Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741,
751 (D. Nev. 1965). The date of receipt of the complaint "into the custody of an cut-
ployee of the Department of Labor in the mail room" is controlling in determining the
timeliness of the filing. Id. The Department has declared untimely any complaints that
fall outside the one month limit as thus construed. "Thus where a complainant invoked
his internal union remedies on September 26, 1962, and, not having obtained a final
decision within three calendar months thereafter, mailed a formal letter of complaint
to the Secretary on January 25, 1963, which was received on January 28, 1963, It was
concluded that the complaint was untimely filed." INTERPRE'ATIVE MANUAL, supra at§ 474.510. See also Shultz v. District 19, Steelworkers, 319 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
340. Should the union give a final decision within the three-month time period, a
complainant would then be free to appeal to the Department. But rare is the case when
such prompt response is obtained from the union. Most internal appeals are painfully
protracted, and the apparent futility of receiving a final decision within the statutory
three-month period, does not permit the Secretary to entertain the complaint prior to
the expiration of the three-month minimum time span. INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL, supra
note 298, at § "473.200.
The Act does not specify a time limit within which the complainant must initiate his
internal union post-election remedies, but on the basis of a "Congressional intent that
election protests be expeditiously resolved," the Department has imposed a requiremlent
that a complainant initiate internal remedies within a "reasonable time." Id. at § 472.100.
Further, failure to invoke internal remedies within a time limit specified by the union
has been held to bar the Department from taking cognizance of the complaint where
the delay was not caused by fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the union, Id.
at § 472.105.
To the extent that the complainant delays in bringing his complaint to the attention
of the union, within the implied "reasonable time" of the statute or within tile specific
time limit of the union constitution, the minimum period of exclusive union disposition
is extended.
341. 29 US.C. § 482(a) (1970).
342. This was the standard practice of the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted.
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personnel may aid him in perfecting his complaint.34 3 As with a pre-
election complaint, information obtained from the complaining indi-
vidual will be kept in a separate file to be used only if a valid formal
complaint is subsequently received. No attempt is made to follow up
on a pre-exhaustion complaint if no subsequent formal protest is
filed.344
During the exhaustion phase, the union appeals structure is per-
mitted to operate without the slightest interference.3' 3 Early in the
history of LMRDA enforcement, the Department began its investiga-
tion on the basis of a pre-exhaustion "protest" challenging a union
election as long as the election had been completed. After only one
year, however, this policy was altered and LMWP began requiring a
"valid formal complaint" which met the exhaustion requirement be-
fore intervening. 346 This change in policy may have been part of the
decision to refrain from exercising the broad discretionary powers of
§ 601 in favor of the narrower investigatory powers of § 402.317 Two
reasons were given for this self-limitation: (1) Investigations based
on mere "protests" were not disclosing violations actionable under
§ 402, either because no violations were found348 or because the viola-
343. Two of the eight LMWP offices contacted indicated that the) assisted the
complaining union member in this way. The courts have permitted this type of DOL
activity. In two cases defendants pleaded unlawful solicitation of complaints from the
objecting union members because compliance officers aided the complainants in per-
fecting their appeals internally and to the Department. Both arguments failed. Mirtz
v. Local 1622, Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod
Carriers, 59 L.R.R.M. 2286 (D. Nev. 1965). In the former case, the compliance officers
actually drafted the complaint to the Secretary of Labor.
344. Nor is any attempt made to follow up on pre.election complaints to see if the
union was able to resolve the dispute and satisfy the complaining party. As with the
pre-exhaustion complaints, if a valid formal complaint is not lodged against the election.
the Department seems to assume that the dispute was satisfactorily settled by the union.
Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
345. While there is no firm evidence, it is possible that the pre-clearance activity
referred to in connection with the pre-election activities of the Department in fact
involves union attorneys sounding out the Department on how it vies particular election
procedures already employed in elections which have become the subject of protest
within the union appeals structure. There is no indication that the Deparunent attempts
to "weed out" these inquiries or to bring special pressure to bear to gain a favorable
disposition from the union appeals structure.
346. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
347. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
For the first year of the law, the Department had accepted what it now calls
"protests" about union elections. It did not require that the complaining member
exhaust his internal remedy, as Title IV does. The Department could get into a
case earlier because the exhaustion requirement does not apply to its investigation
under Section 601, but only to the union member making a complaint under Title IV.
Interview with Henry Queen, Chief of LMWP's Branch of Elections and Trusteeships,
reported in Daily Labor Report, Washington Daily Reporter System, March 22, 1965,
No. 54:A-2.
348. During the first full year of operation following passage of the Act, more than
half of the cases were closed after investigations revealed that alleged title IV
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tions found were of Title I, and these are subject to neither investiga-
tion under § 60134) nor enforcement under § 402.350 (2) The fruits of
the investigation could not be used in litigation until a complaint sat-
isfying the requirement of internal exhaustion specified in § 402 (a) 35,
was filed. It therefore seemed pointless to the DOL to pursue an in-
vestigation which would be "worthless" if a complaint satisfying
§ 402 (a) were not received.
In a few rare instances, the Department has deviated from this gen-
eral policy and invoked its § 601 authority to intervene prior to the
receipt of a formal complaint. In three cases this intervention involved
seizing ballots to avoid tampering35 2 In two others, the Department
agreed to observe the final tally of national election returns submitted
by individual locals.35 3 And in another case, the Department inter-
violations were unfounded. In the second and third years [after the shift to requir-
ing a valid formal complaint], violations were confirmed in approximately 75 per
cent of the cases, while in the fourth year over 80 per cent of the cases investigated
disclosed some type of title IV violation had occurred.
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1964. supra note 299. at 6.
349. Section 601(a) specifically exempts Title I from its general authorization to
investigate concerning a violation of "any provision" of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (1970).
350. Section 402(a) of the Act limits a complaint to the Secretary to violations of the
provisions of § 401 or of the election and removal provision of the union constitution
and bylaws.
351. Section 601 only empowers the Secretary to report "to interested persons or
officials" the results of an investigation.
352. In the 1964 election of the President of the IUE, James B. Carey was declared
the elected President by a narrow margin over Paul Jennings. The ballots from the
election had been deposited with the Security Storage Company, and when word was
received that the Executive Board of the IUE intended to remove the ballots, the De.
partment instituted an investigation under the "authority of section 601 of the act . .. ."
IUE Interim Report, supra note 256, at 563. In conjunction with this investligation, the
Department took custody of the ballots and recounted them-finding Jennings to be the
winner by a large margin. Id. at 564. One day after the announcement of these findings,
Carey submitted his resignation, and Jennings was installed by the union's execttive
board. Id. at 562.
In the 1969 election for Director of District 15, Steelworkers, the Pittsburgh Area LMWP
Office received word that one of the candidate's observers had been ejected from the
tally of the ballots at his local alid suspected that a ballot switch was in progress. The
Area LMWP Director proceeded to the local and gained possession of the ballots. They
were sent to Washington for analysis, which revealed that indeed a switch had occurred,
The valid ballots were tallied, and the results submitted by LMWP to the international
union tellers which considered the case in conjunction with other challenges to the
election. Interview with union officer N.
In the most recent case, the election of officers in District 5 of the Mineworkers,
allegations of improper tampering with absentee ballots resulted again in an Area
LMWP office impounding the ballots and sending them to the FBI crime laboratory
for analysis. Preliminary results have been announced which confirm the allegation of
at least some degree of tampering. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1970, at 26, col. 2.
353. In the 1965 election of Steelworkers national officers, both candidates (I.W. Abel
and David McDonald) feared that the tally of the returns from the individual locals
would not be conducted with accuracy and fairness. The Department agreed, after joint
request was made- to the Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz, to send observers to
insure the honesty of the tabulation. The observers also accompanied the international
union tellers to various cities across the country to hear the post-election complaints
raised against the election. 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214.
In the 1969 election the Department sent observers to watch a similar tally, this time
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vened shortly after the election of delegates to a convention at which
the intermediate level officers, were to be elected.35a The Department,
however, has no formal guidelines as to when it will intervene under
§ 601 after balloting but before receipt of a valid formal complaint.
In his testimony before the Senate subcommittee, Secretary Shultz
erroneously cited the three ballot-tampering cases as the "sole use"
of § 601 authority.35
Evaluation and Recommendations. The DOL role during the ex-
haustion phase is characterized by self-limitation in deference to the
internal union appeals structure. Preventive intervention is avoided
by eschewing the powers granted in § 601, which provides the basis for
considerably broader regulatory activity. Yet in some situations, action
by the DOL during the exhaustion phase might help to protect elec-
tion rights with none of the feared side effects.
The Department should consider exercising its broader powers in
the following circumstances:
(1) In situations of joint request by the parties, as in the tally ob-
servation cases, the Department should be willing to observe the tally-
ing process. Actual balloting by the rank and file will have been com-
pleted, and a request for departmental assistance is an indication that
both sides foresee a high probability of violation, yet have been un-
able to devise a satisfactory procedure of joint observation of the
tally.356
of the nominations submitted by the individual locals. This action was taken based on
the unilateral request of the incumbent, I.V. Abel. Although § 601 was not explicitly
invoked as the basis for these actions, it provides the sole grounds on which such inter-
vention could be justified. Interview with union attorney W.
354. The delegates to the convention were elected without the use of a secret ballot,
contrary to LMRDA § 401(d), 29 U.S.C. § 481(d) (1970). The Department intervened
immediately after the delegate election and prior to receiving a valid formal complaint,justifying its action on the grounds that by the time the exhaustion requirement had
been complied with the election of intermediate officers at the convention would ha e
been completed. The unlawful election of delegates would have tainted this election and
required a second convention. To avoid this expense to the union, the Department in-
vestigated and gathered evidence showing at least some of the delegates had not been
elected by secret ballot. On the basis of this evidence, the union voluntarily conducted
a new delegate election using secret ballots. Interview with Department of Labor Of-
ficial A.
355. From 1959 until today, the sole use of Section 601 investigatory authority in elec-
tion cases has been to collect or preserve evidence regarding elections which have al-
ready been held and, therefore, in circumstances in which the outcome of the election
could not be affected. This, as I describe later, we were willing to do in this case
if we had received any persuasive indication that evidence was likely to be destroyed.
We have used our authority only after the balloting was done-but before the pro-
cedural requirements for a Title IV investigation had been met.
Hearings on UMTV Election, supra note 2, at 340 (May 4, 1970) (testimony of George P.
Shultz).
356. In the 1965 Steelworkers election, McDonald demanded the right to have an
observer watch the tally of local returns. Abel countered this proposal with a sug-
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(2) The DOL should intervene where it has substantial reason to
believe that violations of the LMRDA have occurred and that a formal
complaint will not be filed because of coercion by the election victors.
While a failure to renew pre-election or pre-exhaustion complaints
may indicate corrective action by the union, a reluctance to file a
formal complaint after exhaustion may also result from intimidation
or a "buy-off" of the opposition.357 In such a situation, there may be
considerable utility in conducting an investigation, particularly be-
cause the DOL can disclose its findings. 358 Such publication might
force corrective action within the union or provoke the filing of a valid
formal complaint, permitting the Department to sue under § 402. If
coercion is a factor, the very presence of the Department might be a
counter-force that would restore the freedom of individual members
to file a complaint. Once filed, legal remedies are available to the
Department to protect the complainant from further reprisal.30
(3) While some complainant members doubted the utility of in-
ternal union appeals,3 60 there seemed to be little desire to circumvent
them completely. 301 However, such procedures are often so complex
that in many instances not even an initial determination is available
before the expiration of the three month waiting period.302 To spur
union appeals and encourage the adoption of prompt procedures spe-
gestion that the tally be inspected by a neutral observer. McDonald still demanded
the right to have his own observer present, and Abel resisted. Only when the Department
agreed to provide two observers for the tally was the deadlock broken with Abel and
McDonald agreeing to supplement the Department's observers with one additional ob.
server each. 1965 USWA Study, supra note 214. In the 1969 election the tally of nomi.
nations covered both national and district level positions, involving about 200 candidates,
all requesting observers. To avoid the unmanageability of such a massive corps of over.
seers, the Department was requested to provide observers. Interview with union at-
torney W.
357. It was suggested that many contested elections, especially at intermediate or
national levels, are in fact "palace revolts" by a former administration member who
breaks with top leadership. If the insurgent fails, he is likely to be given a choice staffposition to bring him back "into the fold" and to avoid continued disruption in the
union. Interviews with union attorney S and Department of Labor Official A. Thequestion arises as to whether the public policy of the statute is vindicated by such a
practice. No complaint will be filed with the Department, for it will be in the interests
of both candidates to insure that no one "rocks the boat." It would appear unlikely
that a union member would go to the Department when he knows that one of the
candidates has in fact withdrawn from the contest. The election may, however, have
been completely corrupt and union members deprived of their rights under tie statute.
358. 29 U.S.C. § 521(a) (1970).
359. See note 508 infra.
360. Interviews with complainant union members H, I, L, and S.
361. Two attorneys did feel that the exhaustion period could be shortened. Interviews
with complainant attorney I and union attorney BB. The same result can be achieved
by the Department's commencement of an investigation prior to exhatstion. It will
then have sufficient evidence to file a Title IV action as soon as the three month statu.
tory period has expired, rather than waiting until that time to begin its investigation.
362. See note 580 infra.
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cially adapted to election cases,303 the Department should initiate an
investigation prior to the three month waiting period in cases involv-
ing unions which employ appeals structures that have previously failed
to give serious and expeditious consideration to election appeals. 3 4
(4) The Department should continue its present policy of inter-
vening where necessary to preserve evidence of violations, as in the
ballot stuffing cases.305
C. The Investigation Phase
When a complaint is made, it is assigned to the Area LMWP Office
with jurisdiction over the local. The Area Office determines whether
the complaint was timely filed 0 and at the same time instructs the
Area Office with jurisdiction over the parent organization to deter-
mine whether the complainant has exhausted his internal remedies.30 T
After a finding that the complaint is both timely and in compliance
with the exhaustion requirements of § 402, the Area Office having
jurisdiction over the local will investigate the merits of the complaint.
The statute specifies that on receipt of a complaint satisfying the
requirements of exhaustion, timeliness, and allegation of a violation,
the Secretary "shall investigate such complaint .. ". . ,08 The DOL
position is that such an investigation is mandatory, not discretionary,
and must at least encompass each allegation in the complaint.30 But
the scope of the investigation is not limited to the violations alleged.
Although the Department has determined that § 402 pre-empts its
general § 601 power to investigate until after the filing of a valid for-
mal complaint,370 it relies on § 601 to prove that its investigatory
powers are not predicated solely upon a complaint by a union mem-
ber371 and therefore that the scope of its investigatory authority "is
363. See pp. 540-44 infra.
364. This policy would seem to gain some support from the recent case of Hodgson
v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971). In a footnote to the majority opinion.
Justice Marshall suggested that "members should not be held to procedural niceties
while seeking redress within their union, and exhaustion is not required when internal
union remedies are unnecessarily complex or otherwise operate to confuse or inhibit union
protestors." Id. at 841. A similar position has been taken with repect to court suits
under Title I of LMRDA. See note 650 infra.
365. See pp. 486-87 supra.
366. See note 339 supra.
367. Interview with Department of Labor Official A. The Area Office responsible for
this inquiry is called the Auxiliary Area Office.
368. 29 US.C. § 482(b) (1970).
369. 29 C.F.R. § 452.16(a) (1970).
370. See p. 485 supra.
371. Iflirprxw MANUAL, supra note 298, at § 475.005.
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not limited to those violations complained of by an individual union
member under § 402."372 Instead, once a formal complaint is received,
the Department considers the entire election process open to inquiryaTa
Evaluation and Recommendations. The use of § 601 to expand the
scope of the Department's investigatory power has been criticized by
union counsel as an improper extension of its statutory authority. This
use of § 601 is, to the contrary, modest, since the provision actually
authorizes a total investigation at any time. Moreover, even § 402
itself arguably permits the Department to investigate any possible
violation of Title IV upon filing of a valid formal complaint.8T4
While the stated policy of the Department is that all phases of the
contested election are to be investigated, four of eight LMWP Area
Offices indicated that the "most substantial" allegations of the com-
plaint were stressed in the investigation. One office suggested that this
meant concentration on those areas of violation that the "courts like,"
that is, clear quantitative frauds which will satisfy the "may have af-
fected" test. This office suggested that for this reason it emphasizes
election day violations, and tends to dismiss misuse of funds as an
inevitable prerogative of the incumbent.3 75
372. Id. at § 475.007. This position has been uniformly affirmed in various judicial
decisions. See Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741 (D.C. Nev. 1965); Wlrtz
v. Local- 125, Laborers, 231 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Ohio 1964), dismissed as moot, 375 F.2d
921 (6th Cir. 1966), reversed and remanded for trial on the merits, 389 U.S. 477 (1968);
Wirtz v. Local 191, Teamsters, 218 F. Supp. 885 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 321 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.
1963).
373. "The valid formal complaint may make only one charge, such as not getting
notice of the election. But that is all it takes for the Department to investigate every.
thing from the nominations to the counting of the ballots. 'Any complaint gives ajurisdictional wedge to look at the entire election .... ' Interview with "Henry Queen,
Chief of LMWP's Branch of Elections and Trusteeships, reported in Daily Labor Report,
Washington Daily Reporter System, March 22, 1965, No. 54:A-1, at A-2. This practice
was confirmed by the two Regional Offices interviewed, which indicated that every
aspect of the election was investigated.
374. The Department itself has made this argument when seeking to bring stilt
relying on violations not raised internally within the union by the initiating complaint.
The argument focuses upon the words of the statute which direct til Secretary to
investigate a complaint filed pursuant to § 402(a) and to bring suit if lie finds probable
cause "to believe that a violation of this title has occurred." The Department interrrets
"a violation" to mean any violation and not merely those listed in the original comp laint.
375. An attempt was made in the study to assess the quality of the Department's
investigations. A few persons contacted accused the investigators of being pro.con-
plainant. Interviews with union attorneys IV, Y, AA, and CC, and union officers X
and L. Complainants, on the other hand, suggested that the investigators were too
sympathetic to the incumbents and not sufficiently attuned to labor election frauds.
Interviews with complainant union members G, I, and S, and complainant attorneys
E and 0. In addition, some specific criticisms were heard. One complainant suggested
that the investigator scheduled hearings at times when it was impossible for men to
attend due to their work schedules. Interview with complainant union member L. An.
other alleged that a key witness to a statutory violation was not even contacted during
the investigation. Questionnaire from complainant union member II. A third union
member contended that the investigators failed to examine the election ballots despite
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The conclusion that DOL investigations tend to focus on election
day abuses376 is supported by a study of the frequency with which the
Department has found various statutory violations during its investi-
gations. Of 669 statutory violations confirmed by the Department from
January 1, 1965, through January 1, 1970, 45.7 per cent involved elec-
tion day abuses while only 6.5 per cent concerned campaign period
violations.3 7 Of course this may indicate that few campaign violations
occurred. But the low frequency of campaign violations should be
contrasted with the substantial extent to which the complainant union
members surveyed alleged that such violations had occurred and had
significantly influenced the outcome of their elections.3T8 The avail-
able data are too sparse to constitute proof, but they at least suggest
that the DOL should more carefully scrutinize elections to detect other
than election day abuses.3 79
D. The Prosecution Phase
If the Area LMWP investigation concludes that no violation has
occurred, it notifies the Regional LMWP Office which, if it concurs
in the finding, is empowered to close the case and so inform the par-
ties.380 If evidence of a violation is found, a copy of the investigative
the fact that the charge of ballot stuffing had been raised. Interview with complainant
union member S.
However, other persons contacted praised the investigators for their thoroughness.
Interviews with union officer 0, complainant union member A, and complainant at-
torneys G and Q. Since Title IV suits are based on the LMWP investigative reports.
attorneys in five of the eleven Regional Solicitor's offices, which are intimately involved
in Title IV suits, were asked about the adequacy of these investigations. Four of the
offices felt that they were very thorough. Only one indicated that they were inadequate,
with the suggestion that the investigators were not sensitive to such things as the
psychological aspect of election day activity.
The only conclusions that can be drawn from this sampling of opinion are that the
competence of the investigators is subject to individual variances.
376. This allegation was made in interviews with complainant union menber JJ
and complainant attorney E.
377. See Appendix A infra.
378. The violations within the category of campaign abuses are misuse of the union
membership list, failure to distribute or discriminatory distribution of campaign litera-
ture, intimidation, and misuse of union funds. See Appendix A infra. Of the thirty.one
complainant union members contacted, seventeen indicated that intimidation was an
abuse which most influenced the outcome of union elections. Eleven indicated that
misuse of union funds had a similar impact.
379. Several union attorneys suggested that the Department favors litigation of
,.picayune" issues involving formal election procedures and eligibility, rather than the
more difficult matters of coercion or campaign fraud. Yet it was these latter abuses
which most concerned Congress at the time of enacting the LMRIDA. Interviews 'ith
union attorneys U, AA, DD, HH, and I.
380. In fact the practice is for the Regional Office to send a cop) of the Area Office
investigatory report to the Washington LMWP Office. Only if the Washington Office
concurs that no violation occurred will the Regional LMWP Office be authorized to
close the -case. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
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report is sent to the appropriate Regional Office and the central
LMWP office in Washington. The report is also sent to the correspond-
ing Regional Solicitor's Office and to the central Solicitor's Office in
Washington, the litigating arm of the Department.38 1
The LMRDA specifies that if the Secretary, upon completion of his
investigation,
finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this title has
occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days
after the filing of such complaint bring a civil action against the
labor organization . . . in the district court . . . to set aside the
invalid election .... 382
The statute thus emphasizes the investigatory role of the Secretary in
determining the validity of the complaint and appears to make the
filing of suit automatic upon a finding of violations that have not
been remedied internally. In the actual operation of the statute, how-
ever, the reverse has occurred. The finding of a violation has become
likely, and the filing of suit discretionary.
1. The Mechanism of Settlement
The finding of a violation is likely because of the "valid formal
complaint" requirement, which has the effect of pre-screening com-
plaints. Violations are now found in eighty per cent of the cases.383
Investigations are used less to determine whether a violation has oc-
curred than as a means of determining which violations have occurred.
Even if a violation is found, DOL regulations state that the Secre-
tary will not institute a Title IV suit unless he also finds that the
violations "may have affected the outcome of an election."3 84 This
381. The Solicitor's Office is headed by the Solicitor of Labor and embraces a1 central
office in Washington and eleven Regional Field Offices. Each Regional Office is assigned
a specific geographic area and has jurisdiction over the labor organizations falling within
that area. Four of these regional offices have sub-regional offices operating in a second
city within the same geographic area. Thus the total number of field offices is fifteen.
See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Regional Offices (1970).
382. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970).
383. See note 348 supra.
384. 29 C.F.R. § 452.16(b) (1970). The rationale for imposing the "may have affected"
requirement before bringing suit was given by Frank M. Kleiler, Director of LMWP, at
the N.Y.U. Seventeenth Annual Conference on Labor:
We do not apply the law literally in this respect, because Section 402(c) provides that
the court may set aside an election only if it finds upon a preponderance of evidence
after a trial that the violation may have affected the outcome. We recognize that
when the Government brings a case to a district court under Section 402(b), the
Government has the burden of proof in showing that the violation may have affected
the outcome. Therefore, where we cannot meet the test, we do not litigate.
Kleiler, Recent Developments in Regulation of Intra-Union Affairs, PROCEEDINGS or 17uit
ANN. CONF. ON LAB. 345 (1964).
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discretion in bringing a Title IV action enables the Department to use
the threat of suit to induce voluntary union compliance and correc-
tion. The sixty day filing requirement in § 402 could limit this con-
ciliatory role, and in several decisions courts have insisted on this pe-
riod of limitation.38 However, the Department has largely circum-
vented this restraint by "taking a waiver" from the union. By this pro-
cedure, the union and the Department agree to disregard the limitation
as to the filing of suit by the Secretary. The Department agrees to defer
filing if the union agrees to waive the defense of timeliness in the
event that settlement is not achieved and the Secretary brings suit to
set aside the election.38 6
By exercising its discretion in bringing an enforcement suit and
securing waivers of the sixty day time limit, the Department has fash-
ioned a promising settlement device.3 7 Settlements take the form of
385. In two cases involving motions on the part of the union to dismiss the Secretar) s
suit as untimely filed, the courts rejected both claims only because they held the pro-
visions of FEn. R. Civ. P. 6(a) to be applicable, thus extending the sixty day limit the
day or two necessary to render the suits timely. In both cases there is dicta to the effect
that the language of § 402(b) is not the usual language of a statute of limitations but
is rather a directive to the Secretary of Labor which he is required to follow. However.
the implication of the holding of the two cases is that if the Secretary's suits were outside
the sixty day limit as extended by civil rule 6(a), they could be dismissed as untimely
filed. Wirtz v. Peninsula Shipbuilders Ass'n, 382 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1967); Wirtz v.
Local 611, Hod Carriers (D. Conn. 1964), cited in Ir,"rrmRErATivE MANUAL, supra note
298, at § 476.200.
In two other cases. motions to dismiss for untimeliness were denied because the union
itself had contributed to the delay by refusing to comply with the Secretary's request for
certain records and information until the Secretary began an enforcement action. The
courts found that the delay caused by the unions' intransigence was not chargeable to
the Secretary under the sixty day restriction, and when the delay time uas discounted
the suits fell within the sixty day limit. Again, the cases implied that if the suits had
fallen outside the sixty day limit, they would have been dismissed as untimely. Wirtz
v. Local 705, Hotel Employees, 63 L.R.R.M. 2315 (E.D. Mid. l9R, vacated on re-
hearing but reinstated on appeal, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832(1968); Wirtz v. Great Lakes District Local 47, Masters, Mates, and Pilots, 59 L.R.R.M.
2085 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
386. Kleiler, Recent Developments, supra note 384, at 345. Interview with Department
of Labor Official A.
387. The Department's right to accept a waiver of the sixty day requirement has
recently been affirmed. In Hodgson v. International Printing Pressmen, 440 F.2d 1113(6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3162 (U.S. OcL 12, 1971), the court held that
the "union's voluntary waivers which were relied upon by appellant may be pled by
appellant Secretary of Labor as an equitable defense to estop the othernise mandatory
bar of the statute." Id. at 1115. In Hodgson v. Local 851, Machinists, Civ. No. 71-1107(7th Cir., filed Dec. 9, 1971), the court reached a similar result. But the opinion also
indicated that the Department's discretion to accept a waiver was not absolute:
We do not hold that the discretion is unlimited, timewise, but in the present case
we cannot say that a 30 day extension was such an abuse that sanctions should be
imposed. Furthermore, in general, the abuse of discretion will not be challenged
by the unions, but by the dissident members who have filed the complaint with the
Secretary. We approve of the decisions noted above, Schonfeld v. il'art, supra, and
DeVito v. Shultz, supra, which hold that the Secretary's decisions can be challenged
if they constitute an abuse of discretion, and in passing note that the Administrative
Procedure Act is applicable to this section by virtue of Section 606 of LMRDA.
Id. at 12.
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Formal Determinations and are both speedy3s8 and common among
those cases in which a remedy is obtained.38 9
Evaluation and Recommendations. The Supreme Court has empha-
sized that the structure of Title IV enforcement reflects a congressional
desire for settlement of election disputes without resort to litigation.390
To achieve this objective, the DOL discretion to sue and its practice
of accepting waivers of the sixty-day filing requirement would seem
essential. If this conciliatory activity is successful, and a Formal De.
termination results, a remedy is obtained more promptly than could
be achieved through full litigation.391
2. The Process of Settlement
Settlement by Formal Determination is initiated by sending a DOL
"summary of violations" letter to the local union upon completion
of the election investigation. 392 This letter lists all violations discov-
ered but gives no indication of the importance the Department at-
taches to them or whether the Department feels they "may have af-
fected" the election outcome. The Department thus seeks settlement
in some cases it will not litigate if voluntary compliance fails. On
the basis of this letter, an offer of settlement may be made by the local.
388. The average time for disposition through formal determination is four months.
Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
389. Of all the Title IV election cases in which some remedy is obtained, either
voluntarily prior to suit, pursuant to stipulation after the commencement of litigation,
or by order of the court, forty-three per cent of these cases are settled by Formal Deter-
mination. See Appendix B infra.
390. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964):
It is apparent that Congress decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion
of the Secretary of Labor in order best to serve the public interest. Cf. San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242. In so doing Congress, with
one exception not here relevant, decided not to permit individuals to block or delay
union elections by filing federal-court suits for violations of Title IV. Reliance on
the discretion of the Secretary is in harmony with the general congressional policy
to allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies, and,
where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with union
problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion before resort to
the courts.
Cited with approval in Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 U.S. 463, 471 (1968).
391. See pp. 492-93 supra.
392. The Area LMWP Office making the investigation has thirty days from the
receipt of a valid formal complaint to have completed its investigation and prepared Its
investigatory report. This report is then sent to the Branch of Elections and Trusteeships,
a division of LMWP. On the basis of the investigative report, a letter is drafted and sent
out by the branch to both the challenged local and its parent labor organization (if
any). This "summary of violations" letter informs these organizations that the local has
violated Title IV of the LMRDA and specifies the violations found. Washington Daily
Reporter System, Daily Labor Report, March 22, 1965, No. 54:A-3. The Department
then has thirty days in which to settle with the union, obtain a waiver of the sixty day
filing requirement, or decide whether to initiate litigation.
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In most cases this will entail a voluntary rerun of the election in
question under the supervision of the LMWP. 3 3 On completion of
the rerun, a Formal Determination closing the case is issued by the
LMWP. 94
Pursuant to the statute,39 the candidates elected in the contested
election serve as the officers of the union during the settlement process.
During settlement negotiations they are in effect asked to permit the
Department to supervise a rerun of the very election that put them
in office. If the officers are willing to permit such a remedy, settlement
is possible. If not, the focus of the negotiations will shift.300 For the
"summary of violations" letter is also sent by the central LMWP of-
fice to the parent labor organization. Where the local refuses to settle,
the Department attempts to coax the national to force corrective
action.397 The success of this strategy will depend both on the power
of the national over its locals30 8 and its willingness to exercise such
393. Of seventy-four Determination cases involving elections held and contested, sixt'-
four of the Formal Determinations required a rerun of the election as the principal
term of settlement. Of these sixty-four reruns, fifty-two were supervised by the DOL.
Figures are for Formal Determinations filed between Jan. 1, 1955, and Jan. 1, 1970. See
Appendix C infra.
394. The Determination letter follows a standard format. After indicating the date
on which the complaint was received and giving notice that an investigation has been
conducted, the violations discovered in the course of the investigation are listed. The
letter then announces:
Upon completion of the investigation, officials of the ...Union were advised of
these findings, and they agreed to conduct nominations and an election of officers.
[The date of nominations and election are then given.] It is. therefore. DETER-
MINED, that there is probable cause to believe that the... Union was in violation
of Title IV of the LMRDA, but the violation has been remedied by the ... election.
Therefore, civil action under section 402(b) of the LMRDA is not warranted.
Washington Daily Reporter System, Daily Labor Reports, March 22. 1965 , No. 54:A-5.
395. The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final decision
thereon [as hereinafter provided] and in the interim the affairs of the organization
shall be conducted by the officers elected or in such other manner as its constitution
and bylaws may provide.
29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
396. The only threat that the Department has at its disposal is the threat of suit. Yet.
in terms of probabilities, the odds are that if the union declines to settle by Formal
Determination, the Department in fact will not bring suit. During the period between
Jan. 1, 1965, and Jan. 1, 1970, the Department dealt with 453 election cases in which
it found evidence of violation and satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement. Thus 453
summary of violations letters were sent out by the Department. Of these cases, 19.2 per
cent were settled by Formal Determination; 25.2 per cent went to litigation; and 55.5
per cent were dosed by the Department without obtaining either voluntary compliance
or bringing suit. See Appendix B supra.
397. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
398. Further, there is a general reluctance on the part of national organizations to
interfere in the internal affairs of their locals. The one exception to this rule appears
to be where the disclosure of violations in the "summary of violations" indicates misdoing
on the part of the local which it has concealed from the national. In one case the national
requested through its legal counsel that the Department bring suit against a waymard
local "to bring it back in line," after the Department's investigation had revealed
misdoing that the local had hidden from the national and lied about to its general
counsel. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
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power.390 Unions vary substantially in both regards. 400 There is some
evidence that a national organization will agree to a settlement as
much for internal political reasons as from a desire to avoid Title IV
litigation.40 1
Evaluation and Recommendations. Seeking settlement by Formal
Determination entails asking the incumbents to agTee to rerun their
own election. 402 If the violations are due to ignorance of the provi-
sions of the LMRDA or innocent neglect in following them, the Dc-
termination device is promising. But when the violations are inten-
tional, an effort by a candidate to "steal" the election, this device is
of limited utility. Although prompt, the Formal Determination works
best where the violation is least serious, or, in the case of locals, where
the DOL fortuitously encounters a national able and willing to im-
pose a settlement.403
3. The Decision to Litigate
When the union makes no offer of settlement, or when the settle-
ment process breaks down, the Department must decide whether to
399. The willingness of the national to enforce the procedural requirements of Title
IV will depend on the attitudes of the national officers and the national's legal counsel,
If they resent the LMRDA provisions as "middle class values imposed on a working
class organization," then there is little prospect of their cooperation in gaining volun-
tary compliance from an offending local. Interview with union attorney P. If the Act
is regarded generally as "anti-union," and an encroachment upon the autonomy of tile
union movement, then the Department can count on little aid in securing compliance
regardless of how the national may feel about the specific practice involved. Finally,
in many cases the national will have heard the election case in connection with the
complainant's appeal within the union, and decided against the complainant, To involve
the national in seeking voluntary compliance from the local is to ask it to re-open the
case and in a sense reverse its position. This the national may be reluctant to do.
400. See pp. 538-40 infra.
401. See pp. 539-40 infra.
402. The national officers may, like local union officials, compute the probability of
the Department's bringing suit should they refuse to settle. At the national level, how-
ever, the odds are much higher that the case will be closed without court action. Only
three cases involving national unions have gone to litigation. The rest were closed
either because the violations -were held not to have affected the outcome, or because
the case was deemed "not suitable" for litigation.
403. It should be noted that courts have no role in the process of settlement by De.
termination. There is no reported case of a court reviewing the Department's disposition
of a complaint by Determination. The sole union attempt to effectively compel tile
Department to agree to such a disposition, by arguing that their corrective action pre.
empted the Department from jurisdiction, was rejected in Goldberg v. Amalgainated
Local 355, 202 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1962). The court held that the filing of a complaint
with the Secretary, provided the exhaustion requirenents of § 401 are met, insures
against any pre-emption by voluntary union correction.
The original complainant also is completely excluded from the settlement process. IIe
receives no copy of the summary of violations letter and is not consulted during tile
ensuing negotiations. If agreement is reached between the Department and the uion,
he is sent a copy of the Formal Determination letter indicating that the case has beent
closed due to union agreement to take remedial action. For a sample of stch a letter,
see note 394 supra. Instances do exist where the complainant has taken an active role
in this post-investigation settlement phase, but this is usually because he has retained
the services of a competent attorney. Interview with complainant attorney N.
496
Vol. 81: 407, 1972
Union Elections and the LMRDA
sue to set aside the contested election. This is done at a litigation con-
ference, with the final decision made jointly by the Solicitor of Labor
and the Assistant Secretary of Labor-Management Relations.40 Their
decision is based on recommendations submitted by the Area and
Regional LMWP offices and the Regional Solicitor's Office. 403
If the decision is not to litigate, the case is closed and a letter to that
effect is sent to the complainant, the local, and the national.40 0 If the
litigation conference decides that a suit should be instituted, the mat-
ter is turned over to the Justice Department which assigns the case
to the United States Attorney for the district where the defendant
404. Under the Democratic administration of the Act, the conference was attended
by the Solicitor of Labor, his Deputy, and several representatives from the Solicitor's
legal staff in Washington; the Assistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations; and
the Director of LMWP, his Deputy, the Chief of LMWP's Branch of Elections and
Trusteeships (BET), and representatives from the BET staff who developed the case. If
the case involved a national union election, representatives from the Area or Regional
LMWP office in that geographical area might also attend the meeting. The decision on
litigation was usually reached after an hour or two of conference, though if a national
union were involved the decision might extend over several days. The final decision.
though made jointly by the Solicitor and the Assistant Secretary, was influenced by the
Area LMWP investigatory report, the disposition recommendations from thc field L.MWVP
and Regional Solicitor's offices, and the judgments expressed by thc participants in the
conference. Interview with Department of Labor Official E.
405. Having received a copy of the investigatory report completed by the Area LMWI'
Office with jurisdiction over the offending local union, see p. 492 supra, the Regional
Solicitor's Office involved sends a recommendation to the office of the Solicitor of Labor
in Washington as to whether litigation is warranted. Similarly, the Area and Regional
LMWP Offices make a recommendation to the Central L.MWP Office.
406. In cases closed because the violations found are deemed to have had no effect
on outcome, the format of the letter sent to the local union and the parent organization
is as follows:
[This is] to notify you of the disposition of a complaint to the Secretary of Labor
alleging violations of Section 401 of LMRDA.
Pursuant to Section 601 of the LMRDA, an investigation was conducted by this
office. The investigation disclosed evidence of the following violations of L.MRDA:
[violations then listed].
However, it has been determined, after consultation with the Solicitor of Labor,
that there is not probable cause to believe that the violations found may have af-
fected the election outcome, and civil action under Section -102(b) of the LMRDA
is not warranted. This case has been closed; but appropriate steps should be taken
by your union to insure compliance with the LMRDA in future elections.
In cases closed because deemed by the Department to be not suitable for litigation,
see p. 498 infra, the closing letter is even more abbreviated:
This is to notify you of the disposition of a complaint to the Secretary of Labor
alleging violations of Section 401 of the LMRDA of 1939 . . . in the regular election
of officers completed [date] by [union], [place].
Pursuant to Section 601 of the LMRDA, an investigation was conducted by this
office. The results of this investigation have been reviewed, and it has been deter-
mined that this case is not suitable for litigation under Section 102 of the LMRDA:
therefore, this case has been closed.
(Note that in this closing letter, the specific violations found are not indicated.)
About ten per cent of the time these letters include infornmal advice to the union as to
how to bring its procedures into conformity with the statute. No attempt is made,
however, to determine whether the union has complied with this advice. Interview with
Department of Labor Official A.
The letter sent to the complainant in each of the above situations is virtually identical
to that received by the union. See Letters on file at US. Dep't of Labor, Office of
LMWP, Silver Spring, Md.
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union maintains its principal office. The Attorney then institutes and
conducts the action on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, as prescribed in
the Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments.407
The DOL has formally denominated only the "may have affected"
test as a criterion for the exercise of its discretion not to sue.408 But
in practice, the Department has also refused to sue on the broader
grounds that the case is "not suitable for litigation." This standard
is extremely difficult to define. Discussion with those involved in Title
IV litigation suggests that the following situations are deemed "not
suitable" by the Department: (a) cases where there is a problem of
proof as to the occurrence of violations; 40° (b) cases where violations
can be proven but it is difficult to substantiate their impact on the
outcome, or Department personnel themselves disagree as to the effect
of the violations; 410 (c) cases in which the alleged violations involve
issues of "reasonableness," and the Department feels that the court
will not agree that the challenged union practice is "unreasonable"; 41 1
and (d) cases involving a provision in a national constitution ap-
plicable to all its locals which is already being litigated.412
The narrower "may have affected" test applied by the Department
has a more explicit meaning. Where the violations involved are of
such a nature that the number of ballots tainted can be determined,
the Department will hold that the "may have affected" test is satisfied
only if the number of ballots affected could have mathematically
407. The Memorandum of Understanding Between Departments of Justice and Labor,
February 16, 1960, reads in part as follows:
5. Prosecution of Civil Enforcement Actions. Any violations of the Act which
form the basis for civil enforcement actions will be investigated by the Department
of Labor. Whenever the Department of Labor concludes that a civil enforcement
action should be instituted, it will refer the case to the Department of Justice, with
the request that suit be, instituted on behalf of the Secretary of Labor, and will
furnish the Department of Justice with all pertinent information in the possession
of the Department of Labor. Upon receipt of such request, the Department of
Justice will institute and will conduct the civil enforcement action on behalf of
the Secretary of Labor. The Department of Justice will not institute any civil en-
forcement action under the Act except upon the request of the Department of Labor,
nor will the Department of Justice voluntarily dismiss any action so instituted exce t
with the concurrence of the Department of Labor. The Department of Justice will
dismiss any action so instituted upon the request of the Department of Labor.
Department of Justice attorneys will collaborate with the attorneys of the Office
of the Solicitor of the Department of Labor in the preparation and, to the extent
feasible, in the presentation of such actions in court.
25 Fed. Reg. 1708 (1960).
408. See note 384 supra.
409. Interview with Department of Labor Official D.
410. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
411. Interview with union attorney AA.
412. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
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changed the outcome of the election.41a When the violation is less
concrete and the specific number of ballots tainted is indeterminate,
the Department has in some instances employed a per se approach
in deeming the "may have affected" test satisfied. However, this ap-
proach is limited to violations of crucial safeguards in the electoral
process, and there is considerable disagreement as to which violations
fall within this category. 414 When the violation is of insufficient im-
portance to warrant a per se test, and the impact on an actual number
of ballots is uncertain, there appears to be little guidance in determin-
ing when and if the "may have affected" test is satisfied.
Thus before the DOL will file a § 402 suit, it must have made a
finding that a violation occurred, failed to reach informal settlement
with the union, determined that the violations "may have affected"
the outcome of the election, and decided that the case is "suitable"
for litigation.
Evaluation and Recommendations. The final decision to sue appears
to be a unilateral determination made by the Department in the isola-
tion of the litigation conference.415 There is a common perception
among both attorneys for Title IV complainants410 and union coun-
sel417 that "political influence" is brought to bear on this decision.
Complainants and their attorneys tended to view this influence as
being exerted in specific instances to forestall litigation-by the na-
tional union to protect an incumbent local officer, or by the AFL-CIO
to defend a national official. It is, however, virtually impossible to
evaluate or document such asserted political bias.418
413. The Department has generally rejected the notion that the "outcome" is affected
whenever the margin of victory was altered by the violations. Thus if the violations
affected only the relative showing of the candidates in the election, and the v.ictor would
still have won even if the violations had not occurred (though by a lesser margin), the
Department will not regard the test as satisfied. Interview with Department of Labor
Official A.
414. The only area of agreement seems to be that unreasonable eligibility requirements
and instances of an eligible candidate being improperly barred from running for office
satisfy the per se test. For other violations, such as misuse of union funds, there appears
to be no clear consensus on whether a per se test should be applied.
415. See pp. 496-97 supra.
416. Interviews with complainant attorneys E, G, H, and I, and complainant union
members 0 and JJ; questionnaire from complainant union member T.
417. Interviews with union attorneys Q. AA, DD, and GG.
418. While two of the Area LMWIP Offices contacted indicated that such political
pressure occurred "sometimes," five indicated that it occurred "rarely" or even "never."
One area staff member did suggest that some cases were "turned off for political reasons,"
but the others indicated either lack of knowledge or a positive conviction that political
influence had no effect on the Department's decisions.
The charge of political influence at the Washington level could be esaluated more
systematically if the reports and recommendations of field personnel could be compared
with the decisions coming out of the Department's litigation conference. This avenue of
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Union attorneys suggested a systematic bias in favor of incumbents
resulting from the fact that the Department, and specifically the As-
sistant Secretary for Labor-Management Relations, depends upon good
relations with labor leaders in order to deal with them in labor-man-
agement disputes. While proof is difficult to obtain, it does not seem
implausible to suspect that on occasion litigation to vindicate the statute
may be sacrificed by the Department to preserve these relationships. 410
This suspicion of a systematic pro-incumbent bias could be dispelled
by participation in the decision to litigate of a party with interests
clearly adverse to the incumbent's. The current participation of LMWP
and personnel of the Solicitor's Office fails to inject this element of
adversariness, because the general perception of these personnel is that
their role is one of conciliation and mediation, rather than enforce-
ment or regulation.
A more effective source of adversariness would be the member-
complainant who initially brought the matter to the Department.
Presently, the complainant has no part in determining the advisability
of bringing suit. He is merely informed of the decision.420 If the liti-
gation decision were to be shifted to the Area or Regional level, the
complainant could participate in that decision directly. Absent this
decentralization of Departmental decisions, it would seem eminently
fair to provide the complainant with a copy of the investigative report
and the litigation recommendation made by the Area or Regional
LMWP Office. The complainant would then be entitled to add his
own statement, to be attached to the Area Office recommendation and
forwarded to the litigation conference in Washington, D.C.
Under current procedure, however, the complainant is excluded
from the decision to bring suit. Perhaps in recognition of this exclu-
sion, courts have occasionally reviewed the Department's exercise of
inquiry could not be pursued, however, because the Department's files of internal cor-
respondence are not open for inspection.
See Shultz v. Restaurant Employees Union, 76 L.R.R.M. 2123 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where
a union's demand for the Department's investigatory files was denied on the grounds
that the union had failed to show "good cause" under FED. R. Civ. 1'. 34, and that the
files were exempt from the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970).
419. It must also be noted that other extraneous considerations may enter into the
decision to bring suit. In some instances the Department might institute suit in a situ-
ation which would normally fall within the "not suitable" category as a punitive mneasure
against a union which had not been cooperative in the pre-litigation phase. No allegation
of such action was received, however.
420. See note 406 supra for sample of letter informing a complainant of the Depart-
ment's decision. Some modification of this format may be required in the wake of
DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969). See note 427 infra.
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discretion not to sue,421 though departmental abstinence has never
been overruled.42 2 But other courts have refused to review altogether,
holding that the Department's decision is a matter committed to
agency discretion and beyond the jurisdiction of the court.4 -3
Judicial reluctance to compel § 402 suits overlooks the fact that the
individual complainant can vindicate his Title IV rights only through
suit by the Secretary.424 A determination by the Department not to
sue is effectively a final judgment on the merits. Moreover, in other
areas, courts are beginning to exercise judicial review when the absten-
tion of an agency has such an effect of finality.42 5
421. Courts which have passed upon the issue have accorded thc Secretary absolute
discretion in determining probable cause of Violation. Wirtz v. Guild of Variety Artists,
267 F. Supp. 527, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 30, Operating Eng'rs, 34 F.R.D. 13,
14 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In one case, the court dismissed an action by a union member to
compel the Secretary to bring suit after the Secretary had closed the case upon a finding
that no violation of the statute had occurred, on the grounds that the court lacked
jurisdiction even to hear the claim. McArthy v. Wirtz, 65 L.R.R.M. 2411 (E.D. Mo. 196T.
Courts have failed to accord the Secretary the same wide discretion where probable
cause of violation has been found but the Secretary refuses to bring suit on tie grounds
that the "may have affected" test is not satisfied. The standard used by the court in
reviewing such a ruling is whether the refusal was "patently arbitrary and capricious."
DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682 (D.D.C. 1969).
The courts have thus far not passed upon a refusal of the Secretary to sue bcause
the case was found "not suitable for litigation." There is dicta, however, in the DeJ'ilo
opinion that would support the exercise of departmental discretion under this standard.
Although the case dealt with a mandamus action seeking a court order directing ti
Secretary to initiate a Title IV suit, after the latter's refusal to do so on the grounds
that the violations discovered did not affect the outcome plaintiff contended at one
point that the Secretary could win the suit if it wcre filed. it rejecting the relevance
of this argument, the court said:
As a matter of law the Secretary is not required to. sue to set aside the election
whenever the proofs before him suggest the suit might be successful. There remains
in him a degree of discretion to select cases and it is his subjective judgment as to
the probable outcome of the litigation that must control.
Id. at 2683. This would appear to legitimate the Secretary's refusal to sue even when
the "may have affected" test is satisfied, i.e., when the Secretary could win the suit, )et
the Secretary feels it is "not suitable for litigation."
422. In Shonfeld v. Wirtz, 258 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), the court held the Sec-
retary's refusal to sue to be arbitrary under the "arbitrary and capricious" test, upon a
finding that seventy voters were denied access to the complainants campaign literature
by the union and that complainant lost the two elections in which he wvas a candidate by
thirty-five and eleven votes. The case was discontinued before judgment was entered,
however, due to plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
423. McArthy v. Wirtz, 65 L.R.R.M. 2411 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Katrinic v. Wirtz, 62
L.R.R.M. 2557 (D.D.C. 1966); Martin v. Wirtz (unreported, 4th Cir. 1965, sum,,aarized in
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1966, supra note 299, at 38); Aguirre v. Wirtz (unreported,
S.D. Cal. 1965, summarized in SUMMARY OF OP'EALTIONS, 19165, supra note 299, at 32);
Altman v. Wirtz, 56 L.R.R.M. 2651 (D.D.C. 1964).
424. In addition, it overlooks the fact that the Senate Committee report intended
to limit the right to refuse suit only in instances of minor violations. The goal was to
avoid frivolous actions. The Department was to make a decision, much as a private
lawyer would, about the usefulness of litigation. It was not to be empowered to pre-
judge the entire case without review. S. REP. No. 187 oN S. 1555, 86fit Cong., 1st Sess. 21
(1959). See also Cox, supra note 201, at 845; Smith, The Labor.Managenzent Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. REv. 195, 25 (1960).
425. There are essentially two issues involved in the question of tie propriety of
review. One is jurisdictional, where the courts have grown restive permitting admin-
istrative decisions to go unreviewed unless clearly committed to agency discretion. See
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Effective review will require greater disclosure of the grounds of
the Department's decisions than is currently made.420 At least one
court has demanded such increased disclosure, 427 and others could
demand that the Department further clarify its general position on
instituting suit.428 The complainant should be provided with infor-
mation as to the violations considered by the litigation conference
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970); Abbott Laboratories Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140-41 (1967); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097-98
(D.C. Cir. 1970). Professor Jaffe contends that judicial review is the rule unless specifically
excluded by Congress. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsFrIVaE ACTION 3'16 (1965);
4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.07 (1958). This restiveness is likely to be
greater in the case of the Department's decisions because, although an element of ex.
pertise is involved, the original congressional directive simply asked the Secretary to apply
the lawyer's calculus of his chances in litigation. See note 424 supra. This test does not
involve a kind of expertise that the courts lack. For an analysis of the functional elements
in committing a decision to agency discretion, see Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A
Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 382
(1968).
As to the second element in the issue of review, the interest of the complaining party,
the complainant who files his protest with the Department of Labor certainly has a
stfficient interest to challenge the decision of the Department once the courts decide
that they have jurisdiction to review. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin,
428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), for situations where
the interest involved was much less direct than in a Title IV action and review was
accorded.
426. There is also some question as to the standard to be applied in reviewing tile
Department's decisions and the form of relief. The DeVito court suggested that the
action had to be patently arbitrary or capricious and would not be an abuse nmerely
because the proof suggests that the agency would have won if it had gone to court,
72 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2683 (D.D.C. 1969). This standard seems to give the agency a great
deal of leeway when one recognizes that it is suing in the interest of tile private indi.
vidual whose rights have been denied as well as in the public interest. But, unless the
courts wish to regularly substitute their judgment for that of the Department, the
DeVito standard may be the only viable one.
As to the remedy, the only relief available is a mandamus to begin legal action. Such
relief faces two major hurdles. By the time the decision has been reached on the merits
of the mandamus action, the sixty day filing period for litigation will have passed.
Secondly, the court must then supervise the prosecution to insure that it is vigorously
pursued. Intervention on the part of the complainant might insure that this latter
condition is satisfied.
427. DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969). The court held that tile letter
sent to the complainant explaining the Department's decision not to bring stilt was
insufficient to give the complainant "an adequate written statement on the reasons for
nonintervention." Some indication was required of why the Department deemIed that
the violations it had discovered did not warrant litigation. Id. at 383-84.
428. Professor Davis has taken the position that this pressure should be applied
more often:
Any officer who has discretionary power necessarily also has the power to state
publicly the manner in which he will exercise it, and any such public statentnt
can be adopted through a rule-making procedure, whether or not the legislative
body has separately conferred a rule-making power on the officer.
The preceding sentence is (a) especially important to successful control of dis.
cretionary power, and it is (b) exceedingly simple and clearly incontrovertible, even
though (c) the legal effect of such a public statement by an officer depends upon
extremely complex law that often baffles the best judges and the best lawyers.
(a) That an officer having discretionary power can make a public announcement
of what his response will be to specified problems is especially important because
such announcements are often the most practical and the most effective means of
confining discretionary power ...
K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JusTICE 68 (1969).
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and the reasons that each violation was deemed either to not have
affected the outcome or to have been unsuitable for litigation. Such
information will notify the complainant of the rationale behind the
Department's disposition of his complaint and assist a reviewing
court in determining whether the Department's discretion has been
properly exercised. Such increased disclosure would restore confidence
among union members that the Department's decisions are not con-
trolled by political considerations.4 29
Suspicion of political influence within the Department could be
further dispelled if the Department were to manifest greater concern
with correcting violations in those cases where it decides not to bring
suit. Having gone to the expense of investigating an election case later
closed without settlement or litigation, the Department should specify
in detail in its letter to the union how the discovered violations could
be avoided in the future. The Area LMWP Office with jurisdiction
over the offending union should subsequently contact the union to
encourage adoption of formal procedural changes where necessary,
and, where informal practices are involved, it should remind the
union's election committee of the violations prior to the next election.
Further, the original complainant should be provided with a copy
of the violations found and the suggestions made to the union. For
if settlement negotiations have failed to obtain remedial action, the
complainant may wish to raise the issue of election procedures within
the union and obtain correction in future elections.
4. The Scope of the Complaint
Paralleling the debate over the scope of the Department's investi-
gation is the question of whether the Secretary can bring suit based
on discovered violations which were not included in the complaint
filed by the union member. The primary consideration underlying
the issue is the respect for union autonomy embodied in the exhaus-
tion requirement of § 402 (a). Such deference would appear to pro-
hibit an action based on violations that had not been considered by
the union in its appeals process.4 30
429. It is interesting to note the general lack of opposition to mandamus actions
evidenced by the union attorneys contacted, perhaps because of their own suspicions
about the role of political influence in the Department. See pp. 499.500 supra. Of the
thirty-five union attorneys contacted, only twelve opposed this form of relief, and
eight positively favored it.
430. The scope of complaint problem involves two possible comparisons. The com-
parison discussed in the text is between the violations contained in the formal complaint
filed by the Secretary to set aside the contested election and the violations brought to
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The Department has in the past contended that the filing of a for-
mal complaint simply "triggers" an investigation and authorizes the
Secretary to bring suit upon any and all violations discovered, whether
or not they were brought to the attention of the union.4 1 This argu-
ment has been rejected in every reported case in which it has been
raised,4 32 courts consistently sustaining union motions to strike from
DOL complaints violations of which the union had no notice.' 8
The Supreme Court ruled obliquely on the scope of complaint ques-
tion in Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers.4 4 That case raised an unusual
problem in that the violations had been considered by the internal
appeals mechanism of the union, though only in connection with a
run-off election. The question was whether the union was obliged
to consider such violations as to the initial election as well. In
holding that the union had such an obligation, the Court said that
notice of the "overwhelming probability" that the violations had oc-
curred in the initial election was a reasonable substitute for a formal
the union's attention during the process of internal appeal. But there is a second con,
parison, between the violations contained in the Secretary's formal complaint in court
and the violations alleged to the Secretary by the individual complainant. Four cases
have dealt with this comparison. In the first, the union sought to strike certain violations
about which no union member complained either to the union or to the Secretary. Thedistrict court granted the motion, holding that the Secretary's suit must be limited to
"those grounds about which some member . . . has previously complained to the Union."
Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees, 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,359 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (emphasis
added). The appellate court, however, upheld the granting of the motion because "no
member of the union filed with the Secretary any complaint as to these items." 381 F.2d
500, 506 (2d Cir. 1967) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
The second case, Wirtz v. Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, reflected a similar disparity of
treatment between the district court and the Second Circuit. 64 L.R.R.M. 2449 (N.D N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 381 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1967).
At least one court has rightly seen that the only policy interest at stake in the scope
of complaint controversy is the integrity of internal union appeals. It therefore held
that receipt by the union of any post-election appeal alleging a specific violation is
sufficient to permit the Secretary to sue on that violation even if it was not included
in any formal complaint to the Secretary. 'Wirtz v. Local 1622, Carpenters, 285 F. SUpp.
455 (N.D. Cal. 1968). The Sixth Circuit, however, has recently indicated that it considers
the matter still unresolved. Hodgson v. Local 1299, Steelworkers, Civ. No. 71-1297, at 16(6th Cir., filed Dec. 29, 1971).
431. Kleiler, Recent Developments, supra note 384, at 343-44.
432. Wirtz v. Local 257, Glass Bottle Blowers, 273 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1967): Wirtz
v. Local 406, Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. La. 1966); Wirtz v. Local 450,
Operating Eng'rs, 63 L.R.R.M. 2105 (S.D. Tex. 1966). However, the Supreme Court in
Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers, 389 U.S. 477, 482 (1968), explicitly refused to rule on this
contention:
We therefore need not consider and intimate no view on the merits of the Secretary's
argument that a member's protest triggers a § 402 enforcement action in which
the Secretary would be permitted to file suit challenging any violation of § 401
discovered in his investigation of the member's complaint.
433. Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, v. Wirtz, 381 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Local
257, Glass Bottle Blowers, 273 F. Supp. 746 (D.N.J. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 174, Musicians,
272 F. Supp. 294 (E.D. La. 1967); Wirtz v. Local 450, Operating Eng'rs, 63 L.R,R.M.
2105 (S.D. Tex. 1966); Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 1965).
434. 389 U.S. 477 (1968).
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complaint to the union.435 Although Local 125 is not a pure scope of
complaint case,430 courts have since adopted its basic principle. If the
court finds "fair notice," the Secretary may sue on the basis of a viola-
tion not alleged by the complainant during his union appeal. 4'3 7
The DOL has contended that the "fair notice" requirement is satis-
fied when the union has received a "summary of violations" letter list-
ing the findings of the Department's investigation of the case. Early
court decisions supported this position,438 but the Supreme Court has
recently indicated that the concept of "fair notice" may require more.
In Hodgson v. Local 6799, Steelworkers,430 the complainant invoked
his union remedies charging misuse of union facilities during his
435. [I]n the face of Dial's evidence raising the almost overwhelming probability
that the misconduct affecting the runoff election had also occurred at the June 8
election, the union insists that it was under no dut)' to expand its inquiry be)ond
the specific challenge to the runoff election made by Dial. Surely this is not the re-
sponsible union self-government contemplated by Congress in allowing the unions
great latitude in resolving their own internal controversies. In default o1 respondent's
action on a violation which it had a fair opportunity to consider and resolve in con-
nection with Dial's protest, the Secretary was entitled to seek relief from the court
with respect to the June 8 election.
Wirtz v. Local 1925, Laborers, 389 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1968).
436. In most scope of complaint cases the problem is not the failure of the com-
plainant to challenge within the union a prior controlling election which the Secretary
later seeks to set aside, but rather the failure to allege within the union a %iolation upon
which the Secretary seeks to bring suit.
437. Complaints to the union of specific violations have been broadly construed to
encompass related allegations in the Secretary's complaint. Wirtz v. Local 705, HotelEmplo,Employees, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 US. 832 (1968) (complaint that
continuous good standing requirement had been discriminately applied to disqualify a
candidate under the same requirement); WVirtz v. Petroleum Workers Union. 807 F. Supp.
462 (N.D. Ind. 1969) (internal protest that a meeting attendance requirement was un-
fairly applied held also to challenge the fairness of the requirement itself). Violation
of the statute's requirement of proper notice of the nomination and election to union
members has even been held to be within the scope of the Secretary's complaint without
any notice whatsoever to the union, on the theory that it is "too fundamental a re-
quirement to be made dependent on a private complaint to put it in issue whetn the
election is being contested." Wirtz v. Local 1622, Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455, 462 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), quoting Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741, 752 (D. Nev. 1965).
438. Wirtz v. Petroleum Workers Union, 307 F. Supp. 462 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Wirtz v.
Local 1622, Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1968). In the Petroleum Worhers
case, there had been conferences between LMWP personnel and union officials dealing
with the violations in question. These were also considered by the court in finding ade-
quate notice. 307 F. Supp. at 470.
439. Hodgson v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333 (1971). Certiorari was granted
on the question:
Does Landrum-Griffin Act authorize Secretary of Labor, in action to set aside
union election, to allege only those violations of Act that were protested internally
by complaining union member, or may Secretary also allege additional violations
disclosed by his investigation and which he has given union opportunity to correct.
59 U.S.L.W. 3241 (US. Dec. 8, 1970).
The only notice to the union of the violations contested was the Department's "sum-
mary of violations" letter and several conferences with the union. The question, then.
was whether the Secretary was restricted to the violations protested within the union
or whether he might also rely on those brought to the union's attention b)' te "sum-
mary of violations" letter.
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unsuccessful bid for a local presidency. Failing to receive relief from
the union, the aggrieved candidate filed a complaint with the DOL
alleging misuse of the facilities and also, for the first time, objecting
to a meeting attendance requirement imposed as a condition for can.
didacy. The Department confirmed both charges as violations of the
Act, duly notified the union, and, failing to obtain voluntary compli-
ance, brought suit on both. 44o The Court held that the failure of the
complainant to object to the meeting attendance requirement during
his union appeal barred the Department from suing on that issue.441
The Court, noting the congressional intent to avoid "unnecessary gov-
ernmental interference with internal union affairs" and to give unions
an opportunity to remedy election violations through their own ap-
peals structures, 442 all but flatly held that the DOL cannot sue on any
violation not raised by a complainant in his internal union appeal.
Notice through the Department's "summary of violations" letter was
deemed inadequate. 443
The case need not be read, however, to foreclose the DOL's letter
from constituting fair notice in all cases. In Local 6799, the complain-
ant had knowledge of the potential illegality of the meeting-attendance
provision. It was not a violation newly discovered by the Department
during its own investigation. For while the complainant failed to
raise it during his internal appeal to the union, he included it in his
complaint to the Secretary. The concern of the Court may thus have
been to forestall attempts by union members to knowingly circum-
vent union appeals structures:
To accept petitioner's contention that a union member, who is
aware of the facts underlying an alleged violation, need not first
protest this violation to his union before complaining to the Sec-
retary would be to needlessly weaken union self-government. 444
440. Hodgson v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333, 334-35 (1971).
441. Id. at 336.
442. Id. at 338-40.
443. Petitioner contends that the congressional concerns underpinning the exhaus-
tion requirement were in fact adequately served in this case . . . because the union
was later given a chance to remedy specific violations before being taken to court
by the Secretary.
The Court rejected this contention.
[U]nder petitioner's limited view of congressional objectives, the exhaustion re-
quirement of § 402(a) is left with virtually no purpose or part to play in the statutory
scheme. . . . The obvious purpose of an exhaustion requirement is not met when
the union, during "exhaustion," is given no notice of the defects to be cured,
Id. at 339.
444. Id. at 340.
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Under this interpretation of the case, it would still be possible for the
Secretary to sue on a violation unknown to the complainant at the
time of his internal appeal. Such a view is more consonant with the
concept of "fair notice" in Local 12544G and is also suggested by a
passage which comes at the end of Justice Marshall's opinion:
We are not unmindful that union members may use broad or im-
precise language in framing their internal union protests and that
members will often lack the necessary information to be aware of
the existence or scope of many election violations. Union democ-
racy is far too important to permit these deficiencies to foreclose
relief from election violations; and in determining whether the
exhaustion requirement of § 402 (a) has been satisfied, courts
should impose a heavy burden on the union to show that it could
not in any way discern that a member was complaining of the
violation in question. But when a union member is aware of the
facts supporting an alleged election violation, the member must,
in some discernible fashion, indicate to his Union his dissatis-
faction with those facts if he is to meet the exhaustion require-
ment.
4 4 6
This interpretation also more accurately reflects the statutory purpose
in giving investigative authority to the Department.
[I]t is most improbable that Congress deliberately settled exclu-
sive enforcement jurisdiction on the Secretary and granted him
broad investigative powers to discharge his responsibilities, yet
intended the shape of the enforcement action to be immutably
fixed by the artfulness of a layman's complaint which often must
be based on incomplete information. The expertise and resources
of the Labor Department were surely meant to have a broader
play. 447
Evaluation and Recommendations. The reading of Local 6799 ad-
vocated above would permit the Department to sue on violations
discovered during its own investigation, where the union's only notice
comes from the DOL and where the complainant was unaware of the
violations during the exhaustion phase. 448 This reading would prob-
ably affect the Department's activities only slightly, since few com-
plainants will deliberately circumvent their union appeals proce-
445. See note 435 supra.
446. Hodgson v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 403 U.S. 333. 340.41 (1971).
447. Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers, 389 U.S. 477, 482 (1968).
448. See pp. 506-07 supra.
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dures.4 49 Needless resort to the Department is likely to bring adverse
reaction within the union.4a o This reading is also preferable for its
recognition of the inadequacy of complainants' investigatory re-
sources. 451 Its limitation of the scope of complaint defense would
strengthen the DOL's hand in bargaining for a settlement. 452 Finally,
this interpretation would create an incentive for unions to investigate
thoroughly all aspects of an election when challenged within the
union.453
449. The broader interpretation of the opinion was adopted in Hodgson V. Local
1299, Steelworkers, Civ. No. 71-1297 (6th Cir., filed Dec. 29, 1971). This reading, barring
suit on all violations not raised before the union during the exhaustion phase regardless
of the knowledge of the complainant, would significantly limit the Department's settle,
ment and litigation activities. This limitation could be avoided by increased pre.exhaustlon
contact between the complainant and LMWI' personnel, with the latter coaching the
complainant on what to bring to the attention of the union. See pp. 475-77 supra.
450. Both complainant union members and union officers indicated that departmental
intervention caused significant reaction among the rank and file. Union officers tended
to feel that the reaction hurt the complainant since the membership resented the pres-
ence of the Department as an outsider. Complainant union members felt that intervention
tended to harm the winner of the first election, by casting some suspicion of wrong.
doing upon him. While this latter assessment would seem to encourage complainants
to resort to the Department, the general uncertainty as to the precise reaction of the
rank and file may temper this enthusiasm. Several union members suggested that the
impact of the Department's intervention would vary depending upon the violations
discovered: if trivial, the complainant would be discredited, but if there were violations
involving fraud or misuse of funds, the reputation of the incumbent would be harmed.
Interviews with complainant union member L and union officers A and G. It was also
suggested that in a close-knit union, such as a craft union, with a tradition of solving
its problems internally, resort to the Department would harm the complainant. But If
the union were large and diverse, the Department's intervention would have little
impact. Interview with union attorney S. Finally, it was suggested that younger union
members tended to be less opposed to government intervention, and only older members
reacted strongly against it. Interview with union attorney I.
451. In Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers, 389 U.S. 477 (1968), the complainant alleged
that several ineligible members voted in the union's runoff election. When the Depart.
ment investigated it found that ineligible voters had also participated in the first
election. In Wirtz v. Local 705, Hotel Employees, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 832 (1968), the complainant claimed that lie had been illegally disqualified
because of alleged non-payment of dues. After a thorough investigation, the Department
found that the incumbent victor in the election had also not paid her dues. There would
have been no way for the complainant to have known of this problem without having done
almost as complete a review as the government. Finally, in Wirtz v. Local 1622, Carpeni-
ters, 285 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1968), the Department discovered that the tnion
newspaper, which was used to give notice of the election, had been distributed front
an inaccurate mailing list. Although a member might have found an occasional indi-
vidual who had not received his paper, it would have been unusual for him to have
been aware that papers were mailed to only 2300 of the 2700 union members.
Discussion with complainants revealed that while they can find and present adequate
evidence on the formal procedures surrounding an election, they lave a diffictlt time
ascertaining campaign violations, ballot stuffing, and discrimination in the use of Inei.
bership lists.
452. The union may be reluctant to settle where it believes that it can defend on
the grounds that a violation alleged by the Secretary was not raised during the exhaustion
phase of the enforcement process.
453. Such a duty would seem to be an obvious part of an effective internal tnion
appeals structure. In only one instance, however, has a court suggested imposing such
a duty, and then only in an informal opinion on the scope of complaint issue. Wirtz v.
Local 169, Hod Carriers, 59 L.R.R.M. 2286 (D. Nev. 1965).
Should subsequent Court interpretation narrow the Department's power to bring stilt
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E. The Adjudication Phase
1. Disposition by Stipulation
During the pre-litigation phases the Department relies on informal
negotiation with the offending union to gain compliance through
Formal Determination. Should persuasion fail to obtain corrective
action, the Department must resort to litigation. But even when suit is
initiated, the pattern of negotiated compliance persists, for it is within
the discretion of the Department to settle the action by stipulation
if the union agrees to remedial measures4a4
The minimum requisite for settlement prior to judgment is depart-
mental supervision of an election. 4 5 The Department will accept
such a settlement when it believes a stipulated election will occur
before one which could be obtained by court order4 0 The stipulated
to only those issues raised before the union by the complainant, statutory amendment
would be in order. Section 402(b) should then be amended to enable the Secretary to ini-
tiate a civil action based on Title IV violations not raised by complainants in their
internal protests or appeals so long as the union is given prior notice and an oppor-
tunity to cure such violations by the Department via a summary of violations letter.
Such authority is required if the Department is to make the most of the informal ne.
gotiation process.
454. The stipulation is based on an agreement reached between the union and the
Department. It is then entered as judgment, and the court retains jurisdiction until the
Department certifies to the court the names of persons duly elected to union office in
an election supervised by the Department. Interview with Departument of Labor Official A.
Unions have unsuccessfully attempted to compel such stipulations, in effect, by ar-
guing that the Department's powers are pre-empted by the union's own voluntary cor-
rective action. Shultz v. Local 1299, Steelworkers, 324 F. Sulp. 750 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
rev'd on other grounds, Civ. No. 71-1297 (6th Cir., filed Dec. 29, 1971). Unions have
also argued pre-emption based on the occurrence of an intervening regularly scheduled
election against which no complaints have been raised. This contention has also been
rejected. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 389 US. .163 (1908). The theory of
the Court was that
only a supervised election could offer assurance that the officers who achieved
office as beneficiaries of violations of the Act would not by some means perpetuate
their unlawful control in the succeeding election.
Id. at 474. While the Court was concerned with the inabilit to assure that other viola-
tions might not occur in an unsupervised election, it niglt be argued that cven an
election without violation in which the winners of the contested election were re.elected
would merely perpetuate an incumbency unlawfully obtained, and permit the officers
full enjoyment of the fruits of illegality. Hence even a "clean" intervening election
should not moot the Secretary's action.
455. Prior to 1962 the Department would accept an unsuperviscd voluntary renm by
the union as settlement. This policy was due primarily to the lack of staff and expertise
in LMWP, which made widespread supervision of elections impossible. Since that time
LMWP has acquired sufficient resources that it can insist oil supervision as a condition
of settlement. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
456. The method by which settlement is arranged depends on the level within the
union at which the Department is negotiating. If the national is involved in the case.
either as defendant or representing the local whose election is challenged, the settlement
will be arranged between the national and the central LMWP and Solicitor's Offices in
Washington. Interviews with Department of Labor Officials A and B. If only a local is
involved, then settlement is negotiated at the field level by the Regional Solicitor's Of-
fice handling the litigation. After consulting with the Area LMWIP Office having juris-
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election may be either a rerun of the contested election or the next
regularly scheduled election for the contested offices.4  The Depart-
ment appears to make little distinction between these two alterna-
tives. 458
Evaluation and Recommendations. In fact, however, the conse-
quences of these two remedies are quite different. To the incumbent,
supervision of the next regular election avoids the disruption of a re-
run and allows him to serve the complete term to which he was elected.
Further, he avoids the stigma and inference of wrongdoing that would
result from a formal voiding and rerun of the challenged election.
Because the Department makes no attempt to publicize the reasons
for its supervision of an election,459 supervision of a regularly sched-
uled election may be of such low visibility as to go unnoticed by most
union members.
To the complainant, supervision of the next regular election may
be an inadequate remedy. Having provoked hostility from the union
membership by appealing outside the union organization, 400 mere
supervision of the next regular election may be interpreted as a re-
jection of his allegations and may discredit the complainant in the
eyes of the membership. If the complainant is a defeated candidate,
failure to secure a rerun may impair his ability to secure support for
another election campaign.
The apparent disregard of the difference between supervision of a
rerun and of the next regularly scheduled election may be due to
the fact that the original complainant, to whom this distinction is
perhaps most significant, is normally not included in the negotiations
that result in settlement by stipulation. 40 ' If the national is involved,
settlement is conducted through the central DOL offices in Washing-
diction, the Washington LMWP Office, and his own superiors in the Solicitor's Office IIn
Washington, the Regional Solicitor will seek an accommodation between the objectives
sought by the Department personnel in the settlement and the demands of the defendant
union. If an agreement is reached, it is sent to Washington LMWP and the Solicitor's
Office for approval, and then forwarded to the Justice Department for final action.
457. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
458. Interviews with Department of Labor Officials A and B. The only contrary in.
dication came from members of a field office who indicated that where the violations
involved were merely negligent and not willful, and where the union had no prior
history of election violations, settlement for supervision of the next regular election
rather than for supervision of a rerun was more likely.
459. Interview with Department of Labor Official A. By way of contrast, the district
court in Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), afl', 399 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1968), ordered that copies of its decision voiding a contested election be
sent by the union to each member.
460. See note 450 supra.
461. Interview with Department of Labor Official B.
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ton, and distance alone may preclude a complainant's participation.0 2
Even when the settlement is arranged by a Regional Solicitor's office,
the complainant is not usually consulted. Though some regional of-
fices do as a general rule confer with the complainant, it is not because
of DOL policy. Personnel in the Solicitor's office view as their "client"
not the original complainant but rather the Area LMWP Office that
investigated the case. 4 3 Even when consulted, the interests of the
complainant are given little weight in the negotiation process.404
This exclusion of the complainant reflects an overemphasis on post-
election remedies as a vindication of the broad public interest in hon-
est elections, ignoring the fact that the LMRDA was also intended to
guarantee individual rights of participation within the union.403 The
Supreme Court has recently recognized this critical interest in Title IV
adjudications by granting a member's petition for intervention in
Trbovich v. United Mine TVorhers.4°0  Formerly, courts had denied
such petitions on the grounds that since the complainant could not
initiate a Title IV action, he could not intervene6 7 once the action
was brought by the Secretary. The Court rejected this position and
found
no evidence whatever that Congress was opposed to participation
by union members in the litigation .... 40s
462. Since many national union counsel arc also located in Washington, settlement
negotiations at this level may be conducted informally over the telephone or at occasional
meetings. The complainant, however, not being located in Washington, will not be
privy to these informal negotiations.
463. Two of the five Regional Solicitor's Offices contacted expressed their refusal
to include the complainant in settlement negotiations in this fashion.
464. One qualification to this general proposition has been made. If the complainant
had been a candidate in the contested election and would be eligible to run again in
a rerun but would not be eligible to run in the next regular election, this may influence
the Department to insist on his eligibility as a condition in any settlement for super-
vision of the upcoming election, see Stein v. Wirtz, 366 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967); or, to insist on supervision of the rerun rather than the next
regular election, Interview with Department of Labor Official B; or, to refuse to settle
altogether, Shultz v. Carpenters District Council, 74 L.R.R.M. 2863 (N.D. Ohio, 1970).
465. The LMRDA is phrased in terms of rights of individual union members. The
method of enforcement that has evolved under the DOL's administration, however, is a
far cry from the model suggested by Senator John F. Kennedy, in whid the Department
was to act as the complainant's lawyer. See note 295 supra.
466. 40 U.S.L.W. 4161 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972). Intervention was sought in the Depart-
ment's suit to set aside the December 9, 1969, election of officers of the United Mine
Workers. In that election the incumbent union president, W-1. Bo)le, was opposed by
the late Joseph A. Yablonski.
467. McGuire v. International Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 74 L.R.R.M. 2185 (6th Cir.
1970); Stein v. Wirtz, 366 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967);
Shultz v. District 19, Steelworkers, 74 L.R.R.M. 2222 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Morrisey v. Shultz,
74 L.R.R.M. 2679 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Wirtz v. Local 1377, IBEW, 288 F. Supp. 914 ("N.D.
Ohio 1968); Wirtz v. Local 11, Operating Eng'rs, 66 L.R.R.M. 2080 (C.D. Cal. 1967);
Wirtz v. Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, 60 L.R.R.M. 2092 (D.N.J. 1965).
468. 40 U.S.L.W. 4161, 4162 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972).
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The Court, through Justice Marshall, conceded that the Secretary was
given exclusive control of the post-election remedy for two reasons:
(1) to protect unions from frivolous litigation and unnecessary
judicial interference with their elections, and (2) to centralize
in a single proceeding such litigation as might be warranted with
respect to a single election. 469
The Court held, however, that participation by the complainant once
the decision to sue had been made did not frustrate either of these ob-
jectives.
The Court also recognized that the interests of the Department
and the complainant could diverge, thus justifying complainant inter-
vention to protect his interest:
The statute plainly imposes on the Secretary the duty to serve
two distinct interests which are related, but not identical. First,
the statute gives the individual union members certain rights
against their union and the 'Secretary of Labor in effect becomes
the union member's lawyer' for purposes of enforcing those rights.
104 CONG. REC. 10947 (1958) (remarks of Senator Kennedy). And
second, the Secretary has an obligation to protect the 'vital public
interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that
transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union mem-
ber.' Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 389 U.S. 463,
475 (1968). Both functions are important, and they may not
always dictate precisely the same approach to the conduct of the
litigation. Even if the Secretary is performing his duties, broadly
conceived, as well as can be expected, the union member may
have a valid complaint about the performance of 'his lawyer.'
Such a complaint, filed by the member who initiated the entire
enforcement proceeding, should be regarded as sufficient to war-
rant relief in the form of intervention under Rule 24 (a) (2).4 70
Intervention under Rule 24 requires a showing that the intervenor's
interests are not adequately represented by the existing parties in the
suit.471 The Court in Trbovich requires only a demonstration that
469. Id.
470. Id. at 4164.
471. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest rclating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (emphasis added).
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the representation "may be" inadequate. Such a showing, which the
Court itself describes as "minimal," 472 would appear to invite fre-
quent intervention in future Title IV suits. 473 Intervention of this
kind would be largely unnecessary if the DOL adopted a policy of
participation by the complainant in the settlement process. This par-
ticipation should often satisfy the complainant that his rights are
being vindicated and that he need not incur the expense of formal
intervention. 47 4 Involvement of the complainant will also have a
salutary effect on Title IV dispositions. 47 i His presence will sensitize
472. The requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that represen-
tation of his interest "may be" inadequate; and the burden of making that showing
should be treated as minimal. See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 24.09-1 [4].
40 U.S.L.W. 4161, 4164 n.10 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1972).
473. It should be noted that the Court limited the intervention to the claims of il-
legality presented by the Secretary's complaint, preventing the intervenor front raising
two additional grounds for setting aside the election. Id. at 4164. This limitation fore-
closes an effective device for reviewing the Department's decisions both as to whether
specific violations occurred and as to whether they affected the outcome of the election.
The congressional objective of centralization of litigation has been achieved even if the
intervenor is permitted to allege .new grounds for setting aside the election. The De-
partment's screening function, freeing the union from frivolous litigation may be cir-
cumvented if the Department .has already passed on these alleged violations. But as the
Court majority itself recognizes, it is less burdensome for the union to respond to new
claims in the context of a pending suit than when presented in a new complaint. If
indeed the allegations are "frivolous," it would appear to be a simple matter to let the
intervenor submit his proof. A minimal showing by the union should then be sufficient
to convince the judge that the Department did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
include the allegations in its complaint. Since the complainant is entitled to a review
of the Department's exercise of discretion, see notes 420-29 supra, judicial scrutiny in
the course of a motion to intervene would provide a context in which review could be
promptly and adequately provided. An intervenor's request to introduce further allega-
tions supplemental to those included in the Department's complaint could properly be
seen as a request for such review.
It is also significant that the allegations sought to be raised by the intervenor in
Trbovich were hardly "frivolous" in the normal sense of that word. The petition alleged
as additional violations of the Act: (1) that the union required members to vote in
certain locals, composed entirely of pensioners, which petitioner claimed were illegally
constituted under the union constitution; and (2) that the incumbent president im-
properly influenced the pensioners' vote by bringing about a pension increase just
before the election. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4161 n.2. Given the significant role which pensioners
played in determining the outcome of the election, the allegations if true could hardly
be considered "frivolous." See p. 431 and notes 84-87 supra. Moreover, the factual basis
for the claims has been well established. See Letter from Harrison A. Williams, Jr.,
Chairman, to members of the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, June 24, 1970. By not
including these allegations in its complaint, the Department apparently concluded that
the challenged acts were not violations of the LMRDA. Even if the Department is en-
titled to make this determination initially, it is surely not beyond the reach of judicial
review.
474. Formal intervention requires the presence of counsel to represent the com-
plainant, and this may involve considerable expense. If the Department were truly ful-
filling the role of "complainant's lawyer," this expense will be unnecessary,
475. This involvement would satisfy one of the principal objections which complainant
union members had to the current administration of the Act. Of the thirty-one com-
plainanits contacted, fourteen indicated that the Department made little effort to get in
touch -vith the complainant during the pendency of the Title IV action. One complainant
only discovered that a case he had initiated had been settled by happening upon an
article to that effect in the local newspaper. Interview with complainant union member
L. Only three of the complainants contacted indicated that the Department kept them
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the Department to the impact of various settlement arrangements
on the union's internal political structure,470 and specifically to the
distinction between a rerun and supervision of the next regularly
scheduled election. Moreover, a degree of adversariness will be
introduced to counterbalance the close relationship between Depart-
ment personnel and union counsel that exists at other stages of tile
enforcement process. 477 Finally, the presence of the complainant will
prod the Department to handle cases more quickly, since the com-
plainant is generally the party most injured by delay.478
2. Disposition by Judicial Order
If a stipulated settlement is not obtained while the action is pend-
ing, the case is brought to trial.479 Although the action is nominally
conducted by the local United States Attorney, the Regional Solici-
tor's Office for that area aids in the preparation of the suit.4 80 Thus
continually informed as to the progress of the litigation. Such a situation tends to be
more likely when the complainant has retained the services of an attorney. Interview
with union attorney W. Fifteen of the complainants indicated that there should have
been more contact with the Department during the period in which the litigation was
pending and only one felt that such increased contact was unnecessary.
476. The Department instituted suit against several Operating Engineers locals con-
testing the union's requirement of membership in the parent branch of the local as a
prerequisite to holding union office. The Department and the national union agreed
that two locals would serve as test cases on the reasonableness of this requirement. Tile
other suits were dismissed, and the two test cases were narrowed to deal solely with
the issue of the eligibility provision. Yet those two cases also involved allegations of other
violations which, while initially included in the Department's complaint, were dismissed
pursuant to the agreement with the union. Complainants in one of the cases argued
that their right to an election free from the violations dismissed in the case was sacri-
ficed to an agreement based on mere expediency and made at the national level of both
the union and the Department. Interview with complainant union member L.
477. It was precisely this type of consideration which motivated the Court to permit
intervention in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S, 129(1967). Major purchasers of natural gas were allowed to intervene in a divestiture pro-
ceeding brought by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department under § 7 of tie
Clayton Act. The Court held that the government was not adequately protecting the
interest of the purchasers and expressed a fear that the Antitrust Division would "knuckle
under" to pressure and sign a consent decree too favorable to the defendants. Id. at 142.
If intervention is to be allowed in such well-publicized litigation involving an agency
not known for particularly close ties with those whom it is supposed to regulate, tie
need for intervention may be even more pressing in the case of a post-election Title
IV suit.
478. See pp. 525-26 infra.
479. The Justice Department conducts Title IV civil enforcement actions pursuant
to its Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Labor. See note 407 supra.
480. Such collaboration is authorized in the Memorandum of Understanding between
the Labor and Justice Departments. See note 407 supra. The extent of actual cooperation
varies with the particular area in question. In some areas, lack of personal contact be.
tween the Solicitor's Office and the United States Attorney and geographical separation
between the two offices tend to minimize the role of the Solicitor's personnel in the
litigation process. In others, geographic proximity and personal rapport mean great
reliance on the resources of the Solicitor's Office. Thus in one region the Solicitor's
Office prepares the complaint, depositions, and the briefs, sends them to the Solicitor
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when attempts at settlement fail, it is the court that must finally dis-
pose of the case.
Section 402 specifies that
[i]f, upon a preponderance of the evidence.., the court finds...
that the violation of section 401 may have affected the outcome
of an election, the court shall declare the election . . . to be
void .... 481
When the court sustains the Secretary's finding of a violation, it
must determine whether the violation "may have affected" the elec-
tion outcome. This standard does not require a finding that the viola-
tions did affect the outcome-that the defeated candidate would have
won had the election been fairly conducted. Rather, the court need
only be satisfied of a "reasonable probability" that the violations in-
fluenced the outcome. 482
As noted above, adjudicative problems arise where the violations
do not affect a clearly ascertainable number of ballots or voters. The
Supreme Court attempted to provide guidance for such situations in
in Washington for approval, and then releases them to the United States Attorney. In
another, the Solicitor's regional staff even conducts the in.court trial work.
The primary reason for placing responsibility for the conduct of litigation in the Justice
Department was the fear that the Solicitor's Office might be too tied to the labor move-
ment, so that the presence of the Justice Department was required to bring more ad-
versariness into the process. Interview with Department of Labor Official B. Yet Justice
does not participate in the initial decision to bring suit, and while the litigation is
pending, Justice will neither settle a case without the approval of the Labor Department
nor obstruct a settlement arranged by Labor Department personnel. Interview with
Department of Labor Official B; Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 407. The
adversariness gained in the settlement process would seem to be minimal, and at least
some attorneys with experience in the Title IV area suggested that the arrangement
handicaps the government because Justice personnel are less familiar with such litigation
than the Solicitor's staff. Interviews with complainant attorney E and union attorne)s
GG and II. Three of the five Regional Solicitor's Offices contacted indicated that the
conduct of the litigation suffered due to the lack of familiarity on the part of Justice
Department personnel. It would therefore seem appropriate to undertake a re-examina-
tion of the Understanding to ascertain whether it contributes to the effective enforcement
of the Act.
It should be noted that a second reason was given for vesting Title IV litigation in
the Justice Department. This was a desire to centralize all government litigation in a
single agency to provide uniformity in the handling of all litigation in which the
government is involved. Interview with Department of Labor Official B. This second
rationale cannot be evaluated here because it depends upon considerations external to
the policies behind the LMRDA. An examination of the continued advisability of vesting
the power to litigate in the Justice Department must weigh any potential gain in en-
forcement effectiveness resulting from a transfer of this authority to the Solicitor's
Office against the impairment of governmental operations resulting from a dilution of
the centralization principle.
481. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (97o).
482. Wirtz v. Local 410, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1966); Wirtz v.
National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47, 58 (S.D.N.Y.), afJd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.
1968); Wirtz v. Local 1622, Carpenters, 285 F. Supp. 455, 464 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees.483 There, an unreasonable eligibil-
ity requirement was applied both to exclude specific candidates and
to curtail eligibility generally among the membership. The Court
observed that in such cases,
[t]here can be no tangible evidence available of the effect of this
exclusion on the election; whether the outcome would have been
different depends upon whether the suppressed candidates were
potent vote-getters, whether more union members would have
voted had candidates not been suppressed, and so forth. Since
any proof relating to effect on outcome must necessarily be specu-
lative, we do not think Congress meant to place as stringent a
burden on the Secretary .... 484
The Court therefore held that "a proved violation of § 401 [has] the
effect of establishing a prima facie case that the violation 'may have
affected' the outcome." 485
Evaluation and Recommendations. In reviewing the DOL's finding
of probable cause of a statutory violation, courts must not only resolve
factual questions concerning the case but must also pass judgment on
the "reasonableness" of certain union practices. 480 In making such de-
terminations, courts have relied heavily on guidelines promulgated
by the Department. 48 7 In view of the apparent judicial desire for such
direction, and the congressional intent that the Department take the
lead in dealing with union election disputes, 488 the Department should
make greater use of informal rule-making to provide guidelines,
483. Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
484. Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 507 (1968), citing Wirtz v, Local
410, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 1966).
485. Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. 492, 506.07 (1968).
486. Members must, for example, be given a "reasonable" opportunity for the no1lna
tion of candidates. Every member is eligible for office subject to "reasonable" qualifica-
tions uniformly imposed. The right to vote and support candidates for office is guaratiteed
against "improper" interference. 29 U.S.C. § 401(e) (1970).
487. Courts have found these guidelines "highly persuasive," though "not controlling,"
Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2109 (M.D. Fla. 1967). Thus the
INTERPRETATIvE MANUAL, supra note 298, and the regulations published in 29 C.F.R. § 452
(1970) have been used by courts as tools in finding eligibility restrictions on candidacy
for office to be both reasonable and unreasonable. Shultz v. Local 1299. Steelworkers,
324 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd on other grounds, Civ. No. 71-1297 (6th Cir., filed
Dec. 29, 1971); Wirtz v. Independent Petroleum Workers, 75 L.R.R.M. 2J40 (N.D. Ind.
1970); Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union, supra. In dealing with eligibility restrictions
the courts have also relied on an LMWP study of the type and frequency of such
restrictions in union constitutions. DOL QUALIFICATIONS STUDY, supra note 103. Where
a particular restriction rarely appears in other unions or appears only in a much less
stringent form, there appears to be some presumption of unreasonableness-thotigh It
is certainly not sufficient to establish the unreasonableness of the restriction per sc.
Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), af 'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d
Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 174, Musicians, 272 F. Supp. 294 (1967).
488. See note 390 supra.
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especially on questions of reasonableness. 480 The Department has
already promulgated a set of rules interpreting the Act in the Code
of Federal Regulations as "a practical guide as to how the office repre-
senting the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it."4°0
But these rules do little more than restate the provisions of tie
statute, and are indicative of the Department's small effort to investi-
gate union elections and violations of the LMRDA comprehensively.
However, the Department's study on eligibility rules indicates the
type of investigation of which the Department is capable.401 Were
such research techniques, perhaps supplemented by public hearings,
employed in other areas of the Act, more meaningful interpretive
rules could be formulated.492 The rules could serve as an election
code of minimum requirements in union elections. The Department
could be expected to bring suit only for practices in violation of these
rules. Thus they would give unions clear notice as to whether the
union subjects itself to liability to suit by a particular procedure. In
areas of uncertainty such as adequate motive or eligibility restric-
tions, this kind of clarification is desirable.
Departmental rules might also provide some indication as to the
current status of the "may have affected" test in the wake of the Local
6 case. Because a rerun is expensive and time-consuming, both to the
candidates403 and to the union,494 it may have seemed reasonable to
489. The LMRDA grants the DOL explicit rulemaking authority in the areas of
public examination of union and employer reports [LMRDA N 205(b), (c), 29 U.S.C.
§ 435(b), (c) (1970)]; union provisions for removal of officers [LMRDA § 401(i). 29 US..
§ 481(i) (1970)]; and supervision of election reruns [LMRDA § 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b)
(1970)]. No explicit grant, however, is made for dealing with the conduct of union
elections generally. It is therefore arguable that the DOL cannot prescribe legislative
rules governing the election provisions of Titles I, IV, V, and VI, even though an "im-
plied or unclear grant of power" may be deemed sufficient to authorize legislative
rulemaking. I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE L4w TREATIsE § 503, at 299 (1958).
However, it seems clear that the DOL may issue interpretive rules governing union
elections. See DAvis, supra, at § 503 for a full discussion of the distnction between
legislative and interpretive rules. Although interpretive rules may not have the force of
law, they are given weight by courts. Interpretive rulemaking authority need not rest
upon explicit statutory authority. Id.
490. 29 C.F.R. § 452.1 (1970), citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.. 134, 138 (1944).
491. See DOL QUALIFICATIONS STUDY, supra note 103.
492. Should the Department become aggressive in rulemaking, it would seem necessary
to follow the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S, 701-06 (1970),
as LMRDA § 606, 29 U.S.C. § 526 (1970), requires that all rules authonryd pursuant to
the LMRDA be made in accordance with that Act's provisions.
493. Campaign costs are substantial and are paid for primarily from the candidate's
own savings and salary. See p. 461 and notes 244-45 supra. Having expended these
funds on the first campaign, the candidates may be without sufficient financial resources
to conduct a second bid for office.
494. It may cost a small local union only $200 to $300 to conduct an election, but
the expense increases with the size of the union. Thus for a local of several thousand men
the cost may range from $3,000 to $10,000. In one of the largest locals examined. the
expense reaches $60,000. Interviews with union officers C, D, G, and 0, complainant
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limit relief to those situations where the violations potentially influ-
enced the outcome of the election, rather than merely the distribution
of votes.495 Almost from the day of the statute's enactment, however,
the "may have affected" test has come under attack. Commentators
have argued that the test: (1) by condoning violations for which no
remedy is provided, engenders disrespect for the law on the part of
union officials and cynicism among those whose rights are violated; 400
(2) deprives minority movements of an opportunity to indicate their
actual strength within the union; 497 and (3) tends to afford relief
only when parties in an election contest are of relatively equal strength,
as wide margins of victory serve to shield even the most flagrant
violations.498
Perhaps because of such criticism, the case law is not replete with
instances where violations were proven but relief denied due to failure
to show an adequate impact on outcome. 409 Lower courts 00 have in-
terpreted Local 6 to mean that proof of violation establishes a prima
facie case of outcome effect and have ruled against defendant unions
which presented "no evidentiary support," 01 or no "convincing evi-
union members H and I, and union attorney R. At the district level, expenses approxi-
mate those of the largest locals and may even exceed them. In one large district, the
conduct of an election costs the union $150,000, covering expenses for printing ballots,
notifying the membership by mail of the election, printing election rules, reimbursing
lost employment time for tellers, and renting a special election hall. Interview with
union officer 0.
495. See note 413 supra.
496. This effect is exacerbated by the Supreme Court's decision in Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134 (1964), which narrowed the availability of pre.elcction relief for election
violations. Together, these two limitations deprive union members of "that to which
they are entitled-a fair and honest election in the first instance." Summners, supra note
282, at 1248.
497. [A] member who realizes that he has no chance of winning an election may
often wish to run so that he can manifest his opposition to the incumbents, or
perhaps establish a political base for the future. Union democracy will not be
advanced if, when such a member's rights have been infringed, he is denied judicial
relief merely because the violation did not affect the outcome of the elcetion in
question.
Note, Election Remedies Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
78 HARv. L. REV. 1617, 1624 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Note]. Limiting the
"may have affected" test to instances when the actual winner would have been changed
in effect deprives these minorities of a rerun election to provide a fair indication of their
level of support among the rank and file.
498. Painters District 9 Study, supra note 156, at 68.
499. The most startling aspect of Title IV litigation is the success of the Department.
Only thirteen of 177 suits have resulted in adverse judgments. SUMARY OF Os'zrA'rloNs,
1969, supra note 299, at 4 (figures based on election case activity from fiscal 1963 through
1969).
500. Prior cases had regularly employed the Local 6 standard. Wirtz v. Locals 410
& 30, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1966); Wirtz v. Local 406, Operating
Engr's, 254 F. Supp. 962 (E.D. La. 1966); Wirtz v. Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 254 1. Supp.
980 (D. Colo. 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1966), vacated as moot, 387 U.S. 96
(1967); Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 1965).
501. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 405 F.2d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1968).
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dence,"50 2 or which had not "met by evidence"5 03 the prima facie
case. One case effectively construed Local 6 to entirely relieve the
Secretary of the burden of proving that the violation may have af-
fected the outcome and placed on the union the "burden to estab-
lish that the violation did not in fact affect the outcome of the
election."5 04
If Local 6 is construed in this way, its impact will be to place upon
the union a burden found "too stringent" to be borne by the Secre-
tary.505 Where the alleged violation can be shown to have tainted a
calculable number of ballots, the union may be able to rebut the
presumption of outcome effect. But for other violations which do not
affect specific ballots, such as unreasonable disqualification from
candidacy or campaign violations, the presumption would effectively
be conclusive.
Thus, certain practices emerge as virtually per se violations which,
if proven, will result in a new election automatically. 00 This result
may cast doubt upon the present policy of denying most pre-election
relief under the statute.507 If such violations are likely to cause auto-
matic rerunning of the initial contest, dealing with them prior to the
voting would avoid the expense and waste of a second election.
F. The Remedial Action Phase
Having voided the challenged election, the court is obligated by
statute to "direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of
502. Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass Bottle Blowers, 290 F. Supp. 965, 968 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
503. Shultz v. Independent Employees Union, 74 L.R.R.M. 2137, 2140 (W.D. Wis.
1970).
504. Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 405 F.2d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1968).
505. See p. 516 supra.
506. In the Local 6 case the Court struck down the union's requirement of prior
service in minor union positions. Having agreed with the Department that the rule was
unreasonable, the Court recognized a prima facie case of outcome effect which the
union was obliged to rebut. 391 U.S. at 506-07. The union failed to overcome this pre-
sumption even though the incumbents had won the contested elections 9.314 to I.47
and 9,216 to 1,299. 265 F. Supp. 510, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Given these margins of victory,
it is difficult to envision any situation in which the union would be held to have dis-
pelled the presumption of outcome effect. It would seem fair to conclude that any
exclusion from the ballot due to an unreasonable eligibility provision is a per se violation
of the statute, resulting in an automatic rerun of the contested election.
Per se tests are already employed by the Department of Labor, see pp. 498.99 supra,
and seven of the seventeen complainant attorneys contacted recommended their use by
the courts. Such tests found little support among union attorneys, who favored aban-
doning the presumption approach of the Local 6 case. Seventeen of the thirty-five union
attorneys contacted suggested that an election should be overturned only if the Depart-
ment can show that the violations affected enough votes to change the outcome.
507. See pp. 545-48 infra,
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the Secretary . *.".."508 This can be either a rerun election500 or super-
vision of the next regularly scheduled election, but in only a few cases
has a court ordered the latter remedy. 510 If a rerun is ordered, the
election is limited to those offices that "may have been affected" by
the proven violations.511
The burden of supervision rests primarily with the Area LMWP
Office which originally investigated the complaint. -12 The Department
does not conduct the election, as does the NLRB in a representation
election. Rather, it leaves the administration of the electoral process
to the officials designated by the union constitution, 16 The election
supervisor of the DOL merely presides over the establishment of rules
to govern the election and then observes to insure that they are fol-
lowed.
Rules are established at a pre-election conference, chaired by the
election supervisor. All interested parties may attend. Normally the
rules and procedures specified in the union constitution and bylaws
508. 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1970). In addition to the order for an election, the Secretary
may be able to secure other relief from the court. One source of this ancillary relite is
the statute itself, which specifies in § 402(c) that the "court shall have power to take
such action as it deems proper to preserve the assets of the labor organization." 29 U.S.C.
§ 482(c) (1970). Alternatively, the Department may appeal to the general equity power
of the court, which has been the basis for orders protecting complainants to the De-
partment from retaliation by the union. Shultz v. National Maritime Union, 73 L.R.R.M.
2388 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Wirtz v. Local 1753, Longshoremen, 56 L.R.R.M. 2303 (S.D. Miss,
1963). In Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104 (M.D. Fla. 1967), tile
court used its equity powers to enjoin expenditure of union funds by incumbents for
their own campaigns and required repayment to the union of funds spent.
509. If the remedy is a rerun, the question may arise as to the term of office of tile
selected candidates. The Department has interpreted a rerun to be for the unexpired
term of the contested election. INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL, supra note 298, at § 478.005.
But if the next regular union election is impending, courts have in effect pre-cipted
the upcoming election and specified that the term of the officers elected in the rerun
shall be that of the officers that would have been elected if the regular election had
been held. Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2112 (M.D. Fla.
1967); Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, 55 CCH Lab. Cas. 11811 (N.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 366 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1966).
510. Final disposition of Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers (W.D. Pa. 1969),
cited in SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1969, supra note 299, at 15; Wirtz v. Local 169, Hod
Carriers, 246 F. Supp. 741 (D. Nev. 1965).
511. Courts initially approached this as a scope of complaint problem, limiting the
rerun to the office for which the complainant was a candidate or to which his complaint
was directed. Wirtz v. Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 254 F. Stpp. 980 (D. Colo. 1965), a! 'd,
366 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1966), vacated as moot, 387 U.S. 96 (1967). But this position has
in later cases been expressly repudiated, and the general rule has been to limit the
rerun to those offices that "may have been affected" by the proven violations. Wirtz v.
Local 705, Hotel Employees, 389 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 832 (1968):
Wirtz v. Local 205, Technical Eng'rs, 67 L.R.R.M. 2931 (W.D.N.Y. 1968): Wirtz v. Local
545, Operating Eng'rs, 64 L.R.R.M. 2449 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 381 F.2d 448 (2d Cir,
1967); Wirtz v. Local 191, Teamsters, 226 F. Supp. 179 (D. Conn. 1964).
512. An election involving an intermediate or national labor organization may be
supervised by a Regional LMWP Office or perhaps even by the central office. Interview
with Department of Labor Official A.
513. Kleiler, Recent Developments, supra note 384, at 346.
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are followed. Deference is shown to union interpretations of these
procedures unless they are clearly contrary to the statute or to formal
rules prescribed by the Department.51 4 Rules necessary to the conduct
of the election which are not specified in the constitution and bylaws
are adopted at the pre-election conference. 10
Following the conference, the role of the supervisor is essentially
to watch the union elections committee prepare and administer the
election. The supervisor makes certain that dates for the steps in tie
election are established, notice is sent, ballots are printed, and eligibil-
ity lists are prepared. He observes the nomination proceedings, the
balloting process, and the tally of votes. Finally, he will hear any
further complaints against the conduct of the new election from union
members.510 When the election is concluded, the supervisor certifies
the names of the elected officers to the court, which declares them to
be duly elected.517
Some Department personnel claimed that they have no effective
sanction if the union is uncooperative in the supervision process 18
A court may, however, grant an injunction restraining the union from
interfering with DOL supervision, 15 or enforcing a Department rul-
ing when the union refuses to cooperate. 2 0 Further, where supervision
has resulted from a pre-litigation settlement, the Department may
simply bring suit to set aside the election if the union refuses to coop-
514. The statute specifies that a Title IV suit may be brought to obtain "an election
. nder the supervision of the Secretary and in accordance with the provisions of
this title and such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe." 29 U.S.C. §
482(b) (1970). In addition, the court may in ordering an election impose certain restric-
tions on its conduct, such as enjoining the application of provisions found to be con-
trary to the statute though they were not themselves the basis of the Secretary's suit.
Wirtz v. Local 545, Operating Eng'rs, 366 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1966).
515. The description of the supervisory process contained in the text is drawn from
what were characterized as common practices by the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted.
Certain offices indicated that they employed other somewhat unique practices. Three
indicated that they retained the right to step in and construe provisions of the union
bylaws and LMWP guidelines despite the general rule of deference to unions' inter-
pretations of their election procedures. Two indicated that they police campaign ac-
tivities and literature to insure that no Title IV violations occur.
516. At least two of the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted indicated that this was
standard practice.
517. An election may also be supervised by LMWP pursuant to a Formal Determina-
tion or pre-trial stipulation by the parties. In those instances the pattern of LMWP
activity is apparently the same as that described above, with the exception that in the
case for supervision pursuant to Determination there is no certification to any court.
518. Two of the LMWP Area Offices contacted held this view and stressed that their
role was purely conciliatory.
519. Unreported case cited in INTERP'ETATIVE MANUAL, supra note 298, at q 478.100.
The union had refused to allow the complainant, who was determined by LMIVP to be
a member in good standing, to run for office, and had also sent out notice of nomination
and election without the approval of the LMWP supervisor.
520. Hodgson v. Local 1418, Longshoremen, 76 L.R.R.M. 2556 (E.D. La. 1971).
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erateY21 The only remedy specifically denied the Department is the
power to refuse to certify the results of an election supervised pur-
suant to court order.522
Evaluation and Recommendations. Complainant union members
expressed satisfaction with the fairness of Department supervision of
rerun elections and a conviction that supervision effectively pre-
vented the recurrence of the original violations. 2 3 In only a few in-
stances was there any evidence of a significant lapse in the quality of
supervision.5'1 Yet mere prevention of the recurrence of statutory
violations in the supervised election may not guarantee vindication of
LMRDA rights.
It is difficult to ascertain the sense in which a supervised rerun is
a "remedy." It is not punitive in character. The Act provides for no
criminal sanction or penalty in connection with the ordering of a new
election. The Department, in administering the Act, makes no attempt
to inform the membership of its discovery of statutory violations and
studiously avoids any accusation of wrongdoing.G2 5 Its approach even
at this state is conciliatory, not coercive.
Nor is the process truly remedial in the sense of providing a "repeat"
of the contested election, free of violations. No attempt is made to
restore the candidates to their pre-election positions. The winner of
the contested election, serving in office during the Title IV enforce-
521. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
522. Wirtz v. Local 1377, IBEW, 63 L.R.R.M. 2029 (N.D. Ohio 1966). Btut see Wlrtt
v. Local 66, Glass Bottle Blowers (unreported W.D. Pa. 1966), summarized in SMNIAtY
OF O'Ea'rloNs, 1970, supra note 299, at 48; Hodgson v. Local 2212, Carpenters, Civ. No.
1447-69 (3d Cir., filed Mar. 27, 1971).
523. Of the thirty-one complainant union members contacted, ten indicated that the
Department's supervision insured that violations would not occur. Only seven suggested
that violations still occurred in departmental reruns. Of the thirty-five tnion lawyers
contacted, seventeen expressed satisfaction with the adequacy of the Department's super-
vision, and only five suggested that violations of the statute occurred despite this
supervision.
524. In three instances, specific criticisms of the Department's supervision were heard.
In one case, there was a problem in getting the incumbents to send out the insurgents'
mail, and the election supervisor allegedly refused to resolve the matter. Interview with
union officer C. On a second occasion, the Department's representative refused to extend
his supervision to the area around the union hall in which voting was being conducted,
allegedly permitting violations of the statute to occur. In this instance the Departmelt
itself attempted to correct its mistake by refusing to certify the results of the election,
but was overruled by the court which had jurisdiction over the matter. Intervie, with
union attorney T and complainant attorney Q. In a third election, the union's election
committee declared ineligible a candidate who was later found by the national union to
be duly qualified to stand for office. The Department's representative allegedly refused
to pass on the question at the time of the local union's ruling, thus undercutting the
legitimacy of the supervised election. Interview with union officer F.
525. Interview with Department of Labor Official A.
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ment process, remains in office throughout the rerun campaign.52 G
If he is a candidate in the supervised election, his position of incum-
bency will be an obvious advantage. 5 27 Defeated candidates who have
made substantial expenditures of funds during the first campaign may
be unable to obtain sufficient financial support to campaign effectively
in the rerun.528
The supervised election, as it has evolved since the enactment of
the LMRDA, is a prophylactic device designed merely to insure a
procedurally fair election.520 Through this mechanism the union elec-
tions committee can be instructed in the proper procedures for insur-
ing honest balloting. Once this is done, the statute's assumption is that
the democratic processes within the union have been restored and
the policies of the Act vindicated.
Not surprisingly, criticism of this remedy is widespread. Most sig-
nificantly, it is argued that the remedy comes too late in tie Title IV
enforcement process. The average time between the contested election
and the completion of the rerun, assuming no appeal beyond the
district court, is two years and seven months.r' 3 As would be expected,
526. The statute provides in § 402(a) that the challenged election shall be presumed
valid and that in the interim the affairs of the organization shall be conducted by the
officers elected in the contested election, "pending final disposition" of the election
complaint. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970). But once "final disposition" has occurred, and the
court has ordered a new election, this interim period would appear to cease. In fact, the
officers chosen in the contested election serve throughout the period of the rerun. Al-
though the local election committee will run the election, it may be appointed by the
incumbents and will have to deal with these officers in arranging for the facilities and
materials for the election. To a degree then, the incumbents arc presiding over their
own election, and this position cannot help but give them an "air of legitimacy," in
the eyes of the rank and file.
Suspending the officers after the court's finding that a rerun is warranted might be
too drastic a remedy. More active supervision by the Department, rather than deference
to union procedures and personnel in fact controlled by the incumbents, might serie
to mitigate this advantage of incumbency.
527. See note 543 infra. Only minimal data is available comparing the results of
elections supervised by the Department with the initial, contested elections. Information
was compiled on fifty elections supervised by the Department during fiscal 1968.70. In
56.5 per cent of these elections, the winner of the contested election was not himself a
candidate in the subsequently supervised election. The incumbent was re.clected in 63.3
per cent of the remaining elections and defeated in 34.7 per cent.
Department officials suggested that the high percentage of incumbents who did not
stand for election in the supervised contest was a result of supervision involving small,
unpoliticized local union offices which are part-time tasks with traditionally high turn-
over. See Appendix E infra.
528. See note 493 supra.
529. See note 523 supra. Only five of the thirty-one complainant union members felt
that the violations in the first election, while not occurring in the rerun, might none-
theless "taint" the outcome.
530. See Appendix D infra. If the decision of the district court is appealed, then the
time lag increases. It may be argued that election cases be given priority on court
dockets. No judicial conference seems to have adopted this position officially. In view
of the already crowded condition of most dockets, this acceleration may not be advisable.
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complainant attorneys unanimously indicated that litigation under
Title IV was ineffective due to this delay.531 But a substantial portion
of union attorneys concurred,532 and even more significantly, DOL
field staff members also considered the enforcement mechanism inef-
fective because of the substantial delays.533
Delay undoubtedly works to the advantage of the incumbent. If a re-
run were held promptly after the contested election, the abridgment
of democratic procedures might itself become an issue in the subse-
quent election. But the passage of time and the low profile of DOL
supervision make it unlikely that the rerun campaign will focus on
this issue.534 Rather, the incumbent's performance during his time in
office will be the more likely subject of debate. If the incumbent has
performed well, the membership may re-elect hima 35 even though his
incumbency is the fruit of unlawful conduct in the original election.
Delay robs the rerun device of both remedial and deterrent objec-
tives. Yet the remedial function at least seems warranted by the
"may have affected" test itself. Where a violation is of the kind
affecting an identifiable number of ballots, the test permits a rerun
only after a demonstration of doubt that the election winner would
have triumphed in a fair election. 53a As to other sorts of violations,
the presumption that outcome may have been affected will probably
be applied by courts only where the violations pose a serious threat
to electoral responsiveness.r37 Thus a rerun will be ordered only when
established violations have thrown in doubt the question of who would
have won an abuse-free election. Yet the victor in the tainted election
remains in office538 and may have served his entire term by the time
of the rerun. 53D The defeated candidate, often with a substantial claim
531. Only one complainant attorney suggested that the supervised election was an
effective remedy.
532. Thirteen of the thirty-five union attorneys contacted indicated that litigation
under Title IV was an ineffective remedy because too much time passed before the new
election was held. Only ten suggested that the supervised election was an effective remedy.
533. Five of the eight Area LMWP Offices contacted indicated that litigation under
Title IV was not effective because of the delay in disposition through the courts. Two
indicated that the remedy was effective despite the delay. Four of the five Regional
Solicitor's Offices contacted agreed that delay rendered Title IV litigation ineffective.
534. In a sample of fifty Department-supervised elections, see note 527 supra, the
voter turnout in the second election actually decreased in 55.3 per cent of the contests.
See Appendix E infra.
535. See note 541 infra.
536. See note 482 supra.
537. For example, three of the five Regional Solicitor's Offices contacted and three
of the eight Area LMWP Offices suggested that willful violations were taken more seri.
ously by the Department.
538. See note 526 supra.
539. The statute specifies that local union officials must be elected at least once every
three years. 29 U.S.C. § 481(b) (1970). Since the average time between the contested ecc-
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to the office, is left without relief until after the second election.
Though reruns are assuredly more effective than supervision of the
next regularly scheduled election, delay substantially undercuts the
utility of the rerun as a device for remedying the specific violations
in the contested election.
The deterrence aspect of the rerun device is further impaired by
the approach employed by the Department in supervising the election,
which generally fails to take account of the widespread ignorance of
the provisions of the Act among the rank and file540 and their willing-
ness to tolerate less than fair procedures.541 Blatant election violations
can probably be deterred only when the membership is aware of and
able to insist upon compliance with the LMRDA. The present pattern
of supervision is insufficiently focused on seeking the restoration of
a democratic electoral process through education of the union elec-
torate.
The inadequacy of the rerun device is shown most clearly in its
utter failure as a means of disciplining conscious attempts to sub-
vert democratic procedures to gain office. When such tactics succeed,
the unscrupulous candidate will nevertheless spend an average of over
two and one half years in office.5 42 While he may hold that office un-
der an aura of illegitimacy, he will nevertheless have at his disposal
the union's communication resources and the opportunity to justify
his incumbency by performance. 43 The losing candidate, particularly
tion and the rerun is two years and seven months, see p. 523 and note 530 supra, the
average local official will have at most five months left of his term by the time the
rerun has occurred.
Since the statute requires that district and national officers be elected only every four
or five years, respectively, the unexpired term could be longer when these offices are
involved. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) and (d) (1970).
540. The general consensus of complainants, their attorneys, union attorneys, and
union officials was that the rank and file generally know little about the provisions of
the statute, but that candidates and incumbent officers know a great deal about the law.
541. It is an old argument that union members are most concerned with their officers'
performance in getting a satisfactory contract, and that if performance is good on this
issue, the membership will tolerate all kinds of misdoing in such matters as elections.
See pp. 413-14 supra.
542. See p. 523 and note 330 supra.
543. The advantage of incumbency in winning a rerun election was well described
in the context of the 1965 Steelworkers election and a discussion of the potential benefit
to McDonald of a Title IV appeal under LMRDA:
But obviously, there would be appeals to the circuit court, and then to the Supreme
Court. And all this time Abel would continue to serve as president, with the over-
whelming majority of the Executive Board and staff representatives on his side.
Under such circumstances it would take a miracle for McDonald to win in the
second round.
1965 USWA Study, supra note 214. Perhaps for similar reasons, two union attorneys
stated that they openly advise a delaying tactic to union officers whose elections are
challenged. They then attempt to draw out the litigation until the Department is willing
to settle for supervision of the next regularly scheduled election rather than a rerun of
the challenged election itself. Interviews with union attorneys 0 and KK.
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if he is part of a wider insurgent movement, faces the gradual frag-
mentation of his support and possible harassment and intimidation
of himself and his supporters 44
The inability of the rerun device to cope with a deliberate attempt
to seize the election might be ameliorated if additional remedies were
made available under the Act: (1) The Department should be em-
powered to sue for the installation of a candidate where it is clear on
an honest count that he has won the election. t54 This remedy would
be most useful where ballot fraud has occurred and the Department,
having intervened and correctly tabulated the ballots, obtains results
indicating that the "loser" has wona 40 It also could be employed where
the duly elected candidate is barred from office because the current
incumbents refuse to install him 4 7 In either case, there seems to be
no reason for the expense and delay of a rerun when the preference
of the membership is cleare48
544. Of the seventeen complainant attorneys contacted, nine indicated that litigation
under Title IV was not effective because of the delay involved. Six indicated that the
result of this delay was to entrench the incumbents and fragment the insurgent's stp-
port within the union. Only one of these attorneys felt that a Title IV supervised rerun
was an effective remedy.
During the period of the pendency of the action, insurgents and their supporters may
be subject to various forms of coercion. See pp. 444-48 supra. As one complainant
attorney suggested:
To see the election held, the men accused of misdoing conducting union affairs,
and then recriminating against the dissidents-to see this is to see the wheels of
justice stop turning.
Interview with complainant attorney 0.
545. Officials in the Labor Department indicated a need for this form of remedy.
Interview with Department of Labor Official A. The Department has sought this form
of relief in several instances. Wirtz v. Local 73, Teamsters, 257 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ohio
1966); Wirtz v. Lodge 590, R.R. Trainmen (E.D. Ala. 1967), cited in SUMMARY OF OPERA-
TIONS, 1968, supra note 299, at 34; Wirtz v. Carpenters' Council of Cuyahoga County
(N.D. Ohio 1967), cited in SUMMARY OF OP'EATIONS, 1968, supra at 34. In none of these
instances did the court pass directly on the propriety of such relief.
546. In at least three instances, the Department has intervened to prevent ballot
tampering. See note 352 supra. The results were then supplied to, the union and the
internal appeals structure was allowed to handle the matter. In one case the winntig
candidate was installed by the union, but in amother the Department was forced to
bring suit to set aside the election. After a substantial delay, the rerun was held, and
the candidate deprived of victory in the first election was elected and installed, Inter.
view with complainant attorney N. The third case is still pending.
547. In one instance a duly elected candidate was coerced by his incumbent opponent
into resigning after the latter had refused to formally install him. The Department
brought suit for the insurgent's installation, arguing that the court had the authority
to issue such relief pursuant to its general equity power. The court refused to pass
upon this contention. Wirtz v. Local 73, Teamsters, 257 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
The suit was later terminated by stipulation and a rerun election held tinder the De-
partment's supervision. The aggrieved candidate had by this time left the union, al.
legedly due to continued harassment, and the incumbent was re-elected. Interview with
complainant union member F.
548. In seeking this form of relief from the courts, see note 541 supra, the Depart.
ment has argued that the power to order a total rerun incltdes the lesser power to
rerun only one part of the election, the installation. Wirtz v. Local 73, Teamsters, 257
F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Ohio 1966). Alternatively, it might be urged that only so nmuch of
an election as is void need be set aside, and only that part need be rerun tinder the
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(2) Courts should be given the authority to disqualify a candidate
from running in the rerun upon a showing that the candidate will-
fully violated the statute in a manner amounting to fraud in the elec-
toral process.549 Such a showing would rarely be made, for even when
clear fraud does occur it may be difficult to trace it to a particular
candidate. But at the least, courts should be empowered to deal effec-
tively with flagrant abuses should they occur.
(3) For analogous reasons, the Act should be amended to impose
criminal penalties for violations amounting to fraud.5 0
The Department could also modify its supervision policies to more
effectively employ the rerun device as a way of informing tie union
electorate:
(1) The Department should send notice of its supervision to each
union member, explaining that practices occurred which were con-
Department's supervision. Beaird, supra note 78, at 1336. Both of the above arguments
must deal with the phrase in § 402(c) which says that the court "shall declare the
election, if any, to be void." 29 U.S.C. § 482(c) (1970). That phrase on first reading
seems to imply that the entire election would have to be overturned upon a finding
that the "may have affected" test has been met. But it seems doubtful that Congros
had all the possible permutations involving union elections in mind when it drafted
the statute. It did, however, want to minimize the disruption and interference in internal
union affairs. In light of this congressional concern, courts should not read the section
as requiring that the entire election be voided and should be willing to simply install
a duly elected candidate.
549. Because the sanction is essentially punitive, the showing required may be proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt." The notion of disqualification is not foreign to the
statute, as § 504 provides for such a sanction if a person is convicted of any of the
crimes there enumerated. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970). The desired disqualification sanction
could be created by amending & 504 to include willful violation of the statute amounting
to fraud as a basis for invoking the provision's five.year bar to office holding. The
standard of willful violation amounting to fraud is employed to protect the incumbent
officer who knowingly enforces a union election provision which is subsequently declared
contrary to the statute. In this situation, the Department's dispute is with the union,
and the officer will feel obligated to follow the challenged provision since it reflects the
desires of the membership which he represents. In such a case the officer lacks the
intent to distort the election process for his own advantage, which is the circumstance
with which the above reforms seek to deal.
550. This proposal received support primarily among union complainants. In addition,
a few persons suggested that a defeated candidate in a successfully challenged election
be provided with a civil damage remedy against those persons found to have committed
willful violations of the statute, or fraud. Such actions would essentially reimburse the
injured candidates for the cost of the first election, enabling them to wage an effective
campaign in any subsequent rerun. See note 491 supra. The principal objections to this
proposal were that most offenders would be unable to pay and that the threat of such
actions would deter able men from participation in the election process either as candi-
dates or campaigners. However, an analogous remedy is available under § 501(b) for
breaches of fiduciary duty, and no complaints were heard of adverse effects front this
provision. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970). Such a remedy could be created by statutory amend-
ment or, alternatively, a court could construe Titles I, IV, and V as defining obligations
of all union members toward the rest of the union, violation of which gives rise to a
statutory tort. RESTATEIMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-86 (1965). Compensatory damages
are awarded under Title I for unfair disciplinary action and other consequential damage,
such as injury to reputation. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers Union, 350
F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965); Vars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 215 F. Supp. 943
(D. Conn.), aff'd, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963); Farowitz v. Local 802, Musicians, 24t F.
Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
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trary to law and describing what changes will be instituted in the re-
run. The DOL should also explain how the rerun procedures will
bettersafeguard the electoral process.5 51
(2) If the incumbent officers are candidates in the rerun election,
they will possess the advantage of access to union facilities, direct con-
tact with those conducting the election, and a certain legitimacy from
the fact that they are presiding over their own election.5 - To minimize
this advantage, the Department should take a more active role in the
process and insure that procedures for conducting the election do not
favor any particular candidate.5 3
(3) Accompanying the judicial order of a rerun election, the
Department should obtain injunctive relief to insure that misdoing
in the first election does not taint the rerun. Thus if misuse of the
newspaper occurred in the contested election, such action should be
enjoined in the rerun, and coverage for insurgent candidates required
as a compensatory measure. Similarly, prior misuse of union funds
should be enjoined and its deleterious effect mitigated by requiring
that misappropriated funds be restored to the union treasury.
G. An Overview of Administrative Enforcement
In only a minority of the Title IV election complaints brought
before the Department is the statutory remedy obtained. In 53.7 per
cent of the cases,5 4 violations are found by the Department but there
is no agreement for supervision of a subsequent election, and the
Department decides not to bring suit. In 24.5 per cent of the cases,
litigation is commenced by the Department. Most of these cases are
settled by a stipulation in which the union accepts Departmental
supervision of a subsequent election-increasingly, the next regularly
scheduled election. The remainder proceed to judicial decision and a
court-ordered rerun election. In either case, the significant delay
between the contested election and subsequent supervision makes the
device ineffective.
551. This technique has been used on occasion by courts to insure that union members
receive proper information on the circumstances of the rerun. Wirtz v. National Marl-
time Union, 284 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y.), all'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968). Sec also
Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 305 F. Supp. 868, 875-76 (D.D.C. 1969).
552. See note 526 supra.
553. In the Department's supervision of the 1969 rerun of a National Maritime Union
election, allegations were made that rerun procedures, while fair on their face, operated
discriminatorily against insurgents. The Department answered most of these charges hI
a lengthy statement by the election supervisor. Report from Benjamin B. Namnoff,
LMWP Regional Director, New York, to Frank M. Kleiler, Director, LMWP, June 2, 1969.
554. For complete disposition statistics, see Appendix B infra.
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Settlement by Formal Determination, when obtained, provides an
effective remedy for violations of Title IV. The resulting supervision,
almost always involving a rerun election, occurs fairly promptly after
the initial contest. An unscrupulous candidate who has violated the
statute in an attempt to steal the election is not allowed to use his
extended incumbency to enhance his position. The matter of demo-
cratic procedures and their initial violation has greater visibility.
This form of disposition is achieved, however, in only 18.5 per cent
of the Title IV cases. As an enforcement device, it has inherent limita-
tions. The Department can in no way compel settlement by Formal
Determination. It must either obtain the voluntary agreement of the
challenged union or rely on the power and willingness of the parent
organization to compel its offending local to agree to corrective action.
The Title IV process, then, seems to work best at giving unions an
opportunity to remedy election abuses on their own. It adds little
coercive force to that process.
IV. Internal Union Appeals
Congressional reliance on internal union mechanisms to remedy
election abuses, 555 a reliance heightened by DOL operating procedures,
requires that the focus of inquiry shift to an analysis of union griev-
ance procedures if a true picture of the enforcement of election guar-
antees is to be obtained. This section will examine the extent to
which substantive election safeguards are included in union consti-
tutions and bylaws, the internal structures available for the enforce-
ment of these guarantees, and the actual operation of the internal
appeals process.
A. Substantive Election Provisions in Union Constitutions
In 1965, the DOL surveyed seventy-three national union constitu-
tions to determine the extent to which they mandated local elections
requirements similar to those in the LMRDA. The study concluded:
[The constitutions] usually limit directions to prescribing the
constitutional officers, their terms of office, and financial good
standing qualification necessary for holding office and voting.
On the whole, they contain significantly fewer provisions estab-
555. Before a member may file an election complaint with the Secretary of Labor
under Title IV. he must have "exhausted the remedies available under the constitution
and bylaws" of the union, or invoke "such available remedies without obtaining a final
decision within three calendar months after their invocation." LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 482(a) (1970).
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lishing other qualifications required to hold office or vote, or
touching upon the procedural aspects of elections, and an even
lesser number of provisions . . . providing safeguards ensuring
fair elections.ri5
A majority of the constitutions contained only one provision spe-
cifically meant as an election safeguard. This provision, requiring
secret ballots, was included in forty-nine constitutions.5" Apart from
the secret ballot, national union constitutional guidelines only occa-
sionally guaranteed broader prerequisites of responsive elections.558
Provisions for adequate notice to members of nomination proceedings
were included in twenty-six constitutions, use of absentee ballots was
provided in ten instances, the method of nomination was stipulated
in thirty-four constitutions, and notice of the election itself was pro-
vided in only thirty-four of the seventy-three constitutions studied.
Only seven constitutions granted rights to equal distribution of litera-
ture and to inspection of the union membership list. Ten prohibited
use of union or employer funds in election campaigns, and measures
designed to prevent election day fraud-provisions for poll observers,
publication of election results, and preservation of election records-
were included in only twenty-four, six, and twenty-five constitutions
respectively.5 9 The DOL study properly concluded that
[p]rocedural matters and election safeguards are not generally
subjected to extended constitutional regulation by the parental
organizations.5 00
Despite the absence of these election guarantees in national consti-
tutions, further guarantees might be included in local and intermedi-
ate organization constitutions and bylaws. The DOL report notes,
556. DOL CONSTITUTION STUDY, supra note 72, at 8 (emphasis added).
557. Id. at 12. On the other hand, of the seventy-three constitutions, fifty-two named
the local officers, fifty-eight set out their terms of office, sixty-four required paid-up
dues to vote, forty-seven set minimum membership periods to vote, forty made certain
membership classes ineligible as voters, and forty specified the vote required for election.
Id. at 9, 12. None of these. specifications is intended to guarantee a fair, democratic
election. Rather, these provisions may at times prevent responsiveness. See pp. 428-44
supra.
558. Six of the seventy-three national constitutions have no provisions governing
local elections. Id. at 9, 12.
559. Id. at 12. The American Federation of Musicians has incorporated in its national
bylaws a provision that all elections must conform with the LMRDA. Interview with com-
plainant union member A. See also the Steelworkers' requirement that elections be in con-
formance with the Act, at note 614 infra.
560. DOL CONSnTUION STUDY, supra note 72, at 11. The study did find a trend
toward more inclusion of these guarantees in constitutions between passage of LMRDA
in 1959, and 1965; but the progress has been slow, and achievement of full inclusion Is
far off.
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however, that many locals do not have their own governing docu-
ments. A local is often guided only by unwritten traditions.601 It is
therefore unlikely that the gaps in national constitutions are filled
by local regulations.
Because of these substantive failings, members may be unable to
secure the prerequisites of electoral responsiveness by pursuing only
internal remedies, even if the union's appeals structures are proce-
durally fair and efficient. A member who feels aggrieved because of in-
adequate notice of nomination, discipline for free speech, use of union
funds to support a candidate, or other unfair procedures typically has
no internal standard on which to base an election protest. An internal
appeal could, of course, provide a satisfactory remedy if the clallenged
conduct violates the LMRDA and if union leaders choose to enforce
the statutory safeguards within the internal union process. The likeli-
hood of this private enforcement, however, would seem to be directly
related to the credibility of DOL intervention should the union fail
to respond.
B. Internal Appeals Structures
Internal appeals structures have long been available to union mem-
bers who have been disciplined by their locals. Special appeals pro-
cedures to contest infractions of election guarantees are not as com-
mon. The 1965 DOL study found special election appeals procedures
in only fifteen of the seventy-three constitutions surveyed.50 2 The
sample of unions surveyed for this Note contained a somewhat larger
proportion: eighteen of the twenty-nine national unions examined
had some special provision for appealing local union election deci-
sions5 63 The unions in this sample had established a variety of struc-
tures for handling election complaints.
1. Pre-Election Relief
a. Formal Pre-Election Appeals Structures
Only five of the twenty-nine unions examined have formal pre-
election appeals structures. Two limit their attention to complaints
561. Id. at 10.
562. Id. at 77-79. These fifteen constitutions, howcver, did cover forty per cent of
union members in the seventy-three unions in the study.
563. See pp. 531-32, 534-35 infra.
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about local rulings on matters of nomination and eligibility;50 4 the
other three allow more general complaints.505 The specified procedure
in four of the unions is for direct appeal to either the International
President (IP) or the International Executive Board (IEB),50 0 by.
passing the local and intermediate level organizations completely. The
other union requires that the appeal first be made to the local or inter-
mediate organization involved in the disputed election.50 7
b.. Formal Pre-Election Relief Through the General Appeals
Structure
In the absence of a special provision for pre-election appeals, a
formal appeal must follow the procedures prescribed in the union
constitution for the review of general grievances or disciplinary ac-
tions. These general appeals procedures may be ill-suited for appeal-
ing an election irregularity; yet, in the absence of a special election
appeals mechanism, they are the only formal means of protest open
to a member.5 8 These procedures normally call for a protest to com-
mence with the local and proceed through the union hierarchy 00
The regular appeals mechanism is typically incapable of disposing of
a pre-election complaint before the election is held.
c. Informal Pre-Election Relief
Although a national union constitution may provide no formal
means for appealing election irregularities before the election, an ag-
564. Uniform Local Constitution, Laborers' International, art. 12, § 8 (Oct. 17-21,
1966); Constitution, United Plumbers, as detailed in DOL CONSTITtION STUDY, supra
note 72, at 78.
565. Constitutions, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, art. 22, § 5(a) (3uly 4.7,
1966); Upholsterers' International Union, art. 49, § 2 (Sept. 1, 1966); and Hotel and Restau-
rant Employees Union, art. 20, § 11 (July 26, 1966). In five other constitutions studied,
there are special provisions for post-election appeals; however, the wording of each provi-
sion is ambiguous as to whether it also applies to pre-election appeals. All five constitu.
tions refer to the necessity of filing appeals within a certain time after the election; clearly
post-election appeals are contemplated. But, as the time limit on appeals is only a mini-
mum, the sections do not necessarily rule out appeals before the election. Constitutions,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, § 57(g) (Jan. 1, 1968); United Rubber Workers, art.
8, § 5(e) (Nov. 1, 1968); Amalgamated Transit Union, § 47 (Sept. 8-11, 1969); and United
Textile Workers, art. 14, § 8(a) (June 1970). For description of these routes of appeals,
see pp. 533-34 and notes 573-77 infra.
566. Constitutions, Laborers' International, supra note 564, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Upholsterers' International Union, and Hotel and Restaurant Employees
Union, supra note 565.
567. Constitution, United Plumbers, supra note 564.
568. In some unions, local election committees may grant pre-election relief, but the
intermediate or national officers do not take appeals before the election. Interview with
union attorney GG.
569. See p. 534 infra.
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grieved member may receive informal relief by directly asking a na-
tional staff representative,5 0 or a district or national officer, to pressure
local officials to correct election irregularities. In four unions inter-
viewed, national officers follow a policy of intervening in local elections
when they believe a grievance is justified.571 When notified of an
alleged irregularity, the national officer contacts the local officials and
gathers facts relevant to the charge. If he believes that an infraction of
union rules or federal law has occurred, he may order compliance
with the applicable provision. Similar informal remedial activities
probably take place in many other unions. While such informal inter-
vention is likely to be effective, it is not guided by any articulated
standards. Its effectiveness depends solely on the willingness and abil-
ity of national officers to insist on fair and democratic elections.
d. Trusteeship and Related Powers
Most union constitutions contain a provision empowering the na-
tional officers to suspend autonomy and take control of a local when
such action is "necessary" or the "situation requires." Often such provi-
sions explicitly authorize such action to "restore democratic proce-
dures," T2 and even when the constitution is not so specific, the lan-
guage of most provisions is broad erough to encompass such a goal.573
Although these measures to insure fair elections are considered an
extreme step by most unions, they do exist as possible means of pre-
election relief. Their drastic nature makes them a serious threat which
national officers can use to gain local union compliance, especially
when only informal pre-election remedies are otherwise available. On
the other hand, several of the union members interviewed complained
that the national unions often used the threat of trusteeship to intimi-
date dissident movements in local unions.574
570. In some unions, appeals of an infornmal nature arc made not to district or na-
tional officers but to the national staff representatives, who are often able to solve the
problem. Interviews with union officers A and P.
571. Interviews with union attorneys R, S, and AA; letters from officials of the In-
ternational Woodworkers and Amalgamated Transit Union, infra note 587.
572. Constitutions, Laborers' International, art. 9, § 7 (Oct. 17-21. 19M36); United Steel-
workers, art. 9, § I (Aug. 22, 1968); United Textile Workers, art. 7, § 4 (June 1970); and
Service Employees Union, art. 8, § 7.
573. Constitutions, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, art. 6 (July 26, 1966):
International Woodworkers, art. 2, § 7 (June 1970); Amalgamated Tratsit Union, § 28
(Sept. 8-11, 1969); United Brotherhood of Carpenters, § l0J (Jan. 1, 1968); and Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, art. 9, § 7 (Sept. 1966).
574. See further discussion of trusteeships, note 614 infra.
533
The Yale Law Journal
2. Post-Election Relief
Because post-election remedies often necessitate a rerun of the con-
tested election-a disruptive event in the life of any union-there is
little chance that an aggrieved member can obtain post-election relief
informally. Therefore, the primary means of achieving internal post-
election relief is through one of two formal appeals processes.
a. Special Post-Election Appeals Structures
In eighteen of the twenty-nine national unions surveyed there is a
special procedure for appealing the conduct of an election after its
completion. Of these eighteen constitutions, seven do not require ap-
peal first to the local involved, but instead permit direct appeal to
the IP or the IEB.575 Three others require an initial appeal to the
local and then permit a direct appeal of the local determination to the
IP or IEB.570 The other six require a preliminary decision by the
local and an appeal to either an intermediate body at the district level
or to the IP, with final review by the IEB or a public review board.57
b. General Post-Election Appeals Structures
In the absence of special appeals procedures for complaints of elec-
tion misconduct, the aggrieved member must pursue post-election
complaints through the mechanism established by the union for ap-
peals of general grievances or disciplinary actions. These general ap-
peals processes normally involve an appeal first to the local and then to
at least two review bodies. 578
575. Constitutions, Laborers' International, art. 12, § 8 (Oct. 17-21, 1966); National
Maritime Union, art. 12, § 22 (Oct. 1969); Upholsterers' International Union, art. 49,
§ 2 (Sept. 1, 1966); descriptions of constitutional provisions of the United Plumbers,
DOL CONSTITUTION STUDY, supra note 72, at 78; and of the International Union of
Boilermakers, International Union of Electrical Workers, and Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LOCAL UNION ELECTION APPEALS 23, 30, 31 (1966).
576. Constitutions, Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, art. 20, § 11 (July 26,
1966); and United Rubber Workers, art. 8, § 50(e) (Nov. 1, 1968); and description of
the constitutional provisions of the United Steelworkers (which do not require a hearing
at local level) in DOL CONSTITUTION STUDY, supra note 72, at 78.
577. Constitutions, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, § 57G (Jan. 1, 1968); United
Textile Workers, art. 14, § 8 (June 1970); Amalgamated Transit Union, § 84 (Sept. 8.11,
1969); International Woodworkers, art. 13, § 6 (June 1970); International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, art. 22, § 5(b) (July 4-6, 1966); and description of the constitutional pro.
visions of the United Automobile Workers, DOL ELECTION APPEALS STUDY, stipra note
575, at 26.
The other two constitutions include special election appeals procedures, but our In-
formation does not indicate the exact appeals route to be followed. Constitutions, In.
ternational Operating Engineers and International Brotherhood of Painters, id. at 12,
22. See also note 616 infra.
578. Eleven of the twenty-nine unions on which we have data have no special elcction
appeals provisions. They do, however, have general appeals processes:
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The 1965 DOL study of internal union appeals focused on the time
required for exhaustion of internal remedies.Y0 The DOL tried to iso-
late the types of internal appeals structures which facilitate the ex-
haustion of internal union remedies before the filing of complaints
under § 402 (a) (1).8 0 It found five characteristics common to internal
appeals structures which handled post-election complaints expedi-
tiously: (1) the existence of special procedures applicable to election
complaints; (2) two or less steps before final decision; (3) rigid limits
both on the time allowed members in filing appeals and the time per-
mitted for appellate bodies to reach a decision;asl (4) decision at the
One union, the Iron Workers, provides for direct appeals to the IP. DOL E.Ecno.
APiEALs STUDY, supra note 575, at 30.
One union bypasses the local but still requires a three.step appeals process. Constitu-
tion, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, art. 27, § 12 (Sept. 1966).
Three unions provide two-step appeals processes from loca to IEB. Constitutions,
Lithographers, § 18.8; International Typographical Union, art. 11 (Jan. 1. 1970), and
description of the appeals process of the Musicians, DOL ELEciox At't'-As Srotv, supra
note 575, at 31.
Four unions provide indeterminate appeals processes which may require from one to
three steps. Constitutions, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, art. 12 (May 29, 1970): Sen ice
Employees Union, arts. 8 and 16; and descriptions of appeals processes of the Interna-
tional Longshoreman's Association and the Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers0
DOL ELcriox APrAs STUDY, supra note 575, at 30.
One union provides a four-step appeals process. Constitution, United Mine Workers,
arts. 6 and 18 (Sept. 9, 1968).
One union provides a three-step appeal from local to IP to IEB. description of appeals
provisions of the Stage Employees Alliance, DOL EEcrox ArPEArs STUDY, supra note
575, at 32.
579. The study lauded those appeals mechanisms expeditious enough to achieve a
final determination within the three months required before a complainant can file a
§ 402 complaint with the DOL: " 'Justice delayed is justice denied.' This is, in part, the
theme of section 402(a) of Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959." Preface to DOL ELEcTiON At, ,EALS STUDY, supra note 575. The study indi-
cates that forty-nine per cent of all complaints are filed with the DOL more than three
but less than four months after the election, ten per cent are filed betw'een two and
three months, nineteen per cent between four and five months and eight per cent be-
tween five and six months. Id. at 15.
580. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(1) (1970). Of the ninety-four complaints filed after internal
exhaustion under § 402(a)(1), DOL ELETeIoN At-,EAts STUDY, supra note 575, at 24, shows
seven required one month or less to exhaust, twenty-three took between one and two
months, twenty-six required between two and three months, sixteen took between three
and four months, seven took between four and five months, four required between five
and six months, and eleven took more than six months to reach exlaution.
Some unions provide that all appeals may be taken to the national convention. How-
ever, because national conventions are often held only once every three or four years.
LMWP does not regard appeal to the convention as an "available" remedy under §
402(a)(1). Id. at 10. Consequently, all references herein to two-, three- or four-step ap-
peals processes do not include the convention step.
581. Most nationals place time limits on their members for filing appeals. These are
often ineffective as a means of expediting appeals, as delay is more often caused by the
appellate body than by the complainant. The Boilermakers constitution puts time limits
on both members and appellate bodies, and most of its appeals are exhausted within
three months. DOL ELEctroN AtEAvs STUDY, supra note 575, at 35-37.
Although time limits are often beneficial to the complainant in expediting relief or
achieving exhaustion so he can appeal to the DOL, the) can be a :nixed blessing. Rigid
time limits on complainant appeals put great pressure on a member trying to amass
data and properly present his case. And, if union authorities are rushed by time restric-
tions, they may be hasty in investigative duties and fail to make a judicious decision
based on all the facts.
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national level by the IP rather than the IEB;5s2 and (5) elimination
of the initial appeal to the local union trial body.583
C. The Union Appeals Process in Operation
Rigorous evaluation of the internal union appeals process would
require more data than are available and would require some way
of determining whether the processes were fair. This Note cannot
pretend to wholly answer the questions of effectiveness and fairness.
Nonetheless, the bare skeleton of the appeals structure can be 'supple-
mented with a description of operational characteristics garnered from
field interviews-characteristics which are relevant to the speed, thor.
oughness, and even-handedness of the internal union procedures.
More than 25,000 labor union elections are held each year,584 and
only about 100 result in complaints to the DOL5S8 Of the other elec-
tions, some unknown number produce no violations, and some pro-
duce violations about which no complaints are made. Available data
indicate that some 1,000 to 2,000 complaints are raised each year be-
yond the local level of the union hierarchy, although it seems clear
that more are raised at the local level but are not carried fttrther.5NtI
National union counsel estimate that between five and twenty-five
per cent of the complaints advanced beyond the local level are eventu-
ally deemed justified by the internal mechanism of the union.587 There
582. The IP can act immediately, while IEB actions must await periodic meeting dates.
Id. at 35.
583. Id. at 33-37.
584. According to the 1969 DIRECrORY, supra note 29, at 78, there are more than 75,000
locals in U.S. unions. LMRDA § 401(b), 29 U.S.C. § 481(b), states that each local must
hold an election at least once every three years.
585. See Appendix B infra.
586. This estimate is based on the figures in note 587 infra, extrapolating front the
number of locals and number of internal appeals per year in ten unions to the total nunt-
ber of locals in the United States-75,000.
587. Internal
# of Appeals % Fond % Appealed
Union Locals* Per Yeart Justified- to DOLt
Textile Workers 702 2.4 pre 10% 0%(TWUA) 8-10 post
Woodworkers 235 6 post 25% (1 in 11 yrs)
Clothing Workers 797 1 33% 66%
Hotel Workers 482 30 pre 5% 0%
45 post J% 0%Electricians (IBEW) 1,701 10 20% 20%
Upholsterers 189 % 0% 100%
Newspaper Guild 83 10 pre 10-20% 0%0
3-4 post
Laborers 920 60-70 30%
Autoworkers 1,504 20-25 20% ?
Steelworkers 3,600 25-80 55% 10%
* U.S. DEt"T OF LABOR, I)IRE'ORY OF NATIONAL AND INIERNATIONAL LAIOR UNIONS
.x iE UNITED STES 1969 (1970).
t Only internal appeals which got to the international level are included. Figures for
the first seven unions are for recent years. Letters to Yale Law Journal fronm Palticia
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appears to exist, then, a large pool of complaints which the union
views as unjustified yet which never reach the DOL. If these complaints
are unmeritorious, there is little cause for alarm. While it is impossible
to evaluate precisely the extent to which the internal union appeals
process fairly weeds out unmeritorious complaints, certain character-
istics of the process are not reassuring.
Most internal appeals begin at the local level, with an appearance
before the local election board, the local officers, or a meeting of the
membership. Union leaders argue that this is a valuable initial step
because it notifies the incumbent officers against whom the complaint
is often directed of the violations alleged and the evidence available
to support them. If the charges are persuasive, the incumbents will
theoretically be encouraged to settle and avoid intervention by the
national or the DOL.58 8 Union members suggested, however, that
this step is typically futile. They note that incumbents are unlikely
to be sympathetic to complaints about the manner in which the elec-
don was conducted, especially if the reviewing officers were elected
in the challenged election. Trial committees or election boards, often
appointed by the incumbents, are equally unlikely to be sympathetic.
Even if the complaint is made at a meeting of the entire membership,
such meetings are typically not well attended. The incumbents will
often be in control and can table any objection to the conduct of the
election.589
It is thus necessary for most complainants to appeal beyond the local
level. While some appeals are to intermediate level union organiza-
E. Eames, General Counsel, United Textile Workers, Feb. 2, 1971; William Botkin, Sec-
retary-Treasurer, International Woodworkers, Feb. 2, 1971; Richard S. Hoffman, Counsel,
Upholsterers International Union, Feb. 3, 1971; Jacob Sheinkman, General Counsel,
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Feb. 3, 1971; Irvin Leuchter, General Counsel, American
Newspaper Guild, Feb. 3, 1971; JAW. Brown, General Counsel. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees, Feb. 12, 1971; Earle W. Putnam, General Counsel. Amalgamated Transit
Union, Feb. 8, 1971; Laurence J. Cohen, Sherman, Dunn & Cohen, General Counsel,
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Feb. 12, 1971. All figures are approximate; the table
is meant only to show a general pattern. Figures for the last three unions arc from
Brief for AFL-CIO as amicus curiae at 30, Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers, 389
U.S. 463 (1968), Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers, 389 U.S. 477 (1968). Laborers' figures are
for 1961 to 1966; Autoworkers for 1963 to 1966; Steelworkers for 1964 to 1967. Although
the data does not indicate the percentage of cases appealed to DOL, the government
won three Laborers and one Autoworkers case in those years.
588. Interviews with union attorneys P and GG. Appeals to a local trial body could
prove valuable in compiling information on the claimed election irregularity; but, be-
cause local officials are generally unsympathetic to the complaints, they often do not
bother to establish a record before dismissing appeals.
589. Interviews with complainant union member B and union officer H; questionnaire
from complainant union member HH.
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tions, relief is more usually obtained at the national level."O0 For this
reason, the efficacy of the internal union appeals process will depend
largely on the thoroughness of the investigation conducted by the
national, the power and willingness of the national to intervene in
the affairs of the local, and the remedies available to correct election
irregularities. The efficacy of internal appeals comes to be more a
matter of the political structure of the union than of the architecture
of the appeals system.
The scope of the national's investigation seems to vary substantially
among unions. Some national general counsels suggested that they will
go beyond the specific allegations made in an election complaint and
investigate all phases of the contested election. 91 But the general rule
appears to be one of substantial faith in the local incumbents and little
independent investigation. Instances have been discovered where no in-
vestigation at all was made and election records were not even exam-
ined.592 Unless the complainant is well prepared with proof of his
charges, he may lose an election appeal because the national makes
no effort to independently search for evidence of his claims. Com-
plainants as a class are unlikely to have adequate investigative resources
at their disposal, and their ability to prevail within the union is
thereby diminished.9 3
Even when a proper showing is made before the national, remedial
action is not certain. While most nationals have the formal authority
to intervene in local affairs, their ability to exercise this power varies.
The CIO nationals tend to be strong, and power in these unions flows
from the top down. 594 Other nationals have far less control over their
component locals, and in some unions the national is not even per-
mitted to investigate local affairs. 90 Constitutional powers aside, the
political consequences of defying strong local leadership may deter
national officers from reversing the outcome of a local election.
590. Of the election appeals carried beyond the local level, the typical pattern is for
between thirty-three and fifty per cent to be resolved at the intermediate level and the
other fifty to sixty-sLx per cent at the national level. Information from letters of general
counsel of the Electricians-IBEW, Textile Workers, Woodworkers, and Hotel Workers,
supra note 587.
591. Letter from Laurence J. Cohen, supra note 587.
592. Painters District 9 Study, supra note 156, at 69-73.
593. Cf. Wirtz v. Guild of Variety Artists, 267 F. Supp. 527, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
where the union claimed appeals had not been exhausted because complainants had not
produced proof or witnesses for their claim. The court rejected the claim, saying neither
Title IV nor the union constitution required proof or witnesses, and noting the com-
plainants lack a subpoena power.
594. Interview with union attorney S.
595. Interview with union attorney X.
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Whether the intervention is through the formal appeals mechanism
or by informal means, union leaders often shrink from supervising
local politics.596 Unless national officers or their legal counsel are
committed to procedural fairness and implementation of LMRDA
guarantees, they are likely to allow local election decisions to stand.*,,
There is little pressure placed on the national by the LMRDA, as
a Title IV suit, if one is brought at all, will probably name the local as
defendant.5g8
When a national is willing to get involved in local election prac-
tices, the evaluative question becomes one of the national's fairness
with respect to the parties involved. National officers contend they
are free to be even-handed in local election disputes because the
national has little stake in the outcome, and minimal preference as
to who is actually elected.O9 Because of the rapid turnover in local
leadership, national officers claim they cannot afford to become tied
to individual candidates,000 but this claim is open to doubt.00'
The fairness of national intervention is more suspect in connection
with intermediate level elections, because intermediate level offices
are highly political. If factions exist within the union, faction affilia-
tions will appear at the intermediate level and may determine the
disposition of an election complaint by the national -.00 2 National offi-
596. TAFT, supra note 69, at 133.
597. Often such cases involve eligibility restrictions that bar certain groups within
the union from seeking office, as apprentices or branch members. To remove such
restrictions is to alter the distribution of control within the union and to change its
political dynamics. The group that will have its power position diminished will oppose
the change vigorously, and the national leadership jeopardizes itself politically if it
voluntarily undertakes such a change. Even if the leadership agrees that the requirement
is too restrictive, it will prefer to be forced by a court to alter the provision rather than
assume the risk of voluntarily making the change. Interview with union attorney U.
598. The Act provides, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970), that the suit be brought against the
offending union "as an entity." However, courts have pennitted parent organiiations to
intervene on the side of a defendant local. Shultz v. Local 6799, Steelworkers, 71 L.R.R.M.
280 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 403 US.
333 (1971).
599. The exception to this general rule is the disproportionately large local, which
may be both a constituency and a financial base for permanent opposition to the in-
cumbent national leadership. An example of such a local is local 600 of the UAIW
during the early years of the Reuther presidency.
600. Interviews with union attorneys D, R, and PP.
601. Questionnaire from complainant union member V. This complainant was chal-
lenged under the union's eligibility rules after winning an election for business agent.
The national president ruled that the incumbent should retain his position despite his
defeat in the election, telling the complainant that he, the president, was "the Supreme
Judicial Power and what he ruled was law." Complainant protested to the DOL. which
ruled the action illegal, but agreed to allow the incumbent business agent to remain
in office if the national would oversee the next local election.
602. Interviews with union officers N and 0; Brooks, Impartial Public Review ofInternal Union Disputes: Experiments in Democratic Self-Discipline, 22 Oino ST. L.J.
64, 71-73 (1961).
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cials are more likely to call for a rerun when the administration-backed
candidate has lost the original election,0 03 and thus dispose of the mat-
ter with little regard to the merits of the underlying complaint.00-1
Even if the internal appeals process worked speedily, with thorough
investigation and even-handed adjudication by the national, its effi-
cacy would depend upon the availability of remedies for election ir-
regularities. The remedies available to the national are rarely specified
in the constitution, even where there are special election appeals pro-
visions.605 Where remedies are mentioned in union constitutions, they
may be phrased vaguely. 60 Some union general counsel stated that
the national could order a rerun of the contested election or other
"appropriate remedies," including forbidding the tally of tainted bal-
lots or placing an improperly disqualified candidate on the ballot. 0 7
Because the available remedies are unspecified, however, their use
depends almost entirely on the inclinations of the officials involved.
As a rerun is an expensive and disrupting device, nationals may be
reluctant to order them. 008 Yet any lesser remedy may be ineffective
in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. Because remedies
are left to the discretion of the national, the complainant has little
basis on which to contest the adequacy of the relief granted.
D. Recommendations
The LMRDA's reliance on union self-correction of election abuses
is defensible only when there is some reason to believe that internal
union procedures are adequate. While the foregoing discussion
hardly constitutes proof that all internal union appeals systems
603. Interviews with union officers N and 0 and union attorney DD.
604. When the election protest involves a national election, the same problem arlses
as in appeals to local bodies of local elections: the complainant is often askinu the in-
cumbents to rule against their own supporters, or against the election result which made
them victorious. It is very unlikely that any national officer will order himself to rerun
in an election.
605. See, e.g., Constitutions, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, § 57G (Jan. 1, 1968);
Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, art. 20, § 11 (May 23-27, 1966); and Uniform
Local Union Constitution, Laborers International, art. 12, § 8 (Oct. 17-21, 1966).
606. Constitution, Upholsterers' International Union, art. 49 (Sept. 1, 1966), provides
that if union laws have been violated or "fair and equitable principles" not followed In
an election, a member "may seek the remedy thereof." Constitution, United Textile
Workers, art. 14, § 8(a) (June 1970), provides specifically for reruns "if it is determined
that the matter complained of might reasonably have affected the outcome." Although
it seems common for unions to apply a "may have affected" test before ordering a
rerun, they need not. INTFERPRrAaivE MANUAL, supra note 298, at § 475.420 specifically
states that internally ordered reruns need not depend on "may have affected" violations
as long as they are in accord with the union constitution.
607. Letters from William Botkin, JAV. Brown and Laurence J. Cohen, supra note 587.
608. Interview with union officer L.
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are inadequate, or even that most of them are, it does suggest several
ways in which those systems might be improved to increase the likeli-
hood of speedy, 09 thorough, and fair resolution of member complaints:
(1) Union constitutions should be amended to include specific
provisions guaranteeing the prerequisites of responsive elections.0 10
(2) An appeals procedure specifically designed to handle election
cases should be included in union constitutions.
(3) This' appeals structure should provide for both pre- and post-
election appeals.
(a) Pre-election appeals should by-pass the local and be directed
to the International President (IP). His decision could be appealed
upon completion of the election by providing that the International
Executive Board (IEB) or some other appropriate body would have
the power of review. This would serve to check the exercise of im-
proper discretion by the president and to limit his intervention to
cases with clear violations, while providing pre-election relief in such
cases so that the local can avoid the expense and disruption of a rerun.
(b) The post-election structure should require a notice period
to the local union (of perhaps a week) in which time the local would be
able to attempt to remedy any violations that might have occurred,
but no formal appeal should be required to the local. Appeal should
be to either the chief executive officer of the intermediate organization,
and then to the IP, or directly to the IP,611 if the union's intermediate
level organization is an inappropriate one to decide election dis-
609. The DOL ELECTION APPEALS STUDY, supra note 575. at 3941, concludes:
[T]here does not appear to be any indication that labor organizations. in general,
are currently processing their members' election protests more expeditiously than
during the period immediately following the passage of the LMRDA in September
1959 . . . . No trend is discernible which would indicate that there will be any
significant change in either the average number of days taken by the members to
file appeals to higher union authorities, or the average time taken by the organiza-
tions in processing their members' election protests and rendering decisions.
610. If an election guarantee is included in a union constitution, it is enforceable
before election in a state court, as LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970). retains state
remedies for a member who wishes to enforce the union's contractual obligation to him
under the constitution. For further discussion, see pp. 554-56 infra.
611. Although it might seem appropriate to have an appeal to an apolitical trial board
before appeal to the IP, especially when dealing with highly politicized intermediate
elections, there are factors which militate against such a step. First, trial boards would
take considerable time to arrange and would take longer to deliberate. Second, almost
any trial board appointed by the national union will in any event tend to givc de-
cisions favorable to the national leaders; the net result may only be a wasted, time-
consuming effort. Third, final appeal to a public review board or the IEB should
provide an equally fair procedure; as not all complaints would go this far, the resulting
system would be expected to operate more quickly. Yet the possibility of being overruled
would act as a check on the IPs discretion.
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putes.1 2 Subsequent appeal would then be to the IEB or public re-
view board. Appeal to the convention should be viewed as extraor-
dinary, considering the long delay entailed. Such an appeal should be
optionally available to a complaining party but not required for ex-
haustion.
(4) A handbook or election manual should be prepared for the
membership informing them of the substantive guarantees in the
union's constitution and the procedures to be followed in election
appeal cases. 613
(5) The national should be given the constitutional powers to ful-
fill its role in the appeals process, including:
(a) the power to investigate local elections,
(b) a specified assortment of remedies including the power to
order a rerun election, and
(c) the authority to observe, supervise, or actually conduct an
election.
(6) The remedial powers of the national should not include the
power to impose a trusteeship on the local or to assume control of its
finances and administration because of election abuses. The trustee-
ship device creates significant risks of compromising internal union
democracy. The power to observe and conduct a specific election should
be adequate to insure democratic.conditions.014
612. Some intermediate union organizations act as service staff for the locals, have
an administrative structure, and would be capable of investigating and adjudicating.
Other intermediate organizations serve only as lobbying arms or information clearing.
houses and would not have the staff organizations appropriate for this task. lARIuASI,
supra note 66, at 63.
613. The Steelworkers have prepared such manuals. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL UNION ELECTION MANUAL (1967) and INTERNATIONAL UNION ELECTIONS MANUAL
(1968). The manuals include rules on eligibility, conventions, notices of election and
nomination, balloting, appeals, mailing lists and nomination procedures. They also
explain how the LMRDA applies to election procedures.
614. Although the imposition of a trusteeship may be a very potent tool for a national
seeking to restore democratic practices, that same potency makes use of the trusteeship
method unwise except in the most extreme instances. In writing Title III of the LMRDA,
Congress realized both the benefits and evils of trusteeships. They provide a primary
weapon for ridding local unions of graft, corruption or demagoguery. However, if
needlessly imposed, continued for undue lengths of time, or wrongfully used as tools
of internal politics, they can infringe on the independence of a local. Moss, Union
Trusteeships: Title III of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
4 SUF. U.L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1969); Beaird, Union Trusteeship Provisions of the Labor-Manage.
tient Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 2 GA. L. REV. 469, 485-99 (1968).
While seeking to maintain the trusteeship device when necessary, Congress granted
a federal right of local autonomy by limiting the purposes for which trusteeships could
be imposed, LMRDA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1970), and providing means by which a
member could request the DOL to sue, or could himself bring suit to have the trusteeshlp
enjoined. LMRDA § 304, 29 U.S.C. § 464 (1970). This alternate remedies provision, ar-
lowing individual suits even when an administrative remedy exists, contrasts with the
Title IV mechanism which allows only the DOL to bring suit post-election. For further
discussion of the remedies, see Moss, supra at 24-32; Beaird, supra at 516-20.
Congress granted a presumption of validity for the first eighteen months if a trusteeship
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(7) The appeals process should include time limits for decision by
the appellate bodies themselves, with the objective of insuring that
an appeal would be processed through the stage of decision by the IP
before appeal to DOL becomes available.
(8) Should the union require a further appeal to the IEB or to a
public review board, this process could be continued even after a com-
plaint has been filed with the DOL, since disposition by the union
while the complaint is pending with the DOL could result in termina-
tion of the Title IV proceeding., 1
(9) Unions should consider instituting public review boards, em-
ploying means of selection and procedures of appeal which assure
maximum independence to the boards.0 10
was established in conformity with the union constitution and after a fair hearing. After
eighteen months, however, the union must show "clear and convincing proof that the
continuance of the trusteeship is necessary for a purpose allowable under Section S02.."
LMRDA § 304(c), 29 U.S.C. § 464(c) (1970).
As one of the allowable purposes for institution of a trusteeship under Section 30 is
"restoring democratic procedure," the device has been used in election contexts. Fifty
trusteeships, seven per cent of trusteeships reported to the DOL, were imposed for that
purpose. U.S. DEt,'T OF LABOR, UNION TnusrEsn's: A RERT r O CoNoRit n" TIlE
SECRETARY OF LABOR 60-61 (1962). Local autonomy was suspended to prevent ballot
stuffing and tampering, provide orderly union meetings, and supervise renms. Such
action was approved in Sawyer v. Grand Lodge, Machinists, 279 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Mo.
1967). involving chaotic local meetings, but was not approved in Parker v. Teamsters
Union, 229 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1963), where the Teamsters sought to perpetuate a
defeated slate of candidates when ballots were stolen while the lights were out.
Schonfeld v. Raferty, 271 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967),
highlights the dangers of trusteeships in election contexts. The court found the trustee-
ship had been imposed to keep an indicted chief district officer in power despite efforts
by insurgents to install new leadership. For further details, see Painters' District 9 Study,
supra note 156, at 31-44. In the United Mine Workers, nineteen of twenty-three districts
are under trusteeships; seven of the districts have been under trusteeships since 1941.
Each of these districts has a president and a secretary-treasurer who arc appointed by
the national president, rather than elected within the district. The national union
directly controls these intermediate organizations by the power of the purse. Hearings
on UMW Election, supra note 2, at 21-23 (Feb. 5, 1970) (testimony of Joseph A. "Chip"
Yablonski); Beaird, supra at 507; Moss, supra at 9. The national union can and has
threatened to throw the autonomous districts into trusteeships if an insurgent slate is
elected. Interview with complainant union member M. The DOL filed suit to upset
seven of the UMW trusteeships on Dec. 15. 1964, but said it wnas ready to go to trial
only recently. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1971, at 35, col. 2. In the meantime, private suits to
challenge these trusteeships have been prevented by LMRDA q 306, 29 U.S.C. § 466
(1970), which cuts off alternative remedies once the Secretary has filed suit. This inability
of the DOL to remedy the most shocking abuse of trusteeships in the nation demon-
strates how dangerous they may be to local autonomy and democracy.
Because trusteeships are so susceptible to abuse, it seems unwise for them to be used
in administering pre- or post-election remedies. It should be adequate for the national
to send observers if election abuses are anticipated. If the observers' presence in itself
does not stop election abuses, the national can use its normal disciplinary procedures
against recalcitrant members. (See Moss, supra at 10-13, and Beaird, supra at 502-12, on
what constitutes a trusteeship under the law.)
615. Sometimes the national stops its appeals process once complaint is made to the
DOL. Interview with complainant union member A.
616. Public review boards (PRB's) constitute an attempt by labor organizations to
have voluntary impartial review of union decisions and practices not involving collective
bargaining. The best known PRB is the United Autoworkers', established in 1937. Sec
J. ST1FBER, W. OBFRE, & M. HARRINGIoN, DasociAcY AND Puriac Rx%'LEtv (1960). The
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If such improvements were made, the congressional deference to
internal appeals would be warranted, as an efficacious internal appeals
process is the best method for handling election complaints. Internal
appeals allow union leaders close to the problems to solve them, avoid
time-consuming resort to government intervention, minimize legal
expenses, and create within a union an environment conducive to
responsiveness. But until such modifications are adopted, it must be
concluded that congressional reliance on union self-correction and
DOL deference to internal union remedies are largely misplaced, as
these procedures provide inadequate protection for the guarantees
of electoral responsiveness.
UAW Board is composed of prominent citizens appointed by the national president. It
handles appeals from decisions of the union's IEB and reviews on its own initiative or
at the IEB's suggestion violations of the AFL-CIO ethical practices code. Id. at 9. Among
appeals the PRB has handled are claims of election misconduct. Id. at 16.
A PRB can serve several functions. It can force union appeal bodies to be more
conscientious because they realize that an outside board will review their decisions. It
can discover and publicize failings in the union constitution and bylaws. And It can
make members more aware of and willing to exert their rights under the union's con-
stitution. Id. at 30-32, 51-64. The Board can also relieve pressure on union officials by
allowing them to avoid making unpopular decisions, knowing that the PRB will reverse
them and take the blame for the unpopular result. In the election context, this might
be significant, since even fair, conscientious leaders might be reluctant to find against
their friends and supporters in a district or local election. Interview with union attorney
X. See also Brooks, supra note 602, at 84-96.
Despite the UAW's glowing praise for its PRB, UNITED AuiOWORKERS, A MoRE PERFrsar
UNION . . . THE UAW AND PUBLIC REVIEW BOARD, WlY, WHAT, How (1960), few unions
have such bodies. Many union leaders resent the idea that outsiders should review their
decisions or interfere in union affairs. Interviews with union attorney AA and union
officer B. However, support for PRB's was voiced by union members interviewed. In-
terviews with complainant union members D, I, and K; union attoiney II; complainant
attorney K; and union officers F and P.
The efficacy of PRB's in election appeals cases depends on a number of factors. First,
its members must be honest and impartial. If they are appointed by the national presi.
dent, who is likely not to welcome "outsiders," Board members are likely to be friends of
the incumbent administration. The potential for behind-the-scenes dealing with Board
members always exists. Interviews with complainant union members D, 1, and K and
union attorney P. Second, the Board will be limited unless it is aggressive in pushing
the union to adopt fair and comprehensive election rules. PRB's are normally set up
to enforce the union's own rules; if those rules are inadequate, the Board is stytled
unless it can pressure the union to amend them. STIEDER, supra at 30. Third, the Board
will be limited unless it has the resources to investigate claims and the procedures to
receive meaningful evidence. The UAW allows lawyers to present evidence before the
PRB, but it does not allow cross-examination of witnesses. Interview with union officer D.
Use of a PRB will inevitably involve time delays, especially if union leaders grow to
rely on it to be the body which orders reruns or other equitable remedies. The extra
step in the appeals process may involve six to eighteen months to resolve election dis-
putes. Interview with union attorney AA. But if a PRB is well constituted, institution
of such overseers can be a valuable adjunct to union appeals processes. It can be useftl
in establishing an environment within the union which encourages active participation
in the electoral process. Self-improvement through institution of PRB's seems called for
in the union movement. However, as Lipset, The Law and Trade Union Democracy,
47 VA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1961), points out:
Impartial review boards and/or enforced formal rights of opposition and due process
exist in those unions that need them least, such as the UAW, Upholsterers Inter.
national Union, the International Typographical Union or the American Newspaper
Guild. The unions which most need elaborate and realistic safeguards protectIIg
basic rights are least likely to establish them.
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V. Pre-Election Judicial Intervention
In addition to Title IV suits and internal union appeals procedures,
there is a third potential source of relief for election abuses-private
lawsuits brought before the election by union members.017 The more
serious the flaws in the Title IV and internal union appeals procedures,
the more it falls to this avenue of redress to insure fair elections. Pre-
election judicial relief, however, has been severely and unnecessarily
restricted by judicial interpretation of the LMRDA.
A statutory basis for challenging union election practices can be
found most readily in either Title I or Title IV of the Act. Section
101 (a) (1) of Title I guarantees, among other things, that "[e]very
member of a labor organization shall have equal rights . . . to nom-
inate candidates [and] to vote in elections.., subject to reasonable rules
and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws."018
These provisions overlap with similar guarantees in Title IV that "a
reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candi-
dates and every member in good standing... shall have the right to
vote for . . . candidates of his choice . ... 09 But, whereas Title I
may be enforced by a private, pre-election suit,02 0 Title IV relies pri-
marily upon an action by the Department of Labor to set aside the
contested election.021 For violations which are arguably covered by
both titles, pre-election relief would seem to be available on the face
of the statute, either by couching the complaint as a violation of Title
I and bringing a private suit, or by bringing the complaint as a Title
IV violation and arguing for the general availability of pre-election
judicial relief under that title.0 2 2
617. Private post-election suits are apparently precluded by LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C.
§ 483 (1970):
No labor organization shall be required by law to conduct elections of officers with
greater -frequency or in a different form or manner than is required by its own
constitution or bylaws, except as otherwise provided by this subchapter. Existing
rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization
with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected by the
provisions of this subchapter. The remedy provided by this subchapter for challenging
an election already conducted shall be exclusive.
618. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970).
619. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970). Virtually all violations of Title I will also be violations
of Title IV. Harvard Note, supra note 497, at 1625.
620. Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have
been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a
district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be
appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the
district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation oc-
curred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
621. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
622. Note, Union Elections under the LMRDA, 74 YALE L.J. 1282, 1284 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Yale Note].
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The former avenue of relief was narrowed and the latter foreclosed
by the Supreme Court in Calhoon v. Harvey. 23 There, a pre-election
suit was brought challenging a union's rigid self-nomination and can-
didate eligibility requirements under § 101 (a) (1).024 The Court con.
strued the Title I provision as prohibiting only discrimination in the
right to nominate and held that discrimination was not shown because
the same qualifications were required equally of all members of the
union.625 The complaint, which challenged the reasonableness of the
eligibility requirement, was held to state a claim under Title IV
only.(20 Pre-election enforcement of the Title IV provision was pre-
cluded by the Court's holding that the administrative remedy of § 402
was the "exclusive method for protecting Title IV rights. -0 21 Since
that remedy can be invoked only after the contested election,"", direct
pre-election enforcement of Title IV rights was totally barred.02
The Court in Calhoon also seemed to eliminate virtually all possi-
bility of indirect pre-election enforcement of election guarantees
623. 379 U.S. 134 (1964), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 984 (1964).
624. Plaintiffs were members of the National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association,
a maritime union. The union bylaws deprived a member of the right to nominate
anyone for office but himself. The union constitution provided in addition that no
member could be eligible for nomination or election to full-time elective office unless
he had been a member of the union for five years and had served 180 days or more of
sea time in each of two of the preceding three years on vessels covered by collective
bargaining agreements with the union. Id. at 135-36.
625. Id. at 139. As Justice Stewart pointed out in his concurrence, the majority opinion
would thus shield from Title I attack an eligibility requirement which said that only
incumbents could be nominated, as long as it was applied equally to all candidates whon
members wished to nominate. Id. at 143. This narrow reading was not mandated by the
statute, as the Supreme Court has indicated in striking down subtle voting discriminations
in the public sector under similar equal rights provisions. See id. at 143 (Stewart, 3.,
concurring) and cases cited therein.
626. Id. at 139-40. It should be noted that the result reached in Calhoon can be
supported on the narrow ground that the legislative history of the LMRDA specifically
indicates that Congress intended the reasonableness of eligibility requirements to be
determined only under Title IV. In the legislative debates on the LMRDA, Senator
Kuchel stated that he did "not believe that in any fashion the equal rights section
touches what the provisions of the constitution or bylaws might be with respect to the
right to run for office." 105 CoNc. REc. 6710 (1959). Many candidates who were denied
pre-election relief under § 101(a)(1) before Calhoon would have been satisficd with that
interpretation, as they were not challenging the reasonableness of eligibility require-
ments, but rather their discriminatory application. Jackson v. International Longshore-
men, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Snpp.
307 (D. Del. 1961), aJJ'd on other grounds, 305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 890 (1962); Johnson v. Waiters Union, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Byrd v.
Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
627. 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1970).
628. See note 338 supra. See also Yale Note, supra note 622, at 1283 in.14.
629. But see id. at 1290-92 for an ingenious argument that private pre-election relief
under Title IV may still be available despite Calhoon through use of 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1970), concerning jurisdiction of federal courts under congressional acts dealing with
interstate commerce.
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through the vehicle of Title 1.030 While the case on its facts dealt only
with contested eligibility and nomination requirements, Calhoon ig-
nored the potential overlap between Titles I and IV031 on policy
grounds that sweep more broadly. In its opinion, the Court asserted
that Congress intended that judicial deference be paid to the admin-
istrative remedy specified in Title IV:
It is apparent that Congress decided to utilize the special knowl-
edge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor in order to best
serve the public interest .... Reliance on the discretion of the
Secretary is in harmony with the general congressional policy to
allow unions great latitude in resolving their own internal con-
troversies, and, where that fails, to utilize the agencies of Gov-
ernment most familiar with union problems to aid in bringing
about a settlement through discussion before resort to the
courts.
6 3 2
The effect of this policy of judicial deference has been to preclude
most pre-election judicial relief and increase reliance on the adminis-
trative remedy as the prime vehicle for enforcing election rights. This
section will describe the extent to which courts have been willing to
grant pre-election relief despite Calhoon. It will then criticize the way
in which the Calhoon Court interpreted the LMRDA and suggest
areas in which greater pre-election relief should be available.
630. See H. "WVEUGro,, LABoR AND THE LECAL PRocss 212 (1968), commenting on
the effect of the Calhoon opinion:
In accents strong and clear Title IV proclaims the primary rights of the members
to a fair and democratic election, and then, as the Court has it, makes an utter
mockery of those rights by denying their effective enforcement .... Congress ought
not to be read as making promises and then not fulfilling them, as acting in so
slick and deceptive a fashion.
Wellington had noted that, rather than looking to Title IV as a limitation on Title I,
the Court could have and should have used it as a guideline for broadly defining
"equal rights." Id. at 208.
631. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart agreed on other grounds with the holding
of the majority, but cautioned that the majority's sweeping language could destroy many
Title I rights. He noted that Title IV suits impose increased burdens on plaintiffs,
notably a showing that the violation may have affected the election's outcome, and thus
made it difficult to obtain relief. He said the majority's opinion contradicted Congress'
intention of strengthening and supplementing Title IV with Title I. Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134, 143 (1964). Cases subsequent to Calhoon have explicitly interpreted its
decision as precluding Title I enforcement of rights which overlap with Title IV. See
Verbiscus v. Local 49, Marine Workers, 238 F. Supp. 848, 849 (E.D. Mich. 1964); ,McArthy
v. District 9, Machinists, 252 F. Supp. 350, 352 (E.D. Mo. 1966); Spirey v. Grievance
Comm., 69 L.R.R.M. 2709 (N.D. Ga. 1968); McGuire v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 426 F.2d 504, 507-08 (6th Cir. 1970). Commentators on Calhoon have also given
this interpretation to the opinion. See, e.g., Beaird, Some Aspects of the LMRDA "Bill
of Rights," 5 GEo. L. REv. 661, 679 (1971).
632. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964).
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A. Current Availability of Pre-Election Relief
1. Title IV Pre-Election Remedies
Although Title IV generally relies for its enforcement on the post-
election administrative remedy outlined in § 402 of the Act,0 30 sub-
section 401 (c) 034 specifically provides for enforcement of certain rights
by private suit.63 5 Under this subsection, candidates have successfully
brought pre-election suits to compel union officials to distribute cam-
paign literature at the candidate's expense, to enjoin discrimination
with respect to the use of membership mailing lists, and to obtain
union distribution of campaign literature on the same terms as litera-
ture already distributed for other candidates.0 30 The availability of
pre-election enforcement of the right to inspect membership lists is
less clear, 37 and pre-election relief under the subsection's broad guar-
633. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
634. As noted in Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 n.13 (1970), "Section 401(c) of
the Act permits suits prior to election in the United States District Courts by any bona
fide candidate for union office to enforce the rights, guaranteed by that section, to
equal treatment in the distribution of campaign literature and access to membership lists,"
635. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
636. See cases cited notes 220, 221 supra. The remedy in Backo v. Local 281, Car-
penters, 308 F. Supp. 172 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), af 'd, 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denicd,
404 U.S. 858 (1971), after the union ignored the temporary restraining order enjoining
the election, included ordering a new election.
637. The statute does not specifically state that the right to inspect the mailing list
is enforceable in district court, as does the first sentence of § 401(c) in connection with
distribution of campaign literature and non-discriminatory use of the membership list.
29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970). Although the Calhoon footnote states that "access to member-
ship lists" is a right enforceable pre-election (see note 634 supra), the DOL favors a
strict reading of the Act, precluding pre-election enforcement of the inspection right.
INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL, supra note 298, at § 431.700.
The question of pre-election enforcement of the membership list inspection right
was specifically avoided in Conley v. Aiello, 276 F. Supp. 614, 616 n. (SD.N.Y. 1967).
However, in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, Civ. No. 3061-69 (D.D.C., filed Nov.
6, 1969), plaintiff sought to inspect the membership list. Preliminary injunction was
denied, but only upon consideration of "representations of action to be taken made by
counsel for the union." These representations included the promise to allow six Yablonskl
supporters to inspect the membership list. See Supplementary Motion for Preliminary
Injunction to Restrain Violations of Inspection Provisions of Section 401(c) of LMRDA
of 1959, at 2, Civ. No. 3061-69 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 14, 1969). In Antal v. District 1,
Mineworkers, 64 L.R.R.M. 2222, 2223 (W.D. Pa. 1966), the court stated the defendant
was "bound" by the agreement of counsel to allow pre-election inspection of membership
lists. While this decision does not indicate whether Judge Weber found pre-electionjurisdiction to order inspection of the membership list, Judge Weber stated in Antal v.
Budzanoski, 75 L.R.R.M. 2828, 2832 (W.D. Pa. 1970), that the only pre-electlon relief
available under Title IV is "in Sec. 401(c) ...which guarantees candidates for union
office the right to inspect membership lists, and gives such bona fide candidate standing
to sue prior to election for denial of this right. [See the Opinion of this writer in Antal
v. UMW Dist. 5 .... where this right was enforced in this court.]"
But, see an argument that pre-election enforcement of the list inspection right is
doubtful in Daniels, supra note 247, at 325.
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antees of "adequate safeguards to insure a fair election" 038 is even
more doubtful. 63 9
2. Title I Pre-Election Remedies
The Title I provisions relevant to election contests include the
guarantee of "equal rights and privileges" to nominate candidates and
vote, and the general right to freedom of speech and assembly.04 0 These
guarantees are enforceable by any aggrieved member "as may be
appropriate."0 41
Even before Calhoon, a Title I suit seeking a court order to enjoin
voting fraud was dismissed, despite plaintiff's argument that the equal
right to vote was meaningless unless it was an "effective vote." The
court, foreshadowing Calhoon, held that Congress intended for such
election disputes to be resolved through the Title IV mechanism.04 2
The Seventh Circuit, however, had ruled differently prior to Calhoon,
granting pre-election relief under Title I upon a clear showing of ballot
tampering. The court held such tampering to be a denial of the equal
right to vote "as surely as if the doors of the union hall had been
barred."' 6 43 The Calhoon opinion, however, has cast doubt on the
continued availability of Title I suits in such vote fraud cases. 0"4
638. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
639. The Calhoon footnote on § 401(c) did not mention the "adequate safeguards"
provision. See note 634 supra. Courts have dismissed claims under § 401(c) for judicial
determination of the eligibility of an allegedly qualified candidate, McArthy v. District
9, Machinists, 252 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Mo. 1966); for a court ruling that poll watchers
need not be union members, Antal v. District 5, Mineworkers, 64 L.R.R.M. 2222, 2223
(.D. Pa. 1966) (dismissed on the merits, holding that the union's existing poll watcher
requirements were reasonable); and for court orders requiring poll observers, secret
ballots, adequate notice of election, and fair ballot counting, Yablonski v. United Mine
Workers, Civ. No. 3061-69 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 6, 1969) (dismissed, however, only in light
of "representations of action to be taken made by counsel for the union'). A claim for
impounding of ballots was denied under § 401(c) in Jennings v. Carey. 57 L.R.R.M. 2635
(D.D.C. 1964), but without citing any statutory authority, the D.C. Circuit reversed and
gave the requested order. 58 L.R.R.M. 2606 (1965).
The legislative history indicates that the "adequate safeguards" provision was not
meant to be enforceable pre-election. That provision was originally in a different section
of the bill where pre-election enforcement was not contemplated. See S. 1555, § 801(b),
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in NLRB, LrEGSLA.ivE Hisrorty Op TE LAnort.
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscLosURE Acr oF 1959: Trris I-VI 775 (1959). Senator
Javits, whose amendment put the section in its present form, stated no intention to
make adequate safeguards part of the § 401(c) pre-election provisions. 105 Conx. Rc.
6727-29 (1959).
640. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1) and (2) (1970).
641. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
642. Robins v. Rarback, 825 F.2d 929, 930 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 US. 974
(1965).
643. Beckman v. Local 46, Iron Workers, 315 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1963).
644. In a case immediately subsequent to Calhoon, Jennings v. Carey, 57 L.R.R.M.
2635 (D.D.C. 1964), an attempt to obtain ballot counting safeguards under Title I was
dismissed. The court said there was no discrimination alleged and thus under Calhoon
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Prior to Calhoon, candidates declared ineligible for nomination to
union office often sought pre-election relief under § 101 (a) (1). These
suits were generally dismissed on the grounds that Title I granted a
right to nominate, not a right to be a candidate. 645 In denying the
eligibility challenge in Calhoon, the Court did not rely on this ration-
ale, holding instead that a union member would not be deprived of
an "equal right" to nominate if the same eligibility requirements were
applied to all candidates. Title I was thus held to be no basis for a
challenge to the reasonableness of an eligibility requirement,0 40 al.
though it could presumably reach cases of discriminatory application
of the requirement. 647 Subsequent cases have dealt with nomination
there was no Title I remedy. The court further noted that the Calhoon decision con-
firmed the decision in Rarbach, supra note 642. Jennings, however, was reversed In a
decision which cited no statutory authority. 58 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.C. Cir. 1965). For a
description of this case, see NYU Note, supra note 119, at 355-57.
The argument that ballot stuffing is not a discrimination among union members dc.
priving them of equal rights as interpreted by Calhoon is made in Beaird, supra note
631, at 675, and in Bercham, supra note 82, at 10.
But see McDonough v. Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, Civ. No. 1315-71 (D.N.J., filed
Sept. 17, 1971). Judge Coolahan ordered a supervised recount under § 101(a)(l), holding
that until the recount was completed, no post-election appeal to DOL could be started,
and thus Title I jurisdiction still existed. Finding that Calhoon said "only that Title IV
violations do not provide independent or derivative source of jurisdiction under" 0
101(a)(1) and 102, the court held that pre-election relief was available when it could be
shown that, through ballot tampering, equal rights to vote were infringed:
The majority [in Calhoon] attributed to the equal voting rights guarantee of §
411(a)(1) no greater meaning than a prohibition against discrimination. Yet § 481
is replete with references to equal treatment among all candidates and "each mem-
ber." Therefore, if plaintiff brings a colorable claim under § 411(a)(1), logic dictates
that federal jurisdiction is not ousted simply because a similar claim may later be
advanced under Title IV.
See also Stettner v. International Printing Pressmen, 278 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Tenn,
1967), holding that counting of illegal ballots in a referendum violated § 101(a)(l) equal
rights to vote.
645. Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 50 L.R.R.M. 2354 (3d Cir. 1962); Johnson v.
Waiters Union, 190 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Gammon v. Machinists Onion, 199
F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Ga. 1961); Colpo v. Highway Truck Drivers, 201 F. Supp. 307 (D.
Del. 1961), aff'd on other grounds, 305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S, 890(1962); Jackson v. Longshoreman's Ass'n, 212 F. Supp. 79 (E.D. La. 1962); and Byrd v.
Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Col. 1959). Contra, Harvey v. Calhoon, 124 F.2d 362(2d Cir. 1963), rev'd, 379 U.S. 134 (1964); Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 233 F. Supp, 925 (E.D.N.Y.
1964), af!'d, 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1964), af 'd on other grounds on rehearing, 343 F.2d
460 (1965) (noting that Calhoon cast considerable doubt on the first decision, although
the claim was discriminatory application of eligibility requirements; and affirInthg,
based on federal pendant jurisdiction to enforce a state claim under the union consti.
tution).
646. See Davis v. Turner, 395 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1968); Wirtz v. Local 406, Operating
Eng'rs, 254 F. Supp. 962, 968 (E.D. La. 1966).
647. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139 (1964). In DePew v. Edmiston, 261 F. Stipp,
966 (M.D. Pa. 1967), plaintiff, whose unique seniority status allowed him to belong to
either of two locals, was denied relief on a Title I claim that he had been declared in.
eligible because of membership in the "wrong" local, although he had been allowed to
run in the past. The dismissal was reversed, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967), when the
court realized this was a claim not of unreasonableness of an eligibility requirement,
but of discriminatory application of the requirement.
However, in McArthy v. District 9, Machinists, 252 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Mo. 1966),
where the plaintiff claimed that in violation of the union's bylaws he was disqualified
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restrictions other than candidate eligibility requirements, and have
held Title I applicable only when a formal limitation on the right to
nominate is discriminatory on its face.048
Other attempts to use § 101 (a) (1) to protect member voting and
nomination rights have been frustrated by judicial deference to union
autonomy and expertise in writing election regulations.04 9 Relying
on the Calhoon refusal to judge reasonableness, courts have tended to
defer to union nomination and voting restrictions without examining
them for discriminatory impact.050
from candidacy, an apparent discrimination, denial of jurisdiction under Title I was
based on Calhoon. Despite the possibility that discriminatory application of eligibility
requirements could still be challenged under Title I, plaintiffs challenging what appear
to be discriminatory applications of eligibility requirements may not even bring their
actions under Title I, possibly because of the broad sweep of the Calhoon opinion. See
Conley v. Aiello, 276 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
648. Before Calhoon some courts restrained unfair nomination proceedings, Connor
v. Local 560, Teamsters, 45 L.R.R.M. 2165 (D.N.J. 1959), but Title I challenges to
nomination procedures have since been dismissed based on Calhoon's statement that
any requirement applied equally to all members is not a Title I violation. Paravante
v. Local 13, Insurance Workers, 59 L.R.R.M. 2169, 2170 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (refusing to
consider a question of the "propriety of union procedures with respect to the nomination
meeting'); Lenhart v. Local 9, Operating Eng'rs, 68 L.R.R.M. 3084 (D. Colo. 1903)(disallowing a claim that under the union constitution members should have been al-
lowed to nominate a person for more than one office); and Avery v. Stage £mployees
Union, 54 CCH Lab. Cas. 11, 453 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (dismissing claims of violation of
one man-one vote principles, lack of adequate notice, and failure to provide a reasonable
opportunity to nominate).
However, in O'Brien v. Paddock, 246 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), an allegation that
denial to "associate members" of the rights to nominate and vote was a § 101(a)(l) viola-
tion was found to be a triable issue.
As Justice Stewart had predicted, the language of Calhoon led courts to intervene
under Title I only when nomination requirements were discriminator), on their face.
See note 625 supra. Thus, despite the fact that the lack of notice in Avery, the ques-
tionable nomination procedures in Paravante, and the violation of the union constitution
in Lenhart might have just as effectively deprived certain members of equal rights to
nominate as did the "associate member" classification in O'Brien, relief was found
appropriate only in the latter case. See also note 137 supra for a pre.Calhoon example
of a limited interpretation of equal rights.
649. In LMRDA § 101(a)(l), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) (1970), the required equality of
rights is limited by the phrase "subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such
organization's constitution and bylaws." Thus, relief has been denied to a member who
was deprived of the right to vote after being reclassified as a member "not working at
the trade" when the union discovered he had a full-time outside job. Williams v.
International Typographical Union, 423 F-2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 824 (1970). Relief has also been denied to "provisional members" who sought to
participate in the national convention. Ragland v. United Mine Workers, 188 F. Supp.
131 (N.). Ala. 1960). However, a claim that "associate" members were deprived of their
legitimate right to vote has been held a triable issue under § 101(a)(l). O'Brien v.
Paddock, 246 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cf., United Mine Workers v. District 50,
Mineworkers, 74 L.R.R.M. 3001 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
650. Another possible hurdle to Title I relief is the requirement of exhaustion:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an
action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective
of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or
respondents in such action or proceeding, or the' right of any member of a labor
organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative
proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator.
Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
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In contrast to the judicial wariness in § 101 (a) (1) suits, courts have
been quite aggressive in protecting § 101 (a) (2) freedom of speech
and assembly rights.06 ' Recognizing the importance of free speech
during election campaigns,6 52 courts have reversed or enjoined union
suspensions of members resulting from campaign statements.053 When
there has been a "substantial likelihood" that plaintiffs would be able
to show that discharges, transfers, and demotions were reprisals in-
tended to limit free speech during a campaign, preliminary injunc-
tions654 have been issued. This judicial activism has occurred despite
before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or
any officer thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or employer
association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except
as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition.
LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).
However, this requirement has been interpreted loosely ever since the Second Circuit's
decision in Detroy v. Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961). Noting that the statute reads "may be required," the court held that the
requirement was discretionary and was meant to require only that courts never demand
exhaustion for more than four months. Cf., NLRB v. Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418,
425-26 (1968). Detroy held that any time plaintiff can show a clear violation, irreparable
harm, the futility of internal appeals, and that the internal decision would not aid
the court, exhaustion would not be demanded. Subsequent decisions have accepted less
than all four showings to grant relief without exhaustion. Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713,
Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012 (4th Cir. 1965) (clear violation shown); Local 455,
Boilermakers v. Terry, 398 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1968) (futility shown); Steib v. Local 1497,
New Orleans Clerks 9- Checkers, 436 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1971) (futility and irreparable
harm shown); Fulton Lodge 2 v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1969) (futility shown);
Local 760, Fruit 8- Vegetable Packers v. Morely, 378 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1967) (non.
futility not shown by union); Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 337 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1964) (clear
violation shown); Farowitz v. Local 802, Musicians, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1961) (futility
shown). In most election cases, either the violation is clear, the internal remedy futile,
or the harm irreparable. Thus § 101(a)(4) should rarely be a deterrent to relief. See
Bercham, supra note 82, at 22-27.
651. Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and
assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opin-
ions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates
in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the
meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to
the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair
the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to tile
responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to hIs
refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or
contractual obligations.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
652. See Gartner v. Soloner, 54 L.R.R.M. 2146, 2149 (E.D. Pa. 1963):
The plaintiff represents a small dissenting group within the Local who may
provide the checks and balances on the operations of this Local which are needed in
any well run democratic organization.
653. Sheridan v. Local 2, Liquor Salesmen, 303 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Archibald
v. Local 57, Operating Eng'rs, 276 F. Supp. 326 (D.R.I. 1967); Gartner v. Soloner, 54
L.R.R.M. 2146, 2149 (E.D. Pa. 1963). See also note 150 supra.
Most of these suits are also brought tinder LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1970), pro.
hibiting labor organizations from interfering with member rights under the Act and
providing for enforcement through § 102 suits.
654. Cefalo v. District 50, Mineworkers, 73 L.R.R.M. 2964, 2968 (D.D.C. 1970), afl'd
per curiam, 73 L.R.R.M. 2970 (D.C. Cir. 1970), permanent injunction granted, 311 F.
Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1970). Protection was granted an insurgent political group tinder
§ 101(a), and politically motivated dismissals of staffers were reversed, in Local 648,
Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Union, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1025-26 (D.D.C. 1969).
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the fact that the right to free speech during a campaign is a right
guaranteed by both Title I and Title IV.0" The approach taken by the
Court in Calhoon would appear to argue for limiting the free speech
provision in Tide I to non-election contexts, leaving the latter within
the scope of Title IV and subject to enforcement through the post-
election administrative mechanism. This approach has not been
followed in the free speech area.050
3. Title V Pre-Election Remedies
Section 501 of the LMRDA provides that union officials have a
"fiduciary responsibility," and that any member can sue for violation
of that obligation. 57 Because officers conduct elections as part of their
duties, an expansive reading of § 501 might impose upon the officers
a duty to conduct "fair elections" as part of their fiduciary obligation.
Pre-election suits would then be available to remedy any abuses in
election procedures for which the officers were responsible.158 With
a few exceptions, 659 however, most courts have not so interpreted
§ 501. Relief under this section has been denied in cases where plain-
655. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970) grants a member the right to "support the candidate
or candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper
interference or reprisal of any kind . . . ."
656. See Navarro v. Gannon, 285 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1967).
657. 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
658. The language of § 501 is ambiguous as to the breadth of fiduciary duties. 29
U.S.C. § 501 (1970) begins broadly:
The officers . . . and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions
of trust in relation to such organizations and its members as a group.
But, the second sentence of the section refers only to financially related duties, without
any indication as to whether these enumerated duties are examples, or are exclusive.
The legislative history is equally ambiguous. Compare H.R. REP. No. 741 on H.R. 8342.
86th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (1959), with 105 COG. REc. 14,346 (1959) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Griffin).
659. In Moschetta v. Cross, 48 L.R.R.M. 2669 (D.D.C. 1961) the court ordered the
union under § 501 to hold the constitution-mandated international convention and re-
tained jurisdiction to oversee the convention. In a case connected with Moschetta,
Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union v. Ratner, 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964). the
court ordered payment of attorney fees under § 501(b) for a number of suits which had
challenged the union's operation, some of them, like Moschetta, on grounds unrelated
to financial management. In Local 648, Retail Clerks v. Retail Clerks Union, 299 F. Supp.
1012, 1021 ().D.C. 1969), Judge Gesell found that retaliatory firings violated § 609,
ordered reinstatement under § 102, and granted attorney fees under § 501 because
Title V "encompasses . .. protection of political rights." And, in Cefalo v. Moffett, 449
F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1971), a § 501 violation was found in the improper conduct of a
referendum on a merger resolution, although the court noted, supra at 1200:
In general, violations of Title IV rights are not to be redressed as breaches of fi-
duciary duties under Title V.
The only holding outside the D.C. Circuit that § 501 extends beyond financial activi-
ties came in a recent challenge to "bogus" UMW pensioner locals. Sabolsky v. Budzanoski,
79 L.R.R.M. 2993 (3d Cir. 1972). For support of a broad reading of Title V, see Clark,
The Fiduciary Duties of Union Officials under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MaiN.%. L
REv. 437 (1967).
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tiffs have sought to require pre-election registration of voters,000 re-
strain ballot counting,00' protect voting rights,0 2 and eliminate "ghost
locals." 0 3 Some courts, reasoning much as Justice Black did in regard
to Title I in Calhoon, have pointed to the existence of a comprehen-
sive scheme for protecting election rights in Title IV as justification
for reading Title V narrowly. 60 4
The question of whether there is a § 501 violation when union
funds are spent illegally to promote a particular candidate has not
been resolved. 00 Bringing such an abuse under § 501 would not en-
tail recognition of a general fiduciary duty to conduct fair elections;
it would only challenge officer misuse of union funds.
4. State Pre-Election Remedies
Section 403 preserves "existing rights and remedies to enforce the
[union] constitution and bylaws,"0' 0 and under this section state courts
remain an avenue for pre-election relief.007 Commentators in 1959
hoped that passage of the LMRDA would give new life to state reme-
dies for election irregularities,0 8 but this appears not to have oc-
curred.0 9
660. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964), afj'g 234 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
661. Jennings v. Carey, 57 L.R.R.M. 2635, 2638 (D.D.C. 1964). Jennings was reversed
and the ballots impounded. 58 L.R.R.M. 2606 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But, as the lower
court claims were made on the basis of both §§ 101(a)(1) and 501, and the D.C. Circuit's
decision cites no statutory authority, it is impossible to know the jurisdictional basis
for the ruling. If the decision was based on § 501, it would comport with the D.C.
Circuit's minority position of granting broad § 501 relief. See note 659 supra.
662. Schonfeld v. Caputo, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. T 19,078 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
663. Antal v. Budzanoski, 320 F. Supp. 161, 163-65 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
664. Jennings v. Carey, 57 L.R.R.M. 2635 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd, 58 L.R.R.M., 2036
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Schonfeld v. Caputo, 49 CCH Lab. Cas. 19,078 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
665. This question was acknowledged but not decided in Cefalo v. District 50, Mine.
workers, 311 F. Supp. 946, 954-55 (D.D.C. 1970).
666. LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970).
667. For an argument that Calhoon implicitly precludes prc.elcction state court
relief, see Yale Note, supra note 622, at 1290 n.53.
668. Summers, The Impact of Landruin-Griffin in State Courts, 13 CONF. oN LAn. 333
(1960). Summers had noted the reluctance of state courts to intervene in union affairs
prior to 1959 in Summers, supra note 282, at 1243-56.
669. There seem to be only twenty-two reported state cases dealing with union
elections since the Act was passed; relief was denied in all but six. For the six cases
granting relief, see notes 675-80 infra; the sixteen denials are listed in notes 672-73 infra.
Searching for state election relief cases has proved fruitless for others. The California
Superior Court in Burroughs v. Operating Eng'rs Union, 63 L.R.R.M. 2161, 2162 (1966)
commented: "(O]f the more than 500 appellate cases which have construed, applied or
acted upon Title I or Title IV rights . . . only one case is a state case."
However, as noted in Summers, Judicial Protection of Union Democratic Processes
in New York, Oct. 20, 1959, at 2 (unpublished report to the New York Industrial Con-
missioner), many state cases go unreported. In the course of interviewing, instances were
discovered where pre-clection relief was available from state court judges through informal
settlements. These cases do not get reported. Interview with union attorney Y.
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Three factors may largely explain the paucity of pre-election state
relief. First, most union constitutions and bylaws do not include
specified guarantees for a fair election.0 70 Since state enforcement is
based on union constitutions and bylaws, members typically have little
upon which to base a claim.0 7' Second, state courts appear reluctant
to become involved in union election suits. This reluctance is sug-
gested by frequent findings that internal remedies have not been ex-
hausted 72 or that the irreparable harm necessary for a preliminary
injunction has not been shown. 73 Third, where the judiciary is elected,
insurgents seem to believe that judges would favor incumbents and
may be discouraged by this belief from bringing suit in state court.
0 T
670. See pp. 529-31 supra.
671. S. RiEp. No. 187 oN S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1959). Summers, Pre.Emption
and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 Oiuo ST. L.J. 119 (1961).
argues that § 403 establishes a federal substantive law which allows state courts to
enforce Title IV rights as well as union constitutions and bylaws. Although Calhoon
would seem to rebut that theory in holding that the exclusive way to enforce Title IV
rights was through the post-election DOL mechanism, no state court cases were found
denying pre-election relief specifically on those grounds. See also Bercham, supra note
87, at 43-45; Harvard Note, supra note 497, at 1629-31.
672. Burke v. Caputo, 48 L.R.R.M. 2732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961); Thompson v. Edey.
58 L.R.R.M. 2413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); O'Mara v. Fire Officers Ass'n, 75 L.R.R.M. 2047
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 414 Pa. 294. 200 A.2d 306 (1954).
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 17 (1964); McGinness v. Luna, 46 Il1. App.2d 43, 196 N.E.2d 711
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 959 (1965); Ford v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, 56 L.R.R.M.
2807 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1964).
673. Cramond v. AFL-CIO, 267 Minn. 229, 126 NAV.2d 252 (1954); Smith v. Robiletto,
25 App. Div. 2d 454, 265 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1966).
Of the sixteen state dismissals found, six were dismissed for failure to exhaust, supra
note 672, and the two above for lack of a showing of irreparable harm. Of the remainder.
five were denied because the plaintiff was seeking state post.election relief. disallowed
by LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970): MacDonald v. Carr. 355 Mass. 120. 243 N.E.2d
808 (1969); Shranko v. International Hod Carriers. 51 L.R.RM. 2458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961);
Daniel v. Local 1332, Longshoremen, 442 Pa. 113, 275 A.2d 67 (1971); Mamula v. United
Steelworkers, 409 Pa. 175, 185 A.2d 595 (1962); and Burroughs v. Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 63 L.R.R.M. 2161 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966); and three were denied for lack of a
cognizable claim: Brignola v. Barbieri, 11 App. Div. 2d 893, 203 N.YS.2d 370 (1960);
Kuzma v. House Wrecker's Union, 59 L.R.R.M. 2605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); and Roman v.
Calhoon, 41 Misc.2d 544, 246 N.Y.S.2d 559 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963), aflrd, 245 N.YS.2d 757
(App. Div. 1963).
In line with the argument to be made at pp. 556.61 infra, two suggestions of means
by which states should expand the availability of pre.election relief are warranted. (I)
State courts should adopt the Detroy doctrine (see note 650 supra) for determining
whether exhaustion of internal relief should be demanded. This is the exhaustion
standard which is proposed for all pre-election suits as being consistent with the legis-
lative history of LMRDA. See p. 560 infra. Use of the Detroy doctrine will guarantee
uniformity of exhaustion requirements among the states in enforcement of union con-
stitutions and uniformity with federal courts in determining availability of preelection
relief. (2) State courts should use the guidelines developed in Titles I, IV, and V litigation
to determine what is "reasonable" whenever a union constitution calls for "reasonable"
election procedures, and should use the same guidelines to knock down unreasonable
local bylaws whenever they are promulgated under a national union's authorization to
locals to use "reasonable" procedures. See Harvard Note, supra note 497. at 1629. By
using the federal precedents as guidelines, the state courts would maintain the uniformity
of national labor policy and benefit greatly from the experience federal courts have had
in adjudicating Landrum-Griffin claims.
674. Interviews with complainant attorneys I and N, and union attorney GG.
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When they have acted, state courts in pre-election suits have en-
joined unconstitutional nomination rejections, 675 required a vote on
a proposed use of voting machines, 07 enforced election guarantees
where irregularities were shown,07 7 ordered officer elections,078 re-
versed politically retaliatory suspensions, 670 and suspended constitu-
tionally invalid eligibility restrictions.080
B. Calhoon Reconsidered
The language and reasoning of Calhoon go far toward eliminating
pre-election judicial relief for election violations. It is therefore neces-
sary to critically examine the considerations underlying the position
adopted in that case.
Three plausible rationales are suggested by Justice Black's decision.
Each relies on some aspect of the legislative history of the LMRDA
to show that Congress favored routing all election disputes through
the Title IV mechanism. The strength of these rationales, especially
in light of the foregoing analysis of the Title IV administrative mech-
anism, is doubtful.
The United States' amicus brief in Calhoon argued that the Court
should discount the apparent utility of supplementing the Title IV
mechanism through Title I relief and instead should emphasize the
need for a single national labor policy. 81 Implicit in this argument,
and in the majority opinion, is the assumption that courts should rely
on the expertise of the DOL to develop national standards. The Court
was apparently persuaded that the public interest in labor policy
could be vindicated only if the DOL, as a representative of the pub-
lic, was involved as the complaining party in union election litigation.
Secondly, the Court's decision reflects a recognition of the congres-
sional deference to internal union resolution of election disputes. As
already noted, the Title IV mechanism demands exhaustion of internal
675. Beiso v. Robiletto, 26 Misc.2d 137, 212 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
676. Geoghegan v. Rigley, 76 L.R.R.M. 2287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970), preliminary in-junction previously denied, 76 L.R.R.M. 2027 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).
677. Gilbert v. Local 701, Hoisting & Portable Engineers, 237 Ore. 130, 384 P.2d 136
(1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964).
678. Pope v. Local 704, Laborers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2318 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969).
679. Gould v. Murray, 49 L.R.R.M. 2064 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (suspension reversed for
failure to specify sufficiently the charges filed arainst plaintiffs). But see earlier cases
where relief was denied. 28 Misc.2d 1037, 216 N.Y.S.2d 12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961); 47
L.R.R.M. 2252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
680. Libutti v. Di Brizzi, 343 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1965). A federal court, under pendentjurisdiction, enforced the union's constitution tinder state law.
681. Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae, at 8.9, Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134 (1964).
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union appeals before complaint can be made to the DOL,082 while
Title I exhaustion requirements are discretionary. 8s Since eligibility
requirements can easily be brought before the union and can be al-
tered through internal amendment, the Court may have felt that pre-
election intervention in Calhoon would have constituted an invitation
to dissidents to ignore internal union structures and appeal directly
to the courts.
A third plausible rationale for the Court's broad language is that
by requiring review of a complaint by the DOL before a suit can be
brought, unions are screened from frivolous court actions. As the
union's primary tasks are collective bargaining and contract admin-
istration, it is important that union lawyers not be forced to divert
their time to defending frivolous suits. 8 4
The first of these rationales is weak in its assumption that reliance
on the DOL can bring about a uniform national policy with respect
to union elections. Total uniformity is impossible, even under the
Calhoon opinion, because the statute specifically preserves access to
state court relief. While complaints to state courts have been rare,08s
the statute permits pre-election state court relief for violations of
union constitutions and bylaws. 80 To the extent that Title IV rights
are included in union constitutions, state courts will in effect be in-
terpreting federal law without the direct aid of the Department. 8s
The provision of some pre-election relief even within Title IV also
suggests that Congress cannot have meant to rely completely on DOL
suits to generate public policy regarding elections.08 8
If the Court was concerned that a lack of uniformity would result
because judicial decisions would be made on an ad hoc basis, it failed
to comprehend the operation of the Title IV mechanism. The Depart-
ment has created LMRDA precedents through case by case adjudica-
tion 68 9 and has not attempted to articulate broad national policy
682. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
683. See note 650 supra.
684. Practicing union attorneys point out that the Title IV mechanism filters com-
plaints in an additional way not mentioned by the Court. If the complainant wins the
election, or is resoundingly defeated and gives up any hope of pursuing a claim, no
appeal will be made either internally or to the DOL. As a means of reducing the number
of suits brought against unions, union attorneys find the Title IV mechanism to their
liking. Interviews with union attorneys P, S, U, W, and HH.
685. See pp. 554-56 supra.
686. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 145-46 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
687. Summers, supra note 671, at 137; Yale Note, supra note 622, at 1293-94.
688. See pp. 548-49 supra.
689. See pp. 516-19 supra.
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through use of its rulemaking authority.09 0 The assumption that courts
need the assistance of DOL expertise also seems unfounded. Many
cases are purely factual disputes. 0 1 Even when policy issues are in-
volved, judges can rely on DOL rules and guidelines. Or, as was stg-
gested in the legislative history,00 2 the courts can draw on their ex-
perience in other fields of American life.0 3 Finally, any suggestion
that the public interest requires DOL participation in a suit appears un-
supported by the legislative history of the Act. Congress made Title I
provisions enforceable by private suit in order that individual rights
could be litigated directly.09 4 The interest of the general public in
honest unions is important, but that interest is represented by the
statute itself and by DOL interpretive rulings. There is no need to
have a DOL lawyer arguing every election case.
The Court's second rationale, deference to internal union appeals,
is significant, but it does not justify routing all election cases through
the Title IV mechanism. In Title I suits, for example, the court has
discretion to demand full internal exhaustion. When it would be help-
ful for the court to have the guidance of an internal decision, or when
internal relief is available without significant delay, courts can de-
mand exhaustion before hearing a complaint. 0 5
Finally, the desire to avoid disruption of union activities does not
690. See id.
691. See pp. 56167 inIra discussing the nature of cases which might arise prior to
election and distinguishing between factual questions and more complex policy issues.
692. 105 CONC. REc. 6719, 6726 (1959) (remarks of Senators Kchel and Javits).
693. Only a few union lawyers doubted that courts would be able to adjudicate pre.
election suits properly. Some fear was expressed that even an impartial judge could not
cope with a simple fact situation because of ignorance of union politics, but much of
the fear seems to stem from the resemblance of pre-election relief to the despised labor
injunction. Unions and their lawyers suspect an anti.labor judge could intervene to
undermine their organization. Interviews with union attorneys DD and HH. Union
attorney S, however, based his disapproval of pre-election relief on a belief that judges
would be over-zealous in granting injunctions because their attitudes would be: 'If
you aren't doing anything wrong, why are you bothered if I impose an injunction just
to make sure?"
694. By adding the Bill of Rights of Title I to Landrum.Griffin, Senator McClellan
said he sought to give members a right to individual liberties within the union. 105
CONe. REc. 6471-72, 6475-76 (1959). Originally, even suits to vindicate these rights were
to be brought only through the DOL post-election mechanism. See Kennedy-lves bill,
S. 3974 § 303, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), referred to in S. REt,. No. 1684, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 13 (1958); and Kennedy-Ervin bill, S. 505, § 303, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959),
reprinted in I NLRB LEwSLATIVE His-rORY OF THE LABOR-NMANAGMENrT REPO~RING AND
DIscLosuRE Acr 64-65 (1959). But the bill was amended to take Title I suits away front
the DOL and allow private actions. See 105 CoNG. REC. 6696, 6720 (1959) (remarks of
Senators Kuchel and Johnston). Thus, in Title I Congress enumerated some election-
connected rights which courts would be asked to enforce without the aid of DOL
expertise. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 143 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Al.
though the overlap of Title I and IV rights should have been apparent, Congress gave
no guidelines to harmonize the conflicting enforcement schemes.
695. See note 650 supra.
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warrant the judicial restriction of pre-election relief. Although pre-
election suits may be unsettling, reruns resulting from post-election
suits are even more disruptive. They appear to cause far more emo-
tional strain and loss of time for all candidates. 000 In cases where an
election violation is likely to result in a rerun, it is to the union's
benefit to have the defect remedied before the election. Secondly, it
seems highly unlikely that the availability of pre-election relief will
greatly increase the number of suits brought against unions. Although
some insurgents admitted that bringing suit is sometimes used as a
strategy to show that incumbents are unworthy of office,60 7 others indi-
cated that a candidate going outside the union for assistance would
alienate the membership. 98 Moreover, few insurgent candidates have
sufficient funds to be extremely litigious.60 0
The rationales supporting Calhoon are an inadequate basis for the
sweeping restrictions on pre-election relief which the case has spawned.
The problem Calhoon does raise, however, is delineation of the judi-
cial and administrative spheres regarding enforcement of LMRDA
election rights. There is a better solution to this problem, different from
the Calhoon approach, in the form of criteria which courts could
apply to pre-election suits to determine whether pre-election judicial
action is feasible and consistent with the policy goals of the Act. These
criteria would be: (1) the availability of internal relief; (2) the ex-
istence of standards for decision; and (3) the possibility of granting
relief without undue delay in conducting the election.
Courts should be solicitous of union autonomy and require internal
exhaustion when reasonable appeals procedures exist. Such a policy
would comport with the congressional desire that unions be allowed
696. One of the most disheartened incumbents interviewed was the secretary-treasurer
of a large, industrial local whose election had just been overturned for the illegal dis-
qualification of a candidate. He had just been through a hard-fought campaign, had
spent several hundred dollars of his own money, and experienced much strain. The
rerun was forcing him to go through it all again. Interview with union officer E.
697. Interviews with complainant union member D and union attorney U.
Union attorney W suggested another reason why pre-election suits would be numerous
is that during an election campaign enthusiastic candidates would get carried away and
see election violations behind every bush. After the election, with more time for reflection,
the same candidate would not be so prone to sue.
A third reason suggested for pre-election suits was given by complainant attorney I,
who said suits were brought in order to compile evidence of election infractions which
could be used in a post-election suit. By bringing suit, the candidate was able to take
depositions of union officials.
On the other hand, it was suggested that some candidates do not bring pro-election
suits because they want to save the issues for appeals to the DOL to obtain a rerun
should they lose the election. Interviews with union officers D and F.
698. See notes 335. 450 supra.
699. Interview with complainant union member I.
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to "clean their own houses," but would at the same time create an
incentive for unions to provide efficacious pre-election internal appeals
mechanisms if they wish to keep election disputes out of court. Courts
can look to the body of law which has already developed under the
§ 101 (a) (4) discretionary exhaustion requirement for guidance as to
when to defer to the internal appeals process.700
Courts should also avoid pre-election review where questions are
so complex that a violation of the LMRDA cannot be clearly estab-
lished under existing doctrine. If there is a genuine need for the ex-
pertise or the public interest viewpoint of the DOL, the court should
decline pre-election jurisdiction. Uniformity in national labor policy
will be facilitated by this criterion, as courts will avoid areas where
the proper framework for decision has not yet been established.
The third criterion, avoidance of undue delay of an election, rec-
ognizes that the enjoining of an election to permit a long court trial
would be extremely disruptive of internal union affairs. This criterion
would pose no bar to relief in situations where the election need not
be delayed. Where postponement of the election is required to grant
adequate pre-election relief, the court must be certain of the existence
of violations and convinced of their grievous impact on the electoral
process. Otherwise the court should defer to the post-election process
of relief.
These three criteria establish the general principle that when pre-
election relief is available under the LMRDA, limitations on its use
should not be grounded in an arbitrary deference to the DOL post-
election mechanism, but rather in the ability of the court to under-
stand and formulate a prompt remedy while still respecting the in-
tegrity of the union's own appeal procedures.701 When an LMRDA
provision which arguably provides for pre-election relief is the basis
of a private lawsuit,70 2 pre-election relief should be available if the
700. See note 650 supra.
701. Two complainant attorneys (F and Q) have suggested that, in order to aid
courts, the DOL should compile a list of instances when pre-election judicial review
would be warranted. Such a list should be drawni up in line with the criteria here
suggested.
702. The limits of the "pre-election" period are defined by § 403 of the Act which
makes the Title IV administrative remedy exclusive for an election " already conducted."
29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970). The proper interpretation of that phrase is that an election is
conducted "only after the counting of the ballots and the announcing of the results."
Harvard Note, supra note 497, at 1628. This interpretation is consistent with the DOL's
position that the post-election period for purposes of Title IV relief commences only
after the ballots have been counted and the results announced. See note 338 supra.
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three criteria enunciated above have been met.703 In this way, the
policies behind Calhoon can be effectuated without adhering to the
needlessly broad dicta of the opinion itself.
C. Electoral Responsiveness and Pre-Election Relief
1. Freedom from Internal Group Discrimination
The reasonableness of a union rule depriving a class of members
of the right to vote would be subject to judicial scrutiny under the
§ 101 (a) (1) provision guaranteeing equal rights to vote.704 Despite
the applicability of that section, and the present availability of pre-
election relief even under Calhoon, the foregoing criteria for granting
such relief would indicate review is unwise if the suit is brought im-
mediately prior to the election. First, internal exhaustion, if reason-
ably available, might give the court some indication of the various
interest groups within the union and some understanding of the
union's reason for imposing the restriction. Second, while such restric-
tions are to be viewed with great suspicion, guidelines as to what
limitations might be "reasonable" are not available.70 The third cri-
703. Union election oversight as suggested here is similar to the system now estab-
lished in Australia. Under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1969 z§ 80, 141.
159-71, the Australian Commonwealth Industrial Court has wide powers to intervene in
union elections. A union member can, either before or after an election, appeal directly
to the court for enforcement of the union's own rules (§ 141), or request the Industrial
Registrar, the Australian equivalent of the DOL, to refer to the court allegations of
violations of the national rules for elections (§§ 159-71). The court has broad intervention
powers and need not limit its investigation to any specific allegations (§ 165(l)). It is
authorized to make whatever orders it thinks "necessary for the purpose of the inquir)
(§ 165(2)), including postponement of the election until the inquiry is completed (§
163(a)(1)). Moreover, it is not bound by rules of evidence (§ 164(4)(b)). If violations arc
found, which did or may affect the election outcome (§ 16:(4)). the court may declare
the election or any step in the election void (§ 165(3)(a)), or a person elected or not
elected (§ 165(3)(b)), or arrange for a new supervised election (§ 163(3)(c)). The court
may also punish for contempt of its orders. Even if an irregularity is not found, the
court may order the complainant's costs paid provided he acted reasonably in lodging
the complaint (§ 168(2)).
Members may also seek a supervised election. Either 1,000 members or ten per cent
of the members in a national election, or 500 members or twenty per cent of the nen-
bers in a local election, may petition for supervision (§ 170). A registry officer will then
conduct the election.
The rapidity with which the system works can be seen in Walkerden v. Giles, 15 F.L.R.
207 (Cth. Indust. Ct. 1969), where only two months elapsed between the time complaint
was filed with the Registrar and when the court ordered the wrongfully declared in-
eligible candidate to be nominated.
For further description of the Australian system, see 0. FOE.ANUER, TRADE UNIoN1st
IN AUSTRALIA 125-51 (1962); NOLAN & COHEN, FEDERAL INDUSTRIAL LAW 356-94 (3d ed.
1963); Merrifield, Regulation of Union Elections in Australia, 10 IhD. & LAU. REL. RE'.
252 (1957).
704. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(l) (1970).
705. See pp. 428-30 supra.
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terion for pre-election relief is also not satisfied, as resolution of this
complex issue would probably entail postponement of the electiou.
However, if suit were brought after internal exhaustion and well
before the next election, two of the criteria for granting pre-election
review would be satisfied. Sound guidelines for resolving this issue
might then be developed. Although DOL expertise would not neces-
sarily be available in a private suit, the Department could participate
as an amicus. Moreover, the advent of a number of voting rights suits
might prompt the DOL to develop its own guidelines on this issue.
Charges of manipulation of interest groups through election pro-
cedures favoring an incumbent-controlled group, isolation of the
group from the normal political processes of the union, or financial
incentives to generate support,706 all involve allegations of specific con-
duct treated separately in the following sections dealing with pre-
election relief for the other aspects of responsive union officer elections.
2. Membership Participation in the Electoral Process
A showing that equal rights to vote or nominate are being denied
in violation of § 101 (a) (1)707 seems likely if eligibility requirements
are applied discriminatorily,70s if nomination meetings are manipu-
lated,70 9 or if adequate notice of nomination meetings or elections is
not given .710 Calhoon is no bar to this construction since it recognized
that discrimination in the right to vote or nominate was a fit subject
for Title I relief. A showing that free speech is being denied in violation
of § 101 (a) (2)11 seems likely whenever union members or staffers
are subjected to job intimidation, 712 members are fined or disciplined
for expressing opinions, 71 3 or violence or other coercive means are
used against candidates or their supporters.1 4 Between these two
Title I provisions, virtually all of the abuses of participation rights
are covered by a statutory provision that would permit pre-election
relief. Only the reasonableness of eligibility provisions appears beyond
the reach of Title I-reflecting the continuing impact of the Calhoon
decision.
706. See pp. 430-34 supra.
707. 29 U.S.C. . 411(a)(1) (1970).
708. See pp. 439-40 supra.
709. See pp. 440-44 supra.
710. See pp. 440-42 supra.
711. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
712. See pp. 444-52 supra.
713. See note 150 supra.
714. See pp. 444-52 supra.
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Most allegations of infringement of rights to participate in tie
electoral process will fulfill the proposed criteria for granting pre-elec-
tion relief. Internal exhaustion will often be futile, for the charge of
abridging participatory rights will be directed at the very officers
who would be hearing any internal appeal. Pre-election appeal beyond
the local is often unavailable.- 15 Courts should in these instances find
internal exhaustion unnecessary. The issues involved in suits to en-
force participatory rights will often be purely factual and the relevant
principles clear. For example, it should not be difficult for a court
to determine that a prospective candidate meets union eligibility
requirements but has nonetheless been denied nomination, or that
notice to the electorate has been inadequate, or that members are
being threatened with loss of jobs for election activities. In a few
cases, courts have granted such relief, and their example should be
followed.13' Lastly, delay of the election need not be undue in such
cases. Injunctions against infringements of free speech or orders to
have voting at a more convenient time or place will not delay the
election at all. Even a finding of inadequate notice would typically
necessitate only short delays.
It is possible that determining reasonable endorsement require-
ments in the nomination of intermediate or national officers will pre-
sent more complex issues involving necessary delay, and refusal to grant
pre-election review would there seem warranted. 17 However, if suit
is brought well before the election, it should be possible for a court
to resolve the issue as suggested previously for suits challenging the
composition of the union electorate.718
3. Mechanisms of Communication
The primary problems in the communication area-discriminatory
use of the membership list or newspaper and failure to distribute
candidate campaign materia171 -are covered by § 401 (c) which itself
provides for pre-election enforcement.720 The provision contains no ex-
haustion requirement, and none need be imposed. In instances of fail-
ure to distribute literature, a request for action will already have been
fnade to the union, since it is the refusal to act on the request which
715. See pp. 531-33 supra.
716. Depew v. Edmiston, 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967). See also free speedi cases cited
at notes 653-54 supra.
717. See pp. 432-34 supra.
718. See p. 562 supra.
719. See pp. 452-60 supra.
720. 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (1970).
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constitutes a violation of § 401 (c). Exhaustion for discriminatory use of
the membership list, including its use to mail the newspaper, will
often be futile since appeal would have to be made to the same per-
sons who are charged with the misconduct. The primary issues in
§ 401 (c) suits will be factual in nature,.and courts have already laid
down principles of interpretation. Finally, unless the suit is brought
immediately before the balloting, courts would have time to fashion
effective remedies without delaying the election.
4. Discriminatory Use of Union Resources
Use of union resources to support a particular candidate should be
subject to attack under § 501.721 Suits challenging staff campaigning
on union time, provision of campaign services at union expense, or
direct use of union funds should thus be susceptible to pre-election
review.72
2
Although there is no formal exhaustion requirement in § 501, the
section does require that a plaintiff first apply to union officers for
relief.723 Even when rejected, the plaintiff may proceed in court only
"upon leave . ..obtained upon verified application and for good
cause shown." 724 In determining whether to grant leave to sue, the
court has an opportunity to employ the three criteria suggested above
for governing pre-election relief. In addition, the plaintiff will have
to comply with the "good cause" requirement. The full scope of this
requirement has not been articulated by the courts, but the interpre-
tation of a similar "just cause" requirement in § 201 (c) suits to com-
pel unions to open their financial records seems applicable. 25 In both
§§ 201 and 501, the issue involved is the illegal expenditure of union
funds, and the same difficulties confront members trying to gather
information to support court suits. The Ninth Circuit has construed
the good cause requirement of § 201 (c):
The standard for determination whether there was just cause is
necessarily minimal. Just cause need not be shown by a prepon-
721. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1970).
722. See pp. 460-68 supra.
723. However, he need not exhaust internal remedies. Sabolski v. Budzanoski, 79
L.R.R.M. 2993 (3d Cir. 1972); Purcell v. Keane, 406 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1969); Homer
v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 231-32 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Alto v.
Bintz, 290 F. Supp. 577, 580 (D. Minn. 1968); Giordani v. Hoffman, 277 F. Supp. 722,
725 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
724. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970).
725. 29 US.C. § 431(c) (1970).
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derance of the evidence. It need not be enough to convince a rea-
sonable man that some wrong has been done; it is enough if a
reasonable member would be put to further inquiry.72 0
The availability of pre-election relief under § 501 should depend
largely on the availability of evidence. In some cases it may be difficult
and time consuming to separate legitimate union expenses from cam-
paign expenditures, or staff campaigning from legitimate performance
of duties. When such complicated factual questions make long trials
necessary and undue delay of the election inevitable, it would be
necessary to deny pre-election review.
5. Fraudulent Tally of Votes
Ballot stuffing or vote tampering dilute the value of one's vote and
would appear to violate the § 101 (a) (1) guarantee of an equal right
to vote.727 Similarly, when election procedures are such that members
fear their votes will not be secret, they may be coerced from voting
their free choice and thus deprived of equal voting rights. 28
Exhaustion of internal appeals, if none are available beyond the
local, would prove futile in cases where local officers are responsible
for the offensive practices. Internal appeals might also be futile if
the tampering were occurring on election day. Such abuses should not
be difficult for courts to understand or remedy. In a few cases, courts
have granted pre-election relief for ballot stuffing.720 Moreover, there
are available analogies from federal and state law on prevention of
election day fraud,730 and the National Labor Relations Board rules
governing representation elections should provide further standards.73'
Undue delay should not be a problem. The court can resort to third
party oversight of the voting process to prevent invasion of secrecy
and ballot tampering. Arrangements for such neutral observers should
726. Local 760, Fruit 8: Vegetable Packers v. Morley. 378 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1967).
727. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970).
728. See pp. 468-72 supra.
729. See pp. 549-50 and notes 643-44 supra.
730. Various Supreme Court cases have dealt with the issue of whether the right to
vote in public elections includes a right to have the vote counted-and counted accu-
rately. United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) (involving an indictment for ballot
stuffing); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). In United States v. Mosley, 238
US. 383, 386 (1915), upholding a criminal statute which made it a federal crime to
falsify a count in a congressional election, the Court said. "We regard it as equally tin-
questionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress
as the right to put a ballot in the box." These decisions are reaffirmed by the apportion-
ment cases which conclude that any procedure which "dilutes" the effect of a vote is a
denial of a citizen's equal rights to vote. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1954).
731. These procedures are outlined at 29 C.F.R. § 102.69 (1970).
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not require either complicated planning or postponement of the
election.
D. The Costs of Litigation
Even if courts are willing to entertain more pre-election suits to
correct irregularities in the electoral process, the costs of litigation
may stand as an obstacle to the effectiveness of this mode of LMRDA
enforcement. 732 One insurgent reported that his legal fees over a ten
year period totaled more than $40,000.733 Many candidates cannot
meet such a burden, and it may therefore be impossible for them to
hire good lawyers. 734
One solution to the problem of litigation expenses would be to
award attorney's fees to plaintiffs successful in pre-election suits. The
LMRDA provides for court costs and attorney's fees to be awarded in
Title II and Title V suits, and courts have made these awards. 73
Title I, however, contains no similar provision, 30 and recovery of
costs was generally denied to successful plaintiffs until the Third
Circuit decision in Gartner v. Soloner.73 7 Since that decision, several
courts have deemed it to be within their discretion to allow recovery
for litigation expenses, 738 but others have continued to find such
awards to be unjustified.730 Litigation expenses have also been denied
to plaintiffs in successful § 401 (c) pre-election suits. 740
Union attorneys tend to oppose granting court costs or attorney's
732. Interviews with union attorneys AA and BB, and complainant union members
F, H, and S.
733. Interview with complainant union member I. Another complainant was able to
find a lawyer, but he left the lawyer with $100,000 in unpaid legal fees. Interview with
complainant attorney 1.
734. Interviews with union attorney AA and complainant attorneys I, L, and Q.
735. 29 U.S.C. § 431(c) (1970). Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. Morley, 378 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1967).
29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1970). Local 92, Iron Workers v. Norris, 383 F.2d 735, 742.44 (5th
Cir. 1967); Carpenters Union v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872, 886 (10th Cir. 1965); Ratner V.
Bakery &- Confectionery Workers, 354 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bakery & Confectionery
Workers v. Ratner, 335 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Local 618, Retail Clerks v. Retail
Clerks Union, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1022, 1026 (D.D.C. 1969).
736. 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
737. 384 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1967). See cases cited therein for previous denials of at-
torneys' fees in Title I suits. This decision includes an exhaustive review of the Title I
legislative history on this question.
738. Robins v. Schonfeld, 326 F. Supp. 525, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cefalo v. District 50,
Mineworkers, 311 F. Supp. 946, 955 (D.D.C. 1970), noting that the suit, by vindicating
Title I rights, benefited the entire union; Burch v. Machinists, 78 L.R.R.M. 3072 (6th
Cir. 1971); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
739. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 314 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C. 1970): Glordant v.
Upholsterers Union, 69 L.R.R.M. 2433 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af d, 403 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1968).
740. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 314 F. Supp. 616 (D.D.C. 1970).
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fees, whether paid from union funds or by the specific individuals
being sued.741 They fear that such awards would encourage frivolous
sUits.74 2 The reluctance of union members to appeal outside the union
except in extreme cases, however, suggests that complainants will still
prefer to avoid litigation even if expenses are recoverable.J 4
VI. Conclusion
There is no simple formula for producing internal responsiveness.
The LMRDA, through specific guarantees and sufficiently general
language, has provided union members, courts, and the DOL with a
mandate and a broad range of potential regulatory powers for the
achievement of fair elections. The statutory balances, however-be-
tween union self-correction and government intervention on the one
hand, and workers' rights and the public interest in democratic union-
ism on the other-have shifted as the statute has been implemented.
The point has been reached where union self-correction figures all too
prominently in the conciliatory government enforcement process, and
the DOL's conception of the public interest is dominant as a result
of an unduly narrow doctrinal treatment of individual workers' access
to the courts. Unions may well be the best institutions to reform elec-
tion procedures and implement responsiveness. But the current state
of internal union mechanisms bodes ill for extreme reliance on union
self-correction. Similarly, a single administrative enforcement mech-
anism under the Department of Labor may be the best way to achieve
741. Of twenty-two union attorneys interviewed, ten opposed awarding court costs
in pre-election suits to victorious plaintiffs, three favored imposing costs on the indi-
viduals sued; and five favored imposing costs on the union. Of seventeen complainant
attorneys interviewed or answering questionnaires, none opposed granting court costs;
seven favored imposing costs on the individuals sued; and seven favored imposing costs
on the union.
A suggestion was made that costs be granted only if the violation were willful. One
complainant attorney suggested that the willfulness of the violation should only be
determinative of whether the individuals responsible or the union itself should bear the
costs. Interview with complainant attorney D.
742. Interviews with union attorneys U and X.
Harassment injunctions will be deterred by the provision of FEo. R. Cv. P. 65(c), whid
allows a judge to require security be paid by the applicant for payment of damages to
the enjoined party should he be found to have been wrongfully enjoined.
743. For discussion of the internal political disadvantages involved in appealing out-
side the union for assistance, see notes 697-99 supra.
For further discussion of attorney fees in LMRDA cases, see Sosnoff, Financing Demo-
cratic Ferment and Revolt within Labor Unions through Court Awarded Counsel Fees,
21 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 359 (1968); Note, The Furtherance of Union Democracy: Pro-
viding for Counsel Fees in Labor Members' Bill of Rights Suits, 31 U. Prrr. L. RE%. 643(1970).
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a uniform national policy toward union elections.7 44 But workers'
interests as individuals are also at stake, and the operation of the
DOL mechanism suggests neither a comprehensive articulation of
policy nor a firm insistence on compliance.
Unions are representing more and more white collar workers and
younger, better-educated blue collar workers. Both groups manifest
a greater desire for representative institutions than their predecessors.
These new demands will force union leaders into more responsive
roles in order to satisfy the participatory demands of their members.
Thus the necessity for internal union democracy appears more pressing
than ever before.
744. The recommendations made in Part III for altering the Department of Labor's
administration of the Act, coupled with expansion of pre-election relief along the lines
suggested in Part IV, would greatly improve enforcement of LMRDA. It might still be
suggested that adjudication of all union election disputes, both pre- and post.election,
should be vested in a single administrative agency. Such an agency, by combining inves-
tigative and adjudicatory functions, would hopefully develop expertise in matters of
internal union politics and provide prompt relief. However, it seems by no means clear
that district court judges are lacking in the expertise necessary to handle LMRDA suits,
nor that any administrative agency can be shielded from gradual cooptation by estab.
lished labor interests. The possibility of appeal to the courts of any administrative de.
cision casts grave doubt on the prospect of greater speed of disposition than currently
exists under Title IV. Overall, it seems unlikely that exclusively administrative enforce-
ment would be preferable to the current system of mixed judicial and administrative
intervention, if improved as suggested here.
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APPENDIX B
Department of Labor Disposition
(a) Election Complaints Received'
of Election Cases
Fiscal Year 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Number of Complaints 99 149 92 118 110
(b) Disposition of Election Cases
Yearm 1965 1966 1967
%Dis- Dis- % Dis.
posed posed poscd
Num- in this Num- in this Num- in this
ber Manner ber Manner ber Manner
Case in Which No Violations
Found 3 3.6 2 1.7 1 1.2
Case in Which Complainant Failed
to Exhaust Internal Remedies 3 3.6 1 .8 1 1.2
Case Resulting in a Determination 15 17.9 32 27.1 16 20.0
Case in Which Violations Found
Which Did Not Affect Outcome 33 39.3 23 19.5 209 36.3
Case Found Not Suitable for
Litigation 18 21.4 25 21.2 18 22.5
Case in Which Suit Was Brought 12 14.3 35 29.7 15 18.7
Year2  1968 1969 Total
%Dis- % Dis- % Dis.
posed posed posed
Num- in this Num- in this Nun- in this
ber Manner ber Manner ber Manner
Case in Which No Violations
Found 2 2.2 2 2.2 10 2.1
Case in Which Complainant Failed
to Exhaust Internal Remedies 0 0 1 1.1 6 1.3
Case Resulting in a Determination 14 14.3 10 11.2 87 18.5
Case in Which Violations Found
Which Did Not Affect Outcome 22 22A 22 24.7 '129 27.5
Case Found Not Suitable for
Litigation 37 37.8 25 28.1 123 26.2
Case in Which Suit Was Brought 23 23.5 29 32.6 114 24.5
1. DOL SUiMMARY OF OPERATIONS, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, supra note 60.
2. Data for first five categories collected from DOL files for dates in each calendar year,
data for sixth category from DOL SUMMARY OF OtERATIONs, supra note 60, is for
fiscal year. [Continued on following page]
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APPENDIX B-Department of Labor Disposition of Election Cases-Continued





Number of Suits Brought 177
Number of Suits in Which Settlement Had Been Reached
by June 30, 1969 123 100
Number of New Supervised Elections per Court Ordered
Stipulation 79 64.2
Number of Union Stipulations of Future LMRDA
Compliance 21 17.1
Number of Suits Dismissed on Secretary's Motion or by
Stipulation 10 8.1
Number of Suits in Which Judgment Was Granted or
Relief Denied 13 10.6




nation lation sion TOTAL
Overdue Election Held Without DOL
Supervision 4 .... .... 4
Overdue Election Held Under DOL
Supervision 8 ........ 8
Union Pledged Compliance in Next
Regular Election (No Supervision) 2 2 .... 4
Union Constitution or Bylaws Amend-
ed to Comply with the Act (No
Supervised Election Held) 11 1 1 13
Improperly Disqualified Winner
Installed Without Rerun Election 1 1 .... 2
Rerun Election Held Without DOL
Supervision 12 1 .... 13
Rerun Election Held Under DOL
Supervision 52 14 7 73
Next Regularly Scheduled Election
Held Under DOL Supervision 4 13 1 18
1. The relief obtained in three kinds of cases is indicated. The Formal Determinations
included are those concluded by the Department from Jan. 1, 1965 through Dec. 31,
1969. The other two categories refer to Title IV suits brought by the Department from
Jan. 1, 1965 through Dec. 31, 1967 in which some remedy was obtained either pur.
suant to stipulation or court decision.
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APPENDIX D
Time Lapse Data'
Cases Closed by Cases Closed by
Court-Approved Court
Stipulation Decision
Time Lapse Between Challenged Election
and Filing of Suit 7.3 months 6.7 months
Time Lapse Between Challenged Election
and Supervised Election 2 yrs., 1.6 mos. 2 yrs., 6.7 mos.
1. Based on suits filed by the Department from Jan. 1, 1965 through Dc. 31, 1967 in
which remedy through departmental supervision of a rerun or next regularly sched-
uled election was obtained, either pursuant to stipulation or court decision.
APPENDIX E
Statistics on Elections Supervised by DOL'














Total Number of Offices Involved in Supervision 212 284 496
Number of Offices Contested 160 224 384
Number of Contests with Different Outcome' 103 114 217
Per Cent of Total Contests 64.4 50.8 56.6
Number of Contests with Incumbent Victory3  39 70 109
Per Cent of Total Contests 24.3 31.3 28.4
Number of Contests with Incumbent Defeated' 18 40 58
Per Cent of Total Contests 11.3 17.9 15.0
1. Information drawn from 50 elections supervised by the Department during fiscal years
1968-70.
2. Indicates offices in which the winner in the original, challenged election does not stand
for office in the subsequent, supervised election.
3. Indicates offices in which the winner in the original, challenged election stands for
office in the subsequent, supervised election and is victorious.
4. Indicates offices in which the winner in the original, challenged election stands for
office in the subsequent, supervised election and is defeated.
[Continued on following page]
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APPENDIX E-Statistics on Elections Supervised by DOL-Continued
(b) Statistics on Contested Offices Where tihe Winner of the Challenged Election Stands




Incum- Incum- nal Winner
bent bent Stands for
Victory % Defeated % Office
Supervised Election Pursuant to
Stipulation or Court Decision 39 68.2 18 31.8 57
Supervised Election Pursuant to
Formal Determination 70 63.6 40 36.4 110
All Supervised Elections 109 65.3 58 34.7 167
(c) Turnout in Supervised Election Relative to Challenged Election
Turnout Turnout
Greater in Less in
Supervised Supervised
Election Election
than in than in Total
Challenged Challenged Supervised
Election % Election Elections
Supervised Election Pursuant to
Stipulation or Court Decision 9 47.4 10 52.6 19
Supervised Election Pursuant to
Formal Determination 12 42.8 16 57.2 28
All Supervised Elections 21 44.7 26 55.3 47
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